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Accidents

CSCL Indian Ocean grounding (2016)

On the evening of 3 February 2016, the CSCL Indian Ocean was proceeding up the River Elbe from Felixstowe to Hamburg. Two pilots were aboard. At about 22:10 local time, an alarm sounded shortly after the vessel turned toward the River Lühe line. The bridge team found that the helm was unresponsive and ordered the engines stopped and then astern. The crew prepared an anchor, used the bow thruster, and warned approaching traffic.

Classification

  • Incident Type: Grounded
  • Severity: Medium

Vessel Details

FieldValue
Vessel NameCSCL Indian Ocean
Vessel TypeContainer
Flag StateHong Kong [HK]
IMO Number9695157
Gross Tonnage187541
LOA (m)399.67
Breadth (m)58.73
Year Built2015
Crew Size24

Incident Details

FieldValue
Date2016-02-03
LocationRiver Elbe off Lühesand, south of buoy 116
Coordinates53.583333, 9.623333
RegionGermany
Investigation BodyFederal Bureau of Maritime Casualty Investigation (BSU)
Direct DamageNo water ingress or structural damage was found.

Key facts

  • The vessel was inbound from Felixstowe to Hamburg with two Elbe pilots aboard.
  • At about 22:10 local time, an alarm sounded and the bridge team found that the helm no longer responded.
  • A local reset restored steering response, but the vessel grounded south of buoy 116 at 22:20.
  • The BSU found that incorrectly wired SAFEMATIC valves locked the rudder when the system activated; investigators could not establish why it activated.
  • After two unsuccessful refloating attempts, dredging and other preparations, 12 tugs freed the vessel on 9 February.

Narrative

On the evening of 3 February 2016, the CSCL Indian Ocean was proceeding up the River Elbe from Felixstowe to Hamburg. Two pilots were aboard. At about 22:10 local time, an alarm sounded shortly after the vessel turned toward the River Lühe line. The bridge team found that the helm was unresponsive and ordered the engines stopped and then astern. The crew prepared an anchor, used the bow thruster, and warned approaching traffic.

A crew member reset the steering gear locally, and the helm responded again at about 22:15. The ship continued to turn to port. A hard-to-starboard order and half-ahead engine movement did not prevent it from grounding south of buoy 116 at about 22:20. The initial inspection found no water ingress or escape of fuel or lubricants.

The first two refloating attempts, on 3 and 4 February, failed. The response then included hydrographic surveys, structural calculations, ballast discharge, transfer of fuel and lubricants, and dredging beside and astern of the vessel. At 02:00 on 9 February, 12 tugs began hauling the ship by its stern and starboard side. It was back in the fairway by 02:20, passed propulsion and steering tests, and continued to Hamburg under its own power with a tug escort.

The BSU found no hydraulic leak and reported that the hull remained structurally intact. Its inspection found that an additional steering-gear safety system, SAFEMATIC, had been wired incorrectly. When the system activated, the incorrect valve switching made two hydraulic cylinders oppose each other and lock the rudder. The BSU concluded that the wiring fault combined with SAFEMATIC activation caused the loss of steering. It could not determine what triggered the activation. The report found no evidence that the ship's size or passage beneath a high-voltage power line caused the helm failure. No pollutants escaped.

Sequence of events

Date/timeEvent
2016-02-03 22:10 localAn alarm sounded and the bridge team found that the helm was unresponsive.
2016-02-03 22:15 localA local reset restored steering response.
2016-02-03 22:20 localThe vessel grounded south of buoy 116.
2016-02-03 22:55 localThe first refloating attempt began; it was later suspended after as many as six tugs failed to free the ship.
2016-02-04A second attempt with seven tugs failed.
2016-02-04 13:45 localThe Central Command for Maritime Emergencies took over response coordination.
2016-02-05Ballast discharge and fuel and lubricant transfer began; investigators examined the steering gear.
2016-02-06Dredging began beside and astern of the vessel.
2016-02-09 02:00 localTwelve tugs began the third refloating attempt.
2016-02-09 02:20 localThe vessel was back in the fairway and later proceeded to Hamburg under its own power.

Contributing factors

FactorEvidence statusDescription
Incorrect SAFEMATIC wiring combined with system activationConfirmed findingThe BSU found that incorrect wiring caused the activated system to switch hydraulic valves in a way that locked the rudder. The report could not establish why SAFEMATIC activated.

Investigation

The Federal Bureau of Maritime Casualty Investigation (BSU) published its findings in report 34/16. It attributed the helm failure to the combination of incorrectly wired SAFEMATIC equipment and the system's activation, but could not establish the activation trigger. The report recommended inspections of sister ships, expanded testing of SAFEMATIC during periodic inspections, and improved error logging for steering gear. It stated that the casualty was not caused by the vessel's size.

Novatug's later comparison of the CSCL Indian Ocean and CSCL Jupiter groundings discusses vessel control and port-approach capacity. Its simulation suggesting that a Carrousel Rave Tug could have prevented a grounding applies to the CSCL Jupiter case; it is a Novatug analysis, not a BSU finding about this incident.

References

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