Classification
- Incident Type: Grounded
- Severity: High
The grounding caused extensive vessel damage and environmental damage. Tugs assisted the vessel during departure from the terminal, but the grounding occurred during the vessel's navigation toward Bligh Reef.
Vessel Details
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Vessel Name | EXXON VALDEZ |
| Vessel Type | Tanker |
| Flag State | United States [US] |
| IMO Number | 8414520 |
| Gross Tonnage | |
| LOA (m) | 300.8 |
| Breadth (m) | |
| TEU | |
| Year Built | |
| Crew Size |
Incident Details
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Date | 1989-03-24 |
| Location | Prince William Sound, Alaska, USA |
| Coordinates | 60.83,-146.87 |
| Region | United States |
| Fatalities | 0 |
| Injuries | 0 |
| Missing | |
| Cargo Loss | Approximately 258,000 barrels of crude oil |
| Direct Damage | Eight cargo tanks ruptured; vessel damage estimated at USD 25 million |
| Economic Damage | USD 1.85 billion cleanup cost (1989 estimate) |
| Insured Loss | |
| Salvage/Cleanup Cost | USD 1.85 billion during 1989, NTSB estimate |
Key facts
- EXXON VALDEZ grounded on Bligh Reef at about 00:09 Alaska standard time on 24 March 1989 while under the third mate's navigational control. NTSB, p. v.
- Approximately 258,000 barrels of crude oil spilled from eight ruptured cargo tanks. NTSB, p. v.
- The NTSB reported no direct personal injuries. The Alaska Oil Spill Commission account separately distinguishes no direct deaths from four cleanup-related deaths. NTSB, p. 14; Alaska account.
- Cargo lightering to EXXON BATON ROUGE began on 25 March. NTSB, p. 14.
- The NTSB estimated vessel damage at USD 25 million, lost cargo at USD 3.4 million and 1989 cleanup costs at about USD 1.85 billion. These describe separate loss categories. NTSB, p. v.
Narrative
EXXON VALDEZ was carrying about 1,263,000 barrels of Alaska North Slope crude oil when it left the Alyeska Marine Terminal on 23 March 1989. The last mooring line was released at 21:12 Alaska standard time. Two tugs assisted the departure; one subsequently escorted the tanker through Valdez Narrows. The pilot brought the vessel into the outbound traffic lane and disembarked at 23:24, after which the master took responsibility for navigation. NTSB, pp. 3–4.
To avoid glacial ice, the master notified the Valdez Vessel Traffic Center that the tanker might cross into the inbound lane. At about 23:31 he altered course to 200 degrees and announced a reduction to about 12 knots, although the engine records did not show the announced speed reduction. A further alteration toward 180 degrees followed. According to the third mate, the master instructed him to return to the traffic lanes when Busby Island Light was abeam and to call if the master had not returned. They did not review the intended manoeuvre together on the chart. The master left the bridge at about 23:52. NTSB, pp. 6–8.
The tanker failed to turn back into the traffic lanes in time and grounded on Bligh Reef at about 00:09 on 24 March. Eight cargo tanks ruptured, releasing approximately 258,000 barrels of oil. At about 00:27 the master reported the grounding and oil leakage to the Vessel Traffic Center. The chief mate checked tank levels, hull stresses and stability and advised against moving the vessel. Attempts to manoeuvre free continued until the main engine was stopped at about 01:41. The crew then prepared lightering equipment; EXXON BATON ROUGE came alongside that evening, and cargo transfer began the next morning. NTSB, p. v and pp. 13–14.
The NTSB recorded no direct personal injuries and catastrophic environmental damage. Its probable-cause determination identified the third mate's fatigue and excessive workload, the master's alcohol-impaired navigation watch, Exxon's failure to provide a fit master and a rested and sufficient crew, ineffective Vessel Traffic Service arrangements and inadequate pilotage services. The investigation therefore addressed operational and organizational failures as well as the missed turn. NTSB, p. v and p. 14.
Sequence of events
All times are Alaska standard time, as used in the NTSB report.
| Date/time | Event |
|---|---|
| 1989-03-23 21:12 | Last mooring line released; two tugs assisted departure. |
| 1989-03-23 23:24 | Pilot disembarked. |
| 1989-03-23 about 23:31 | Master altered course to 200 degrees to avoid ice. |
| 1989-03-23 about 23:52 | Master left the bridge after instructing the third mate to return to the traffic lanes. |
| 1989-03-24 about 00:09 | Tanker grounded on Bligh Reef. |
| 1989-03-24 about 00:27 | Master reported the grounding and oil leakage to the Vessel Traffic Center. |
| 1989-03-24 about 01:41 | Main engine stopped after attempts to manoeuvre free. |
| 1989-03-25 morning | Cargo lightering to EXXON BATON ROUGE began. |
Contributing factors
| Factor | Evidence status | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Fatigue and excessive workload | Confirmed finding | The third mate failed to manoeuvre the tanker properly because of fatigue and excessive workload. |
| Alcohol-impaired navigation watch | Confirmed finding | The master failed to provide a proper navigation watch because of impairment from alcohol. |
| Company staffing and fitness controls | Confirmed finding | Exxon Shipping Company failed to provide a fit master and a rested and sufficient crew. |
| Vessel Traffic Service effectiveness | Confirmed finding | Inadequate equipment, manning, training and management oversight reduced the effectiveness of the service. |
| Pilotage | Confirmed finding | The NTSB identified a lack of effective pilotage services. |
These are the NTSB's probable-cause findings. NTSB, p. v.
Investigation
The National Transportation Safety Board issued Marine Accident Report MAR-90-04, dated 31 July 1990. Investigation DCA89MM040 is completed. The report examined navigation watchkeeping, fatigue, alcohol controls, manning, Vessel Traffic Service effectiveness, pilotage and spill-response planning. Its recommendations addressed the Coast Guard, environmental authorities, Exxon and other tanker operators, Alaska, Alyeska and the regional response team. NTSB, documentation page and p. v; investigation record.
References
- NTSB investigation page
- NTSB Marine Accident Report MAR-90-04
- NTSB safety recommendations M-90-26 through M-90-31
- United States Coast Guard history of the grounding
- United States Coast Guard initial pollution report
- Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council, details about the accident
- EPA Exxon Valdez spill profile
- GovInfo record for NTSB MAR-90-04
Video
- The New York Times: In the Wake of Disaster
- NOAA retrospective: Hindsight and Foresight, 20 Years After the Exxon Valdez Spill
- PBS NewsHour archive: the Exxon Valdez oil spill, 25 years ago
Related
- United States
- Exxon Shipping Company
- National Transportation Safety Board
- United States Coast Guard
- Alyeska Pipeline Service Company
- EXXON VALDEZ
- Grounding
- Fatigue and Alertness