Classification
- Incident Type: Grounded
- Severity: Medium
Vessel Details
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Vessel Name | CSCL Indian Ocean |
| Vessel Type | Container |
| Flag State | Hong Kong [HK] |
| IMO Number | 9695157 |
| Gross Tonnage | 187541 |
| LOA (m) | 399.67 |
| Breadth (m) | 58.73 |
| Year Built | 2015 |
| Crew Size | 24 |
Incident Details
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Date | 2016-02-03 |
| Location | River Elbe off Lühesand, south of buoy 116 |
| Coordinates | 53.583333, 9.623333 |
| Region | Germany |
| Investigation Body | Federal Bureau of Maritime Casualty Investigation (BSU) |
| Direct Damage | No water ingress or structural damage was found. |
Key facts
- The helm stopped responding at about 22:10 local time while the vessel was inbound from Felixstowe to Hamburg with two Elbe pilots aboard.
- The steering gear responded again after a local reset, but the vessel grounded south of buoy 116 at 22:20.
- Two refloating attempts failed before dredging, ballast discharge, fuel transfer, and a coordinated pull by 12 tugs freed the vessel on 9 February.
- The report lists 24 crew; the hull was found structurally intact and surveillance detected no pollutant discharge.
- The BSU found that incorrect SAFEMATIC wiring caused the steering lock, but could not determine why the safety system activated.
Narrative
CSCL Indian Ocean was proceeding up the River Elbe from Felixstowe to Hamburg on the evening of 3 February 2016. Two Elbe pilots had joined the vessel off Brunsbüttel, and the master, officer of the watch, helmsman, and lookout were also on the bridge. At about 22:10 local time, an audible and visual alarm sounded shortly after the vessel turned for the River Lühe line. The pilot then established that the helm was no longer responding and advised stop engine and full astern. The anchor was manned, the bow thruster was activated, and approaching traffic was warned.
A crew member reset the steering gear locally, restoring helm response at 22:15. The vessel nevertheless continued turning to port. A hard-to-starboard order and half-ahead engine movement did not prevent it from grounding south of buoy 116 at 22:20. The crew's immediate assessment found no water ingress and no escape of fuel or lubricants.
An initial refloating effort began at 22:55 and eventually involved six tugs, but it was suspended as the ebb strengthened. A second attempt with seven tugs at high tide on 4 February also failed. The Central Command for Maritime Emergencies then coordinated a larger response. Preparations included hydrographic surveys, structural calculations, discharge of ballast water, transfer of fuel and lubricants, and dredging beside and astern of the vessel. At 02:00 on 9 February, 12 tugs began hauling CSCL Indian Ocean by its stern and starboard side. The ship was back in the fairway by 02:20, passed propulsion and steering tests, and proceeded under its own power to Hamburg with a tug escort.
Investigators found no hydraulic leak and confirmed that the hull remained structurally intact. Testing showed that SAFEMATIC, an additional steering-gear safety system, had been wired incorrectly. When activated, the incorrect valve switching created a hydraulic short circuit in which cylinders 2 and 4 opposed one another and locked the rudder. The BSU concluded that the helm failure required both the incorrect wiring and SAFEMATIC activation. It could not establish what triggered the activation: no oil loss, manual activation, float-switch defect, electrical short circuit, or fire was demonstrated. The investigation also rejected the ship's size as a cause. No vessel loss or environmental pollution resulted from the grounding.
Sequence of events
| Date/time | Event |
|---|---|
| 2016-02-03 22:10 local | An alarm sounded and the bridge team established that the helm was not responding. |
| 2016-02-03 22:15 local | A local steering-gear reset restored helm response. |
| 2016-02-03 22:20 local | CSCL Indian Ocean grounded south of buoy 116. |
| 2016-02-03 22:55 local | The first refloating attempt began; it was later suspended after up to six tugs were unable to free the vessel. |
| 2016-02-04 11:55 local | A second attempt involving seven tugs was unsuccessful. |
| 2016-02-04 13:45 local | The Central Command for Maritime Emergencies assumed responsibility for coordinating the response. |
| 2016-02-05 | Ballast discharge and transfer of fuel and lubricants began; technical investigators examined the steering gear. |
| 2016-02-06 | Dredging began beside and astern of the vessel. |
| 2016-02-09 02:00 local | Twelve tugs began the third refloating attempt. |
| 2016-02-09 02:20 local | The vessel was back in the fairway and subsequently proceeded to Hamburg under its own power. |
Contributing factors
| Factor | Evidence status | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Incorrect SAFEMATIC wiring | Confirmed finding | Incorrect cable connections caused two hydraulic cylinders to oppose one another and lock the rudder when SAFEMATIC activated. |
| SAFEMATIC activation | Confirmed finding | Activation was necessary in combination with the wiring fault to produce the helm failure. |
| Activation trigger | Suspected | The BSU considered a random float-switch malfunction but found no defect and could not demonstrate why SAFEMATIC activated. |
Investigation
The Federal Bureau of Maritime Casualty Investigation (BSU) investigated the grounding in report 34/16. It concluded that incorrect wiring in the SAFEMATIC system caused the casualty, while the reason for the system's activation remained unresolved. The BSU found no connection between the helm failure and the vessel's size or its passage beneath a high-voltage power line. Recommendations addressed inspections of sister ships, steering-gear documentation and testing, technical standards, and emergency planning for very large vessels.
References
Related
- CSCL Indian Ocean
- Germany
- Federal Bureau of Maritime Casualty Investigation (BSU)
- Central Command for Maritime Emergencies
- HATLAPA
- KOTUG Offshore
- Smit Salvage
- Bugsier
- Grounding