Classification
- Incident Type: Collision
- Severity: High
Vessel Details
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Vessel Name | Fremont |
| Vessel Type | Tug |
| Flag State | United States [US] |
| Gross Tonnage | 68 |
Other vessels:
| Vessel | Role | Flag |
|---|---|---|
| Duval 2 | Tank barge | United States [US] |
| Juraj Dalmatinac | Containership | St. Vincent and the Grenadines |
Incident Details
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Date | 1992-12-21 |
| Location | Houston Ship Channel, Galveston Bay, Texas, United States |
| Region | United States |
| Fatalities | |
| Injuries | 1, Fremont operator |
| Missing | |
| Vessels sunk or lost | 1, Duval 2 |
| Direct Damage | More than USD 955,500 |
| Economic Damage | More than USD 6 million |
Key facts
- Juraj Dalmatinac's bow penetrated the side and bottom hull of Duval 2.
- Duval 2 buckled and sank when Juraj Dalmatinac backed away; both cargo tanks were breached.
- Molten sulphur spilled into the waterway.
- The Fremont operator suffered minor internal injuries after being thrown against the pilothouse chair and deck.
- The collision closed the Houston Ship Channel to all traffic for three days; ship traffic was restricted to one-way movement from 25 December 1992 to 17 February 1993.
Narrative
Fremont left Baytown at 1710 on 21 December 1992, pushing tank barge Duval 2 toward Galveston with about 2,464 long tons of molten sulphur. The towboat carried its operator, two deckhands, and a contract tankerman. When dense fog closed in, the operator followed company policy by moving to the outbound starboard side of the Houston Ship Channel and stopping beside buoy 51 at about 2145. Visibility was then so poor that he could barely see the head of the 310-foot tow. Fremont had no compass, so the operator tried to hold the tow's orientation by watching buoy 51 and interpreting radar contacts for buoy 52 and beacon 49. He notified vessel traffic service at 2200 that he had stopped in “shut-out fog.” (NTSB/MAR-93/02, PDF pp. 7-10)
The tow gradually became misaligned and partly obstructed the channel. Meanwhile, the inbound containership Juraj Dalmatinac approached in the fog. Its two pilots and master did not systematically track the closing radar contact with the available automatic radar plotting aids and initially treated Fremont as outbound traffic. Radio contact began at about 2226, but the developing geometry was not understood in time. Although the containership still had sufficient room to pass, its bridge team delayed substantial avoiding action until visual contact was made at close range. (NTSB/MAR-93/02, PDF pp. 10-15, 32)
At about 2230, Juraj Dalmatinac's bow penetrated Duval 2's side and bottom plating. Fremont heeled far enough for seawater to enter its galley and engine room through open main-deck doors, stalling the starboard engine. When the containership backed away, Duval 2 buckled, both cargo tanks ruptured, and molten sulphur spilled into the waterway. Breaking connection wires abruptly righted Fremont and threw its operator against the pilothouse chair and deck, causing minor internal injuries. The crew recovered the contract tankerman from the sinking barge, moved Fremont clear, and reported the collision at 2233. (NTSB/MAR-93/02, PDF pp. 15-16)
Duval 2 and its cargo were destroyed. Fremont required a USD 16,000 engine rebuild, the barge was valued at USD 750,000, its cargo at USD 122,000, and Juraj Dalmatinac sustained USD 67,500 damage. The channel closed to all traffic for three days, stranding or delaying 65 ships; ship traffic was restricted to one-way movement from 25 December 1992 to 17 February 1993. The Port of Houston lost an estimated USD 600,000 in wharfage fees and shipping-line delay losses were estimated at USD 6 million. (NTSB/MAR-93/02, PDF p. 17)
Sequence of events
| Date/time | Event |
|---|---|
| 1992-12-21 17:10 local | Fremont departed Baytown pushing Duval 2, loaded with about 2,464 long tons of molten sulphur. |
| 1992-12-21 21:45 local | Fremont stopped beside buoy 51 after dense fog reduced visibility. |
| 1992-12-21 22:00 local | Fremont reported to vessel traffic service that it was stopped in “shut-out fog.” |
| 1992-12-21 22:26 local | Fremont and the lead pilot aboard Juraj Dalmatinac established radio contact. |
| 1992-12-21 22:30 local | Juraj Dalmatinac collided with Duval 2 in the Houston Ship Channel. |
| 1992-12-21 | Juraj Dalmatinac backed away; Duval 2 buckled, its cargo tanks were breached, and the barge sank. |
| 1992-12-21 22:33 local | The Fremont operator moved away from the sinking barge and reported the collision to vessel traffic service. |
Contributing factors
| Factor | Evidence status | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Bridge resource management aboard Juraj Dalmatinac | Confirmed finding | The NTSB determined that the ship's pilots and master failed to effectively use available equipment and personnel to evaluate the developing situation and take timely action. |
| Lack of a compass on Fremont | Confirmed finding | The NTSB found that a compass could have allowed the tow operator to monitor heading and keep the tow on station outside the navigation channel. |
| Misalignment of the tow in dense fog | Confirmed finding | The NTSB found that the tow became misaligned while the operator attempted to hold station using a single buoy as a visual reference. |
| Failure to use ARPA tracking | Confirmed finding | The NTSB found that the Juraj Dalmatinac bridge watch did not use the ARPA tracking feature, which could have identified Fremont as a stationary target earlier. |
Investigation
The National Transportation Safety Board adopted Marine Accident Report NTSB/MAR-93/02 on 8 December 1993. It determined that the probable cause was the failure of Juraj Dalmatinac's pilots and master to use all available equipment and personnel to assess the developing situation and act in time. Fremont's lack of a compass contributed by depriving its operator of a reliable means to keep the tow outside the channel. Recommendations addressed compass carriage on commercial towboats, ARPA training for deck officers and pilots, two-pilot working guidelines, vessel traffic reporting, and postaccident testing. (NTSB/MAR-93/02, PDF pp. 32-34)
References
Related
- Fremont
- United States
- Collision
- Tug Incident Classification
- National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)