Classification
- Incident Type: Allision
- Severity: High
- Tug involvement: yes
- Tug mechanism: Tug disposition did not allow timely assistance to slow the vessel or increase its rate of turn.
Vessel Details
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Vessel Name | CMA CGM Centaurus |
| Vessel Type | Container |
| Flag State | United Kingdom [GB] |
| IMO Number | 9410777 |
| Gross Tonnage | 131332 |
| LOA (m) | 363.61 |
| Year Built | 2010 |
| Crew Size | 27 |
Incident Details
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-05-04 |
| Location | Terminal 1, DP World Jebel Ali, Dubai |
| Region | Persian Gulf |
| Coordinates | 25.0167, 55.0667 |
| Fatalities | |
| Injuries | 10 |
| Missing | |
| Direct Damage | |
| Economic Damage | |
| Outcome | One shore crane collapsed, a second was structurally damaged, and ten shore personnel were injured. |
| Investigation Body | Marine Accident Investigation Branch |
Key facts
- At 11:37 on 4 May 2017, the ship made heavy contact with the quay and two shore cranes while turning under pilotage at Jebel Ali.
- Its bulbous bow contacted a spacer pontoon at Berth 15 at 5.3 knots before the vessel heeled to starboard and struck the cranes.
- One crane collapsed and the other was removed from its tracks; port infrastructure, vehicles and the ship sustained structural damage.
- Ten port employees were injured, including one person with a broken arm and leg.
- The MAIB found that the vessel was travelling too fast to complete the intended turn safely and that no agreed manoeuvring plan existed between the pilot and bridge team.
Narrative
CMA CGM Centaurus arrived off Jebel Ali on 4 May 2017 after a ten-day passage from Singapore. A pilot and trainee pilot boarded at 10:31 as the heavily laden vessel entered the approach channel. The master advised the pilot that the ship had a draught of 15.52 metres and was heavy. The pilot said that two tugs would be used for the berth at Terminal 1, Berth 15, but the master-pilot exchange did not establish how the vessel would enter the basin, the intended speed profile, tug use or contingency measures.
As the vessel approached the basin, the pilot slowed it from its earlier approach speed. At 11:29:47, with the vessel making 6.3 knots, he ordered a port turn. The required rate of turn did not develop. He ordered hard-port helm, greater engine power, full bow-thruster power to port and both tugs to push at full power. The vessel nevertheless set laterally to starboard towards the berthed container ship NYK Crane.
The pilot then ordered hard-starboard helm and successive astern engine movements. Those actions allowed the stern to clear NYK Crane but made contact with the quay unavoidable. At 11:37:55, the bulbous bow struck a spacer pontoon at Berth 15 at 5.3 knots. CMA CGM Centaurus heeled to starboard and struck two shore cranes. One collapsed, while the other was removed from its tracks. Several containers fell onto the quay. The vessel was moved with tug assistance to the centre of the basin, after which another pilot took it to a lay-by berth for assessment.
The impact damaged the ship's bulbous bow, forward mooring deck, fore peak tank and starboard quarter. It also damaged the spacer pontoon, ten quay fenders, a mooring bollard, port vehicles and an occupied office building that the collapsed crane narrowly missed. Ten port employees were injured; the most seriously injured person had a broken arm and leg. Temporary repairs were carried out at Jebel Ali before the vessel completed its scheduled port calls and returned to Singapore for permanent repairs.
The MAIB concluded that the vessel was proceeding too fast for the turn, that the tugs could not react quickly enough when the rate of turn had to increase, and that the unstructured master-pilot information exchange left the bridge team unable to monitor the pilot's intended plan. The report also found that the pilot's focus on efficiency influenced the decision to turn without first reducing to a safe speed, while the bridge team did not effectively challenge the decision.
Sequence of events
| Date/time | Event |
|---|---|
| 2017-05-04 10:31 local | A pilot and trainee pilot boarded CMA CGM Centaurus at the channel entrance. |
| 2017-05-04 11:22 local | Tug Asad was made fast forward while the vessel was making 7 knots. |
| 2017-05-04 11:29 local | At 6.3 knots, the pilot ordered the turn to port into the Terminal 1 basin. |
| 2017-05-04 11:35 local | With closing distances to NYK Crane decreasing, the pilot ordered hard starboard and began emergency manoeuvres. |
| 2017-05-04 11:37 local | The bulbous bow struck the Berth 15 spacer pontoon at 5.3 knots; the vessel then struck two shore cranes. |
| 2017-05-04 | After the accident, tugs moved the vessel to the basin centre and another pilot took it to a lay-by berth. |
Contributing factors
| Factor | Evidence status | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Excessive speed at the start of the turn | Confirmed finding | The MAIB found that the vessel was proceeding too fast to complete the intended manoeuvre safely. |
| Ineffective master-pilot information exchange | Confirmed finding | The initial exchange lacked structure and detail, leaving no agreed plan or shared understanding for the turn, tug use or contingencies. |
| Ineffective tug disposition | Confirmed finding | The tugs had been positioned for turning the vessel off the berth and could not assist quickly enough when the rate of turn needed to increase. |
| Insufficient bridge-team challenge | Confirmed finding | The bridge team lacked the knowledge and experience to challenge the high-speed turn effectively, leaving the pilot's decision-making isolated. |
| Operational focus on efficiency | Confirmed finding | The MAIB found that the pilot's focus on efficiency influenced the decision to begin the turn without first reducing to a safe speed. |
Investigation
The Marine Accident Investigation Branch investigated the serious marine casualty in Report 17/2018. It found that the turn began at an unsafe speed, while the lack of an agreed manoeuvring plan and effective bridge-resource management isolated the pilot's decision-making. The report recorded subsequent action by CMA Ships to improve onboard pilotage management and recommendations concerning DP World UAE Region's management of pilotage and berthing operations for large container ships.
References
- MAIB Report 17/2018: Heavy contact with the quay and two shore cranes by CMA CGM Centaurus
- Splash 247: Dramatic Jebel Ali crane collapse caught on video