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Accidents

Capri and Brightoil Legend allision (2015)

*Brightoil Legend* was a Hong Kong-registered crude oil tanker (IMO 9398266), of 60,379 gross tons and 243.8 m length overall. She was built in 2009 and had 21 persons aboard.

Classification

  • Incident Type: Allision
  • Severity: Medium

Vessel Details

FieldValue
Vessel NameCapri
Vessel NamesCapri / Brightoil Legend
Vessel TypeBulk Carrier
Flag StateMalta [MT]
IMO Number9248526
Gross Tonnage87390
LOA (m)289.8
Breadth (m)45.0
Year Built2001
Crew Size22

Brightoil Legend was a Hong Kong-registered crude oil tanker (IMO 9398266), of 60,379 gross tons and 243.8 m length overall. She was built in 2009 and had 21 persons aboard.

Incident Details

FieldValue
Date2015-07-09
LocationEastern Special Purposes 'A' Anchorage, Singapore
Coordinates1.280700, 103.943533
RegionSouth China Sea
Fatalities0
Injuries0
Investigation BodyTransport Malta Marine Safety Investigation Unit
Direct DamageCapri sustained a bow side-shell fracture and fouled anchors; Brightoil Legend sustained side-shell, internal, deck and fitting damage

Key facts

  • Capri struck the anchored Brightoil Legend at about 13:04 local time on 2015-07-09 at 01°16.842'N, 103°56.612'E.
  • The allision followed a deviation from the anchoring position assigned by Singapore Vessel Traffic Service.
  • Capri dropped her port anchor while making about 5 knots and later dropped her starboard anchor when impact had become unavoidable.
  • Both vessels sustained structural damage above the waterline, but no injuries, fatalities or pollution were reported.
  • The Marine Safety Investigation Unit identified ineffective teamwork between Capri's bridge team and the pilot as the immediate safety factor.

Narrative

On 9 July 2015, the Maltese-registered bulk carrier Capri arrived off Singapore for bunkers. A local pilot boarded at 12:23. Four minutes later, Singapore Vessel Traffic Service gave the pilot an anchoring position at 01°16.35'N, 103°55.90'E, adjoining the Eastern Fairway. The master, two deck officers, a helmsman and a lookout were on the bridge, while three crew members prepared the anchors forward.

At 12:50, Capri was making 6.6 knots on a heading of 275°, with the assigned position 1.75 nautical miles on her port bow. At 12:55, the pilot ordered a turn to starboard. This took the vessel past the anchored Tai Health and toward a different area within the Eastern Special Purposes 'A' Anchorage, where Brightoil Legend was at anchor. The investigation could not establish why the manoeuvre departed from the VTS-assigned position.

Shortly before 13:00, the pilot ordered port helm, astern engine movements and the release of Capri's port anchor. The fully laden vessel dropped that anchor in 25 metres of water while still making about 5 knots. Despite port helm, astern propulsion and six shackles of anchor cable in the water, Capri continued sheering to starboard toward Brightoil Legend. The report found that shallow-water effects made the engine and helm response sluggish, while transverse thrust from the right-handed propeller pushed the bow to starboard. Increasing to full astern worsened the starboard cant.

At 13:03, the starboard anchor was dropped to reduce the impact. At about 13:04, Capri's port bow struck Brightoil Legend at approximately 2.5 knots at 01°16.842'N, 103°56.612'E. Brightoil Legend sustained a 4.9 m by 0.37 m hole in her side shell, buckled internal members, deformed deck plating and damaged deck fittings. Capri sustained a 7.5 m by 0.5 m bow shell fracture, damaged adjacent stiffeners and fouled anchors. The damage remained above the waterline, and no injuries, fatalities or pollution were reported.

The Marine Safety Investigation Unit concluded that ineffective teamwork between the bridge team and pilot was the immediate safety factor. It found no compelling evidence of a formal exchange about the intended passage or anchoring operation. The bridge team did not challenge the deviation, the vessel's progress was inadequately monitored, and the risk of poor response and a strong starboard cant was not recognized.

Sequence of events

Date/timeEvent
2015-07-09 12:23 localA local marine pilot boarded Capri.
2015-07-09 12:27 localSingapore VTS communicated the assigned anchoring position to the pilot.
2015-07-09 12:50 localCapri was making 6.6 knots on course 275°, 1.75 nautical miles east of the assigned position.
2015-07-09 12:55 localThe pilot ordered the vessel to turn to starboard toward a different anchoring area.
2015-07-09 13:00 localCapri passed Tai Health and continued sheering toward the anchored Brightoil Legend despite port helm, astern propulsion and the port anchor being deployed.
2015-07-09 13:03 localThe starboard anchor was dropped in an attempt to lessen the impact.
2015-07-09 13:04 localCapri's port bow struck Brightoil Legend at about 2.5 knots.

Contributing factors

FactorEvidence statusDescription
Ineffective bridge-pilot teamworkConfirmed findingThe MSIU identified ineffective teamwork between the bridge crew and pilot as the immediate safety factor.
Incomplete master-pilot exchangeConfirmed findingThe investigation found no compelling evidence of a formal exchange about the intended passage, anchoring operation or anchoring position.
Unchallenged deviationConfirmed findingThe master did not query the apparent departure from the VTS-assigned anchoring position, and the reason for the deviation could not be established.
Vessel-handling effects not recognizedConfirmed findingThe risk of poor engine and helm response in shallow water, strong starboard cant and allision was not recognized.
Inadequate monitoring and situational awarenessConfirmed findingPlotted positions and the submitted track differed sharply from VDR, AIS and VTS records, indicating inadequate monitoring and inaccurate situational awareness.

Investigation

Transport Malta's Marine Safety Investigation Unit published Marine Safety Investigation Report No. 12/2016 in January 2016. It concluded that ineffective teamwork between Capri's bridge crew and the pilot was the immediate safety factor and identified deficiencies in information exchange, monitoring and situational awareness. The unit recommended that the vessel manager strengthen formal master-pilot exchanges for passage and anchoring operations, require frequent position plotting and reinforce the pilot's integration into the bridge team.

References

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