Andrew J. Barberi (2010) | Novatug Maritime Wiki

Classification

Incident Type: Allision
Severity: Medium
Tug involvement: no
Tug mechanism: N/A

Vessel Details

Field	Value
Vessel Name	Andrew J. Barberi
Vessel Type	Ferry
Flag State	United States [US]
IMO Number	7702762
MMSI	367000150
Call Sign	WYR3370
Gross Tonnage	3335
LOA (m)	94.5
Breadth (m)
TEU
Year Built	1981
Crew Size	18

Incident Details

Field	Value
Date	2010-05-08
Location	St. George Terminal, Staten Island, New York
Coordinates	40.6440, -74.0734
Region	United States
Fatalities	0
Injuries	50
Missing	0
Cargo Loss
Outcome	Fifty people were injured, including three seriously; combined ferry and terminal damage was USD 182,238.
Direct Damage
Estimated Economic Damage	USD 182,238
Insured Loss
Salvage/Cleanup Cost

Key facts

The ferry carried 266 people on its third return trip to Staten Island that morning.
The New York-end propulsion unit became stuck at 75 percent ahead thrust during the approach.
The ferry struck slip No. 5 at 0918:33 EDT at an estimated speed below 8 knots.
Fifty people were injured, including three seriously.
The NTSB identified a solenoid failure as the probable cause and the absence of a propeller-pitch deviation alarm as a contributing factor.

Narrative

Andrew J. Barberi departed Manhattan at 0900 EDT on 8 May 2010 with 266 people aboard. At about 0916, on the third return trip to Staten Island that morning, the double-ended ferry passed the Kill Van Kull buoy roughly 1,000 yards from the St. George terminal. The mate called the engine control room to stand by for docking, and the assistant captain reduced engine speed and propeller pitch. Automatic identification system data showed the ferry still making 15 knots at 0917.

The Staten Island-end propulsion unit responded normally, but the New York-end cycloidal unit failed to follow commands and became stuck at 75 percent ahead thrust. The precise moment of failure could not be determined because the ferry carried no voyage data recorder. As the vessel approached the slip faster than expected, the captain ordered full astern thrust. The assistant captain moved both controls astern and the captain increased engine speed to improve the response, but the failed unit continued thrusting ahead. No audible or visual alarm warned the pilothouse that actual propeller pitch differed from the commanded setting.

Crew members and passengers noticed the abnormal approach speed. Deckhands began moving passengers away from the exterior embarkation areas and people braced for impact. At 0918:33, about 20 seconds after entering the slip, Andrew J. Barberi struck slip No. 5 at an estimated speed below 8 knots.

Fifty people were injured: three passengers seriously and 47 passengers or crew members with minor injuries. Damage totalled USD 182,238, comprising USD 168,625 to the ferry and USD 13,613 to the terminal. The vessel sustained above-water damage over about 52 feet of its Staten Island end, including deformation, buckled structure and a breach in the cycloidal-propulsion space. The terminal's ladders and walkways were also damaged.

Police called for ambulances immediately after impact. The Fire Department of New York arrived at about 0930, established triage and checked the water for anyone who might have fallen overboard. The crew and shoreside personnel used the operator's safety management procedures for collision response, crowd control, damage assessment and evacuation. The NTSB found that this response was timely and effective.

Sequence of events

Date/time	Event
2010-05-08 09:00 EDT	Andrew J. Barberi departed Manhattan for Staten Island.
2010-05-08 about 09:16 EDT	The ferry passed the Kill Van Kull buoy and began preparing to dock.
2010-05-08 09:17 EDT	AIS recorded a speed of 15 knots; the propulsion-control failure likely occurred during the subsequent reduction in speed.
2010-05-08 09:18:33 EDT	The ferry struck slip No. 5 at an estimated speed below 8 knots.
2010-05-08 about 09:30 EDT	FDNY arrived and established a triage area.

Contributing factors

Factor	Evidence status	Description
Solenoid failure	Confirmed finding	Fragments from a fractured bronze ring jammed a solenoid and left one cycloidal propulsion unit unresponsive to pilothouse commands.
No pitch-deviation alarm	Confirmed finding	The propulsion system lacked an alarm that could have warned the crew that actual propeller pitch did not match the commanded setting.
Exact failure timing	Suspected	Investigators could only place the failure during the approach because the ferry was not fitted with a voyage data recorder.

Investigation

The National Transportation Safety Board determined that the probable cause was a solenoid failure that caused loss of control of one cycloidal propeller. The absence of a propeller-pitch deviation alarm contributed to the allision. Investigators could not determine why the bronze ring fractured because its surfaces were too damaged. The NTSB also found that the operator's safety management system, introduced after a 2003 casualty involving the same ferry, improved the crew and shoreside emergency response. It recommended pitch-deviation alarms for relevant passenger vessels and broader safety-management requirements.

References

NTSB source note
NTSB Marine Accident Report MAR-12/01