Classification
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Incident Type | Allision |
| Severity | High |
| Investigation Body | National Transportation Safety Board |
Vessel Details
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Vessel Name | Atina |
| Vessel Type | Tanker |
| Flag State | Malta [MT] |
| IMO Number | 9593000 |
| Gross Tonnage | 83377 |
| LOA (m) | 273.7 |
| Owner | Hanzhou 1 Ltd. |
| Operator | Besiktas Likid Tasimacilik Denizcilik Ticaret Anonim Sirketi |
| Year built | 2013 |
Incident Details
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Date | 2020-10-17 |
| Time | 04:46 CDT |
| Location | Southwest Pass Fairway Anchorage, Gulf of Mexico, 21.5 nautical miles south-southwest of Pilottown, Louisiana, United States |
| Region | Gulf of Mexico |
| Coordinates | 28.844167, -89.396667 |
| Fatalities | |
| Injuries | 0 |
| Missing | |
| Direct Damage | |
| Estimated Economic Damage | USD 72.9 million |
| Outcome | Damage to Atina's starboard accommodation ladder and hull plating; SP-57B sustained a fractured and bulged platform leg and damage to structural members. |
| Environmental Damage | None reported |
Key facts
- At 04:46 CDT on 17 October 2020, Atina struck the northern side of SP-57B at 3.8 knots while attempting to anchor.
- Five people on SP-57B evacuated by helicopter to a nearby platform after an emergency shutdown shut in the platform's wells. The NTSB reported no injuries or pollution.
- The report estimated damage at USD 72.3 million for the platform and USD 598,400 for the vessel, totaling USD 72.9 million.
- The incoming master had no handover period and, according to the NTSB, had no sleep in the 24 hours before the accident.
Narrative
On 16 October 2020, Atina completed discharge of crude oil at the NuStar Terminal in St. James, Louisiana, and departed in ballast for the Southwest Pass Fairway Anchorage. Its planned anchorage was about 3.2 nautical miles northeast of SP-57B. Near Boothville at about 01:10 on 17 October, an incoming master joined by launch and the departing master left without a handover period.
The NTSB found that the operating company's safety-management system required a one-day turnover for senior officers already within the company and seven days for new senior officers. The incoming master had worked for the company but not on Atina. He had travelled from Turkey for about 54 hours, and his work/rest record showed no sleep in the 24 hours before the accident. He told investigators he wanted to anchor because he was tired and unfamiliar with the vessel.
At 03:42, the Associated Branch pilot disembarked near sea buoy SW after warning of a strong westerly set. Instead of proceeding to the planned position, the master chose a location about 0.7 nautical miles from SP-57B and lowered the port anchor at 04:02. Wind was from the northeast at about 25 knots, and the current was setting westward at about 1.5 knots.
At 04:17, the Southwest Pass pilot station instructed Atina to move more than four miles from sea buoy SW. The master ordered the anchor hove up at 04:21; the chain was reported grinding on the hull. The NTSB found that the bridge team lost track of the platform's position during this manoeuvre. The master likely believed SP-57B was another vessel, while the second mate was providing distance and AIS information for the offshore supply vessel Leader, 0.9 nautical miles beyond the platform. The S-band radar showed Leader at three-mile range, where the platform was difficult to see in clutter; the X-band radar at 1.5 miles made it visible at close range.
With SP-57B on the starboard quarter, hard starboard rudder pivoted Atina toward the platform and put the wind and current on the vessel's port side. As the anchor chain decreased and the tanker gathered speed, the wind and current carried it toward the platform. At 04:46, Atina struck the northern side of SP-57B at 3.8 knots.
Platform personnel initiated an emergency shutdown and evacuated by helicopter to a nearby manned platform. The contact damaged Atina's starboard accommodation ladder and hull plating in two ballast tanks. SP-57B sustained a fractured and bulged leg and damage to structural members above and below the waterline. The NTSB recorded no injuries or pollution and estimated total damage at USD 72.9 million.
Sequence of events
| Date/time | Event |
|---|---|
| 2020-10-16 14:48 CDT | Atina departed the NuStar Terminal at St. James, Louisiana, in ballast. |
| 2020-10-17 about 01:10 CDT | The incoming master joined the vessel by launch near Boothville, Louisiana. |
| 2020-10-17 03:42 CDT | The Associated Branch pilot departed near sea buoy SW. |
| 2020-10-17 04:02 CDT | The master ordered the port anchor lowered. |
| 2020-10-17 04:17 CDT | The Southwest Pass pilot station instructed the vessel to move more than four miles from sea buoy SW. |
| 2020-10-17 04:21 CDT | The master ordered the anchor hove up. |
| 2020-10-17 04:46 CDT | Atina struck the northern side of SP-57B at 3.8 knots. |
| 2020-10-17 after 04:46 CDT | Platform personnel initiated an emergency shutdown, evacuated by helicopter, and Atina anchored in the fairway anchorage. |
Contributing factors
| Factor | Evidence status | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Master turnover | Confirmed finding | The NTSB found that the operating company did not ensure sufficient time for the incoming master's turnover, contrary to its safety-management-system procedure. |
| Acute fatigue | Confirmed finding | The NTSB found the master was likely affected by acute fatigue after receiving no sleep in the preceding 24 hours. |
| Situational awareness | Confirmed finding | The NTSB found that the fatigued master had poor situational awareness during the nighttime anchoring evolution. |
| Platform identification | Confirmed finding | The bridge team lost track of the platform; the master likely believed it was another vessel while the second mate provided information for Leader. |
| Wind and current | Confirmed finding | The master did not adequately account for the westerly setting current and northeasterly wind, which set the vessel toward the platform. |
Investigation
The NTSB investigated the contact as case DCA21FM004 and published Marine Accident Brief MAB-21/24 on 10 November 2021. It determined that the probable cause was the operating company's failure to ensure sufficient time for the master's turnover, resulting in acute fatigue and poor situational awareness during the attempted nighttime anchoring evolution. The brief states that the NTSB does not assign fault or legal liability.
References
- NTSB Marine Accident Brief MAB-21/24: Contact of Tanker Atina with Oil and Gas Production Platform SP-57B
- gCaptain: Tanker Master's Fatigue Cited in $73 Million Marine Accident