Classification
- Incident Type: Collision
- Severity: High
Vessel Details
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Vessel Name | Maersk Shekou |
| Vessel Type | Container |
| Flag State | Singapore [SG] |
| IMO Number | 9466984 |
| Gross Tonnage | 94407 |
| LOA (m) | 332.74 |
STS Leeuwin II was an Australian sail-training ship, IMO 8510855, of 236 GT and 55 m LOA.
Incident Details
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Date | 2024-08-30 |
| Location | Port of Fremantle, Victoria Quay, Western Australia |
| Coordinates | -32.0533, 115.7409 |
| Region | Australia |
| Injuries | 2 |
| Direct Damage | Maersk Shekou sustained minor damage, including a 1.8 m x 0.5 m above-waterline hull rupture; STS Leeuwin II was dismasted and sustained substantial damage. |
Key facts
- At about 06:17 WST on 30 August 2024, Maersk Shekou struck the moored STS Leeuwin II at Fremantle.
- STS Leeuwin II was dismasted and sustained substantial damage; two of its crew sustained minor injuries.
- Maersk Shekou later contacted the wharf. The contact ruptured its hull above the waterline, with no water ingress or egress.
- The ATSB identified four contributing factors involving a missed turn order, bridge resource management, secondary-pilot distraction, and workload while the fourth tug was being made fast.
- The ATSB separately identified weaknesses in Fremantle Ports' risk controls as a safety issue.
Narrative
Maersk Shekou arrived off Fremantle in unfavourable weather and was later brought into port by two pilots. The ship was scheduled to use four tugs. It entered the inner harbour entrance channel at 06:09 WST before sunrise as wind conditions worsened, including a south-westerly squall of about 50 knots.
At the charted wheel-over point near South Mole, the pilot did not give the helmsman a course alteration order for the planned turn into the inner harbour. The pilot used the available tugs and the ship's engine to turn, but the helmsman's attempts to maintain the previously ordered heading prevented the planned turn. The fourth tug was being made fast at this critical stage, increasing bridge-team workload. The secondary pilot, who had a monitoring role, was engaged in a phone conversation and did not identify the missed order and opposing helm actions in time.
The ship continued towards Victoria Quay. At about 06:17 WST, its starboard bow flare struck the moored STS Leeuwin II and dismasted it. Two crew members aboard the sail-training ship escaped by its gangway as the collision occurred; two Leeuwin II crew sustained minor injuries. Maersk Shekou continued moving and its starboard quarter contacted the wharf at about 06:20. The contact ruptured the ship's hull by about 1.8 m by 0.5 m above the waterline. The report recorded no water ingress or egress. Maersk Shekou sustained minor damage, while STS Leeuwin II sustained substantial damage.
The ATSB found that the missed turn order, ineffective bridge resource management, the secondary pilot's phone distraction, and the fourth tug being made fast at the wheel-over point contributed to the occurrence. It separately identified strong and changing wind conditions, pre-sunrise entry, and ineffective port risk controls as factors that increased risk. The investigation focused on safety factors and did not apportion blame or liability.
For wider operational context, Novatug's research on port control discusses how pilots, vessel traffic services and towage work together around large ships. It is separate from the ATSB's findings about this collision.
Sequence of events
| Date/time | Event |
|---|---|
| 2024-08-30 04:55 local | Two harbour pilots boarded Maersk Shekou. |
| 2024-08-30 06:09 local | The ship entered the inner harbour entrance channel before sunrise. |
| 2024-08-30 06:13 local | Near the wheel-over point, the fourth tug was being made fast; the pilot did not give the helmsman the planned turn order. |
| 2024-08-30 06:17 local | Maersk Shekou's starboard bow struck STS Leeuwin II, dismasting it. |
| 2024-08-30 06:20 local | Maersk Shekou's starboard quarter contacted the wharf, rupturing the hull above the waterline. |
Contributing factors
| Factor | Evidence status | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Missed turn order | Confirmed finding | The pilot did not order the helmsman to execute the planned turn into the inner harbour. |
| Ineffective bridge resource management | Confirmed finding | Monitoring, challenge and response, error management, and a shared mental model were inadequately implemented. |
| Secondary-pilot distraction | Confirmed finding | The secondary pilot was on a phone call and was distracted from the monitoring role. |
| Fourth tug being made fast | Confirmed finding | Attaching the fourth tug at the wheel-over point increased workload and reduced the resources available for manoeuvring. |
Investigation
The Australian Transport Safety Bureau's final Transport Safety Report MO-2024-001, published on 3 November 2025, identified the four contributing factors above. It also identified a safety issue concerning ineffective Fremantle Ports risk controls for large-container-vessel entry. These included daylight-entry compliance, tug procedures, secondary-pilot monitoring, wind-limit and non-routine-task protocols, and information exchange between VTS and pilots. The ATSB recorded safety action as pending for this issue when the report was published.
Separately, the ATSB listed strong winds, entry before sunrise, and weaknesses in port risk controls among other factors that increased risk. It did not classify all of these as contributing factors.
References
Video
Related
- Maersk Shekou
- STS Leeuwin II
- Australia
- Port of Fremantle
- Collision
- Bridge Resource Management
- Pilotage
- Maersk
- ATSB