Skip to main content

Accidents

CMA CGM Centaurus allision at Jebel Ali (2017)

The coordinates are an approximate map reference for Jebel Ali, not a report-confirmed impact point.

Classification

  • Incident Type: Allision
  • Severity: High

Vessel Details

FieldValue
Vessel NameCMA CGM Centaurus
Vessel TypeContainer
Flag StateUnited Kingdom [GB]
IMO Number9410777
Gross Tonnage131332
LOA (m)363.61

Incident Details

FieldValue
Date2017-05-04
LocationTerminal 1, Berth 15, Jebel Ali, United Arab Emirates
RegionPersian Gulf
Coordinates25.0167, 55.0667
Fatalities
Injuries10
Missing
Direct Damage
Economic Damage
Investigation BodyMarine Accident Investigation Branch

The coordinates are an approximate map reference for Jebel Ali, not a report-confirmed impact point.

Key facts

  • At 11:37 on 4 May 2017, the ship made heavy contact with the quay and two shore cranes while turning under pilotage.
  • The ship began the turn at 6.3 knots and struck a spacer pontoon at Berth 15 at 5.3 knots.
  • One crane collapsed; the other was removed from its tracks. Several containers fell onto the quay.
  • Ten shore personnel were injured, including one with serious injuries.
  • The MAIB found that the vessel was going too fast for the turn and that tug positioning and an ineffective pilot-bridge team exchange reduced the available response.

Narrative

CMA CGM Centaurus arrived off Jebel Ali on 4 May 2017 after a ten-day passage from Singapore. A pilot and trainee boarded at 10:31 as the ship approached the channel. The master told the pilot that the ship was drawing 15.52 metres and was heavily laden. The initial exchange did not establish a detailed plan for the turn into the basin, a safe speed, tug deployment or contingencies.

Two tugs were assigned to the berthing manoeuvre. Tug Asad was made fast forward at 11:22, while the second tug was to connect after the ship entered the basin. At 11:29:47, with the ship making 6.3 knots, the pilot ordered a turn to port. The turn developed more slowly than intended. The pilot ordered hard-port helm, increased engine power, full bow-thruster power and both tugs to push. The ship continued setting laterally towards the berthed container ship NYK Crane.

As the clearance to NYK Crane decreased, the pilot ordered hard-starboard helm and successive astern engine movements. The ship's stern cleared NYK Crane, but contact with the quay could not be avoided. At 11:37:55, the bulbous bow struck a spacer pontoon at Berth 15 at 5.3 knots. The ship then struck two shore cranes. One collapsed and the other was removed from its tracks; containers fell onto the quay. Ten shore personnel were injured, one seriously. The impact also damaged the ship, pontoon, quay fenders, a bollard and port vehicles. Tugs moved the ship to the basin centre, and another pilot took it to a lay-by berth for assessment. Temporary repairs were made at Jebel Ali before the ship returned to Singapore for permanent repairs.

The MAIB concluded that the ship was travelling too fast when the turn began. The tug arrangement was not suited to slowing the ship or quickly increasing its rate of turn. The master-pilot exchange and bridge resource management were ineffective: the pilot's plan was not shared clearly, and the bridge team did not effectively challenge the manoeuvre. The report also found that pressure for operational efficiency influenced the decision to turn before the ship had slowed to a safe speed.

Sequence of events

Date/timeEvent
2017-05-04 10:31 localA pilot and trainee pilot boarded the ship at the channel entrance.
2017-05-04 11:22 localTug Asad was made fast forward while the ship was making 7 knots.
2017-05-04 11:29 localAt 6.3 knots, the pilot ordered the turn to port into the Terminal 1 basin.
2017-05-04 11:35 localAs clearance to NYK Crane decreased, the pilot ordered hard-starboard helm and emergency manoeuvres.
2017-05-04 11:37 localThe bow struck the Berth 15 spacer pontoon at 5.3 knots; the ship then struck two shore cranes.
2017-05-04Tugs moved the ship to the basin centre, and another pilot took it to a lay-by berth.

Contributing factors

FactorEvidence statusDescription
Speed at the start of the turnConfirmed findingThe MAIB found the ship was going too fast to complete the intended manoeuvre safely.
Tug deploymentConfirmed findingThe tugs were positioned for turning the ship off the berth and could not act quickly enough to slow it or increase the rate of turn.
Pilot-bridge team exchangeConfirmed findingThe initial exchange lacked structure and detail, leaving no shared manoeuvring plan or clear understanding of tug use and contingencies.
Bridge-team challengeConfirmed findingThe bridge team lacked the experience and knowledge to confidently challenge the pilot's high-speed turn.
Efficiency pressureConfirmed findingThe MAIB found that the pilot's efficiency focus influenced the decision to begin the turn before slowing to a safe speed.

Investigation

The Marine Accident Investigation Branch published Report 17/2018. It identified unsafe speed, ineffective pilot-bridge team communication, the tug arrangement and efficiency pressure among the factors that contributed to the casualty. The MAIB recommended that DP World UAE Region review pilotage and berthing operations for large container ships at Jebel Ali.

For broader technical context, Novatug's research on how escort tugs control large vessels at speed explains steering and braking forces applied to moving ships. That article is separate from the MAIB investigation and does not establish that an escort-tug arrangement would have prevented this allision.

References

Similar incidents