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Accidents

Costa Concordia (2012)

On 13 January 2012, Costa Concordia departed Civitavecchia for Savona with 3,206 passengers and 1,023 crew. At 21:45:07 local time, while making a close coastal passage at about 15.5 knots, the ship struck Le Scole rocks off Giglio Island. The investigation found that the master had altered the voyage plan to pass close to shore at night and that the bridge team did not adequately monitor the ship's position or warn of the developing danger. Official report, pp. 3 and 152–154

Classification

  • Incident Type: Grounded
  • Severity: High
  • Region: Mediterranean Sea

Vessel Details

FieldValue
Vessel NameCosta Concordia
Vessel TypeCruise
Flag StateItaly [IT]
IMO Number9320544
Gross Tonnage114147
LOA (m)290

Incident Details

FieldValue
Date2012-01-13
LocationLe Scole rocks and Cala del Lazzaretto, Isola del Giglio, Italy
RegionMediterranean Sea
Coordinates42.3641, 10.9215
Fatalities32
Injuries157
Missing0
Vessels lost1
OutcomeAfter striking Le Scole rocks, Costa Concordia flooded, lost propulsion and electrical services, grounded again near Giglio, rolled onto its starboard side, and became a total loss.
Physical DamageA 53 m port-side hull breach flooded five contiguous watertight compartments; the ship was declared a total loss.
Direct Damage
Estimated Economic Damage
Investigation BodyItalian Ministry of Infrastructures and Transports, Marine Casualties Investigative Body

Key facts

Narrative

On 13 January 2012, Costa Concordia departed Civitavecchia for Savona with 3,206 passengers and 1,023 crew. At 21:45:07 local time, while making a close coastal passage at about 15.5 knots, the ship struck Le Scole rocks off Giglio Island. The investigation found that the master had altered the voyage plan to pass close to shore at night and that the bridge team did not adequately monitor the ship's position or warn of the developing danger. Official report, pp. 3 and 152–154

The impact opened a port-side breach later measured at 53 m. Five contiguous watertight compartments, numbered 4 through 8, flooded. Propulsion and the main electrical supply failed, with the blackout recorded 50 seconds after impact. The rudder remained hard to starboard, and the ship turned back toward Giglio under the influence of wind and current. It grounded again near Cala del Lazzaretto at about 23:00 and continued to heel to starboard. The list reached about 40 degrees around midnight and later approximately 80 degrees during rescue operations. Official report, pp. 4–7 and 155–156

The bridge did not initiate the first warning to search-and-rescue authorities. MRSC Livorno learned of the emergency through a shore call at 22:06, and the bridge initially reported only a blackout. The master reported a hull breach at about 22:26 and declared distress after further prompting at 22:36. The abandon-ship order was broadcast at 22:54. Lifeboats were already entering the water, but the increasing list later prevented normal use of some survival craft. Coast Guard units, other public agencies, local vessels and helicopters evacuated people from the ship and the water. The first rescue phase ended at 06:17 on 14 January, and three additional survivors were found on 15 January. Official report, pp. 16–20

At the time of the report, 30 people had been recovered dead, two remained missing, and 157 people had reported injuries. Later Italian Civil Protection reporting states that the final victim was recovered in October 2014 and gives the final death toll as 32. This page therefore records 32 fatalities and no persons still missing. The investigation declared the ship a total loss; 2,042.5 cubic metres of oil were removed by 24 March 2012. Official report, pp. 13, 23 and 35; Italian Civil Protection

Sequence of events

Date/timeEvent
2012-01-13 21:45:07 localCosta Concordia struck Le Scole rocks; flooding and loss of propulsion followed.
2012-01-13 21:45:57 localThe main electrical blackout was recorded.
2012-01-13 22:06 localMRSC Livorno received the first shore-side warning about an emergency aboard.
2012-01-13 22:36 localThe bridge declared distress after prompting by MRSC Livorno.
2012-01-13 22:54 localThe abandon-ship order was broadcast.
2012-01-13 23:00 local (approximately)The ship reached its final position near Cala del Lazzaretto and grounded again.
2012-01-14 06:17 localThe first rescue phase ended; searches for missing people continued.
2014-10Italian Civil Protection records recovery of the last victim during dismantling in Genoa.

Contributing factors

FactorEvidence statusDescription
Hazardous close-shore passage and speedConfirmed findingThe master altered the voyage plan for a night passage close to shore at high speed and delayed the turn away from danger. Official report, pp. 152–154.
Navigation planning and bridge-team performanceConfirmed findingThe investigation identified inappropriate chart use, incomplete handover, inadequate position monitoring, distraction, and a passive bridge team that did not warn the master in time. Official report, pp. 152–154.
Delayed emergency and abandon-ship responseConfirmed findingThe general emergency and abandon-ship signals were delayed after the bridge knew that several watertight compartments were flooded. Official report, pp. 159–160.
Emergency command failuresConfirmed findingThe investigation found that the master left the bridge and ship before evacuation was complete and that several officers did not fulfil their assigned emergency roles. Official report, pp. 159–162.

Investigation

The Italian Ministry of Infrastructures and Transports' Marine Casualties Investigative Body issued the safety investigation report. It identified the master's hazardous close-shore route, navigation errors and violations, and failures by the bridge team as causes of the contact. It also found that delayed alarms, weak emergency coordination and abandonment of command duties hindered evacuation and contributed to the deaths. The report concluded that the ship complied with the SOLAS requirements applicable when it was built, while the flooding of five contiguous compartments exceeded its required survivability standard. Its recommendations addressed damage stability, vital-system redundancy, emergency power, bridge management, muster arrangements, evacuation analysis and search-and-rescue capability. Official report, pp. 152–172

References

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