Classification
- Incident type: Allision
- Severity: High
- Region: Canada
- Investigation body: Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB)
Vessel Details
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Vessel Name | Ever Summit |
| Vessel Type | Container |
| Flag State | Panama [PA] |
| IMO Number | 9300453 |
| Gross Tonnage | 75246 |
| LOA (m) | 299.99 |
| Breadth (m) | 42.80 |
| Propulsion power (kW) | 54942 |
| Operator | Evergreen Marine Corp. |
| Year Built | 2007 |
| Crew Size | 22 |
| Containers on board | 3462 |
Seaspan Falcon and Seaspan Hawk assisted Ever Summit during the berthing manoeuvre.
Incident Details
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Date | 2019-01-28 |
| Location | Vanterm, Port of Vancouver, Vancouver, British Columbia |
| Region | Canada |
| Coordinates | 49.2900, -123.0700 |
| Fatalities | 0 |
| Injuries | 0 |
| Missing | 0 |
Key facts
- Ever Summit was berthing under the conduct of a pilot with two tugs assisting when it struck the berth and a nearby shore gantry crane.
- The TSB states that the vessel, berth, and crane were damaged. The crane's gantry bogies collapsed and its boom fell onto the vessel.
- The report records no injuries or pollution and gives no normalized economic-loss figure.
Narrative
Ever Summit was berthing at Vanterm in the Port of Vancouver on 28 January 2019 under the conduct of a pilot, with Seaspan Falcon and Seaspan Hawk assisting. The vessel approached the berth approximately 10 m off the berth line. The pilot intended to use the forward tug to push and the aft tug to pull so that the vessel would remain parallel to the dock, but he inadvertently issued the opposite commands.
As the tugs carried out those commands, the stern rapidly sheered toward the berth. The pilot called for increased tug power while trying to correct the sheer, but the deviation increased. The master and bridge team were focused primarily on the vessel's position and on carrying out the pilot's orders. They were not closely monitoring the commands given to the tugs and therefore did not identify the erroneous command or the deteriorating situation in time.
Corrective action using the vessel's engine, rudder, and thruster had insufficient effect. The stern struck the dock at an angle of about 10 degrees to the berth line and at approximately 0.4 knots. Because of the vessel's large overhang and the proximity of the crane rail to the berth line, the hull struck both the berth and the nearby shore gantry crane. The crane's gantry bogies collapsed and its boom fell onto Ever Summit. The TSB report records damage to the vessel, berth, and crane, but no injuries or pollution.
Sequence of events
| Stage | Event |
|---|---|
| Approach | Ever Summit approached Vanterm under pilotage with two tugs assisting and approximately 10 m clearance from the berth line. |
| Tug manoeuvre | The pilot inadvertently gave opposite tug commands to those intended. |
| Developing sheer | The tugs carried out the commands and Ever Summit's stern moved rapidly toward the berth. |
| Contact | Corrective propulsion, rudder, and thruster action was insufficient; the stern struck the berth at about 0.4 knots. |
| Allision | The vessel's overhang struck the berth and a nearby shore gantry crane, whose gantry bogies collapsed. |
Contributing factors
| Factor | Evidence status | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Erroneous tug command | Confirmed finding | The pilot intended one tug to push and the other to pull but inadvertently issued the opposite commands. |
| Bridge-team monitoring | Confirmed finding | The master and bridge team relied on the pilot and did not monitor the pilot's tug commands closely enough to identify the error. |
| Berth and crane geometry | Confirmed finding | Ever Summit's large overhang and the 2.13 m distance between the crane rail and berth line left little margin for a berthing deviation. |
| Vessel size and terminal risk management | Confirmed finding | Vessel size had increased without corresponding terminal upgrades, and the TSB identified continuing risks for large vessels at Vanterm. |
Investigation
The TSB Marine Transportation Safety Investigation Report M19P0020 identifies the erroneous tug command, inadequate monitoring by the bridge team, and the interaction between vessel size and Vanterm infrastructure as causes and contributing factors. It also records risks associated with non-standardized tug communications and bridge resource management. The report does not provide a normalized monetary damage figure.
References
- TSB Marine Transportation Safety Investigation Report M19P0020
- Ever Summit TSB source note