Classification
- Incident Type: Grounded
- Severity: High
Vessel Details
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Vessel Name | Ruyter |
| Vessel Type | General Cargo |
| Flag State | Netherlands [NL] |
| IMO Number | 9374674 |
| Gross Tonnage | 2528 |
| LOA (m) | 89.99 |
| Year Built | 2006 |
| Crew Size | 8 |
Incident Details
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-10-10 |
| Location | North shore of Rathlin Island, Northern Ireland |
| Region | United Kingdom |
| Fatalities | 0 |
| Injuries | 0 |
| Missing | 0 |
| Outcome | Ruyter was refloated without assistance; no injuries or pollution were reported. |
| Investigation Body | MAIB |
| Direct Damage | |
| Estimated Economic Damage |
Key facts
- Ruyter grounded on the north shore of Rathlin Island at about 23:11 UTC+2 on 10 October 2017.
- The master was the sole watchkeeper and left the bridge while the bridge navigational watch alarm system was switched off; no night lookout had been posted.
- The grounding flooded the bow-thruster space and forward voids. A later dry-dock inspection found 26 hull penetrations in three compartments.
- The crew refloated the vessel without assistance at 00:22 the following day, using the engine, rudder and rising tide.
- No injuries or pollution were reported. A subsequent shaft-generator fire was quickly extinguished by the crew.
Narrative
The Netherlands-registered general cargo vessel Ruyter was carrying sawn timber from Skagen, Denmark, to Warrenpoint, Northern Ireland, with eight people aboard. At 18:30 on 10 October 2017, the master temporarily relieved the chief officer for a meal break. The master had consumed alcohol in his cabin before going to the bridge. The chief officer smelled alcohol on his breath but, after speaking with him, considered him fit for watchkeeping. The chief officer later resumed the watch while the master returned to his cabin, where he consumed more alcohol.
Shortly before 20:00, the master returned for his scheduled 20:00 to 24:00 watch. The chief officer again smelled alcohol but remained satisfied that the master was fit for duty and handed over the watch. The master altered course to avoid another vessel at 20:02 and set a south-easterly course at 20:08. At 21:05 he set the autopilot to steer 145 degrees. Ruyter maintained that heading until it grounded on the north shore of Rathlin Island at about 23:11 UTC+2.
The master had left the bridge before the grounding. Although the vessel's watchkeeping schedule required a lookout between 22:00 and 06:00, none had been posted. The bridge navigational watch alarm system was also switched off. The chief officer and second officer, awakened by the impact, reached the bridge and found it deserted with several alarms sounding. The crew mustered, and the designated person ashore instructed the chief officer to take command. The coastguard tasked the Portrush all-weather lifeboat and the Rathlin Coastal Rescue Team.
The bow-thruster space was flooded, and water had entered the forward voids. The water level in the bow-thruster space did not appear to be rising. As the vessel moved on the rocks and developed a starboard list, the chief officer used astern engine movements, rudder angles and the rising tide to refloat it without assistance at 00:22 on 11 October. The Portrush lifeboat arrived at 00:49 and confirmed that there was no visible damage above the waterline and no pollution. During the passage to Carlingford Lough, a fire in the shaft generator was quickly extinguished. MAIB reported that shaft misalignment during or after the grounding caused the fire. A subsequent dry-dock inspection found extensive structural damage throughout the forward third of the hull, including 26 penetrations in three compartments.
MAIB found that the vessel grounded because no action was taken to correct its deviation from the planned track. Its conclusions identified the unattended bridge, disabled watchkeeping barriers, insufficient company oversight of the master's routine alcohol consumption, the absence of random alcohol testing or a formal reporting process, and the chief officer's lack of confidence and empowerment to raise his concerns. MAIB did not reduce the casualty to alcohol consumption alone: the report also described how operating without a night lookout and with the alarm system switched off had become normalized on board.
Sequence of events
| Date/time | Event |
|---|---|
| 2017-10-10 18:30 local | The master temporarily relieved the chief officer after consuming alcohol in his cabin. |
| 2017-10-10 21:05 local | The master set the autopilot to steer 145 degrees. |
| 2017-10-10 23:11 local | Ruyter grounded on the north shore of Rathlin Island. |
| 2017-10-10 23:23 local | The chief officer notified the designated person ashore and was instructed to take command. |
| 2017-10-11 00:22 local | The chief officer refloated Ruyter without assistance. |
| 2017-10-11 00:49 local | The Portrush lifeboat arrived and reported no visible damage above the waterline and no pollution. |
| 2017-10-11 12:00 local | Ruyter reached Carlingford Lough anchorage for inspection. |
Contributing factors
| Factor | Evidence status | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Unattended bridge | Confirmed finding | The master left the bridge, leaving no one able to hear the navigational alarms or correct the vessel's deviation from its planned track. |
| Disabled watchkeeping barriers | Confirmed finding | No night lookout was posted and the bridge navigational watch alarm system was switched off, contrary to the vessel's operating requirements. |
| Alcohol-policy breach | Confirmed finding | The master consumed alcohol within four hours of taking his watch, contrary to the company's safety-management requirement. |
| Insufficient company oversight | Confirmed finding | MAIB found that the manager's oversight had not identified or addressed the master's routine alcohol consumption during his first six weeks aboard. |
| Inadequate reporting and testing arrangements | Confirmed finding | Random alcohol testing was not part of company policy, and the chief officer lacked a formal process and sufficient empowerment to report his concerns. |
| Normalized non-compliance | Confirmed finding | Operating without the night lookout and with the watch alarm disabled had become routine because the departures from company instructions had not been challenged. |
Investigation
The Marine Accident Investigation Branch published Report on the investigation of the grounding of the general cargo vessel Ruyter, Rathlin Island, UK, 10 October 2017 as Serious Marine Casualty Report No. 11/2018 in June 2018. MAIB concluded that the master left the bridge unattended, no night lookout was posted and the bridge navigational watch alarm system was switched off. It also identified weaknesses in company oversight, alcohol testing and the process available to the chief officer for raising concerns. The manager subsequently introduced random alcohol testing and empowered crews to notify the company of safety concerns. In view of those actions, MAIB made no recommendations.
References
- MAIB source note
- MAIB Serious Marine Casualty Report No. 11/2018