Classification
- Incident Type: Collision
- Severity: High
Vessel Details
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Vessel Name | Goliath |
| Vessel Names | Goliath / York Cove / Campbell Cove |
| Vessel Type | Bulk Carrier |
| Flag State | Australia [AU] |
| IMO Number | 9036430 |
| LOA (m) | 143 |
Incident Details
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Date | 2022-01-28 |
| Location | Devonport, Tasmania, Australia |
| Region | Australia |
| Coordinates | -41.1798, 146.3613 |
| Fatalities | 0 |
| Injuries | 0 |
| Missing | 0 |
| Vessels Lost | 2 |
| Direct Damage | |
| Economic Damage | |
| Outcome | Goliath sustained minor bow damage; York Cove and Campbell Cove were constructive total losses; the wharf fendering system was destroyed. |
| Investigation Body | Australian Transport Safety Bureau |
Key facts
- At 11:48:22 local time, Goliath struck York Cove at 4.7 knots; York Cove was moored outboard of Campbell Cove.
- Both tugs were unmanned, began taking on water immediately and had sunk in about seven metres of water by about 17:00.
- Goliath sustained minor bow damage, both tugs were declared constructive total losses, and the wharf fendering system was destroyed.
- The tugs carried about 69,000 litres of diesel and other oil in total; an unknown quantity escaped into the Mersey River estuary, although the release was largely contained.
- The ATSB found that steering remained in manual mode while the master attempted to manoeuvre from the port bridge wing using the VecTwin joystick.
Narrative
On 28 January 2022, the Australian-registered bulk cement carrier Goliath entered Devonport from Melbourne and began turning to starboard in the swing basin before berthing at the bulk cement facility. The master conducted the manoeuvre from the port bridge wing. This required the propulsion and steering controls to be transferred from the wheelhouse and the steering selector to be changed from manual to VecTwin joystick mode. York Cove (IMO 8844244) was moored outboard of Campbell Cove (IMO 7606023) at berth Three West; both TasPorts tugs were unmanned.
During the approach, radio calls associated with the mooring operation distracted the bridge team during a change of officer of the watch. When the master ordered the transfer, the second mate transferred the controls but did not select joystick steering mode. Checks that could have detected the omission, including an autopilot-panel check and a VecTwin joystick function test, were not completed. The master believed the joystick controlled the rudders, while steering remained at the wheel inside the wheelhouse.
As Goliath closed on the two tugs, the master selected an astern joystick setting and increased ahead engine power, expecting the VecTwin rudders to generate astern thrust. With the rudders still amidships, each increase in engine setting instead accelerated the ship. The master saw the unchanged rudder-angle indicators only seconds before impact and stopped the engine, but the collision was unavoidable. At 11:48:22, Goliath struck York Cove at 4.7 knots, crushing it against Campbell Cove.
Both tugs began flooding immediately. Goliath moved clear and berthed; the report records that no one was aboard the tugs and that no injuries were reported on Goliath. TasPorts activated its incident response, deployed containment booms and arranged salvage and pollution-control operations. Both tugs sank by about 17:00. Campbell Cove and York Cove had carried an estimated 54,000 and 15,000 litres of diesel and other oil respectively. An unknown quantity escaped into the Mersey River estuary, but the report states that the release was largely contained. Goliath sustained deformation and cracking at the bow, while the wharf fendering system was destroyed. The tugs were later declared constructive total losses and recovered for scrapping in August 2022.
The ATSB found no propulsion or steering-system failure. It identified the incomplete control-transfer procedure, ineffective bridge resource management, absent required BRM training for the master and second mate, and a misleading illuminated joystick-on indication as central safety factors. It also found that TasPorts' risk assessment had considered vessel collisions in the swing basin but had not specifically considered risks to personnel on moored vessels.
Sequence of events
| Date/time | Event |
|---|---|
| 2022-01-28 11:45:52 local | The master placed the bridge-wing engine telegraph at slow ahead while turning Goliath in the swing basin. |
| 2022-01-28 11:47:22 local | The master selected half ahead while trying to arrest the ship's headway with the joystick set astern. |
| 2022-01-28 11:48:22 local | Goliath struck York Cove at 4.7 knots, crushing it against Campbell Cove. |
| 2022-01-28 12:18 local | Goliath was all fast at berth One West. |
| 2022-01-28 13:31 local | Oil-containment booms had been secured around the foundering tugs and Wilga. |
| 2022-01-28 17:00 local | York Cove and Campbell Cove had sunk in about seven metres of water. |
Contributing factors
| Factor | Evidence status | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Steering mode not selected | Confirmed finding | The steering selector remained in manual mode when manoeuvring controls were transferred to the port bridge wing. |
| Incomplete control-transfer checks | Confirmed finding | The selector change, autopilot-panel check and VecTwin joystick function test were not completed. |
| Ineffective bridge resource management | Confirmed finding | Radio traffic and watch changes disrupted the bridge team, and responsibilities for the joystick function test were not clearly shared. |
| Missing BRM training | Confirmed finding | Neither the master nor the second mate had completed the bridge resource management training required by the ship's safety management system. |
| Misleading joystick indication | Confirmed finding | The illuminated joystick-on light identified the selected panel but did not positively confirm that joystick steering mode was engaged. |
Investigation
The Australian Transport Safety Bureau published final report MO-2022-002. It concluded that the collision followed an incomplete transfer of manoeuvring controls and found ineffective bridge resource management, missing required BRM training and a misleading joystick-panel indication. The ATSB also examined risk controls for vessels manoeuvring in the Devonport swing basin. CSL Australia introduced BRM training, a dynamic navigation audit and revised control-transfer procedures and indications. TasPorts proposed changes to port procedures, pilotage-exemption controls and swing-basin operating restrictions.