Maersk Shekou (2024) | Novatug Maritime Wiki

Classification

Incident Type: Collision
Severity: High
Tug involvement: yes

Vessel Details

Field	Value
Vessel Name	Maersk Shekou
Vessel Type	Container
Flag State	Singapore [SG]
IMO Number	9466984
Gross Tonnage	94407
LOA (m)	332.74

STS Leeuwin II was an Australian sail-training ship, IMO 8510855, of 236 GT and 55 m LOA.

Incident Details

Field	Value
Date	2024-08-30
Location	Port of Fremantle, Victoria Quay, Western Australia
Coordinates	-32.0533, 115.7409
Region	Australia
Injuries	2
Direct Damage	Maersk Shekou sustained minor damage, including a 1.8 m x 0.5 m above-waterline hull rupture; STS Leeuwin II was dismasted and sustained substantial damage.

Key facts

Maersk Shekou collided with moored STS Leeuwin II at Fremantle on 30 August 2024 at 0617 WST.
STS Leeuwin II was dismasted and sustained substantial damage.
Two STS Leeuwin II crew members sustained minor injuries.
Maersk Shekou sustained minor damage, including a 1.8 m x 0.5 m above-waterline hull rupture from wharf contact.
The ATSB identified a missed turn order, ineffective bridge resource management, secondary-pilot phone distraction, and fourth-tug workload as contributing factors.

Narrative

On 30 August 2024, Maersk Shekou entered Fremantle Port under the direction of two harbour pilots in strong winds, including a south-westerly squall. The pilots had planned the turn from the entrance channel into the inner harbour. At 0613:40, as the ship approached the charted wheel-over point near South Mole, the helmsman was maintaining the previously ordered heading, but no new order to execute the turn was recorded.

Maersk Shekou had been waiting off Fremantle because of unfavourable weather. Two pilots boarded at 04:55, and the passage plan called for four tugs. The ship entered the inner harbour at 06:09, before sunrise, while wind conditions were deteriorating. Post-accident simulations described by the ATSB found that similar turns could be completed when the bridge team used tug, engine, and rudder actions effectively.

During this critical phase, the secondary pilot was engaged in a phone conversation and the fourth tug was being made fast. These activities increased the bridge team's workload while the vessel continued towards Victoria Quay. At 0615:47 WST, Maersk Shekou was proceeding at 7.2 knots on a steady 083.5 degree heading. At 0617:33, its starboard bow flare struck the moored STS Leeuwin II and dismasted it. Two crew members escaped via the gangway as the collision occurred, and two Leeuwin II crew members sustained minor injuries.

Maersk Shekou subsequently contacted the wharf edge. The contact caused an approximately 1.8 m x 0.5 m hull rupture above the waterline, with no ingress or egress. The ATSB found that the missed helm order, ineffective bridge resource management, secondary-pilot distraction, and fourth-tug attachment workload contributed to the occurrence. It also identified strong weather, pre-sunrise entry, and weaknesses in port risk controls as factors that increased risk, without treating them all as direct causes.

The ATSB did not apportion blame; its findings concern bridge-team and port-system controls rather than individual liability.

Sequence of events

Date/time	Event
2024-08-30 04:55 local	Two harbour pilots boarded Maersk Shekou.
2024-08-30 06:09 local	The ship entered the inner harbour entrance channel before sunrise.
2024-08-30 06:13-06:14 local	The ship approached the wheel-over point while the fourth tug was being made fast; no turn order was recorded.
2024-08-30 06:15:47 local	The ship was proceeding at 7.2 knots on a steady 083.5 degree heading towards STS Leeuwin II.
2024-08-30 06:17:33 local	The starboard bow flare struck STS Leeuwin II and dismasted it.
2024-08-30 06:20 local	Maersk Shekou contacted the wharf, causing the hull rupture.

Contributing factors

Factor	Evidence status	Description
Missed turn order	Confirmed finding	The pilot did not order the helmsman to execute the planned inner-harbour turn.
Ineffective bridge resource management	Confirmed finding	Monitoring, challenge-and-response, error management, and shared mental model were inadequately implemented.
Secondary-pilot phone use	Confirmed finding	The phone conversation distracted the secondary pilot from the monitoring role.
Fourth tug attachment	Confirmed finding	Making the fourth tug fast at the wheel-over point increased workload and reduced resources available for manoeuvring.

Investigation

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau's final Transport Safety Report MO-2024-001, dated 3 November 2025, found that Maersk Shekou failed to turn at the wheel-over point. It identified four contributing factors: the missed turn order, ineffective bridge resource management, secondary-pilot phone distraction, and fourth-tug attachment workload.

The ATSB also identified a safety issue concerning ineffective Fremantle Ports risk controls, including daylight-entry compliance, tug procedures, wind-limit and non-routine-task protocols, secondary-pilot monitoring, and information exchange between VTS and pilots. The report recorded that safety issue as open with safety action pending at publication.

References

ATSB Transport Safety Report MO-2024-001: Collision between container ship Maersk Shekou and tall ship STS Leeuwin II