Classification
- Incident Type: Collision
- Severity: High
Vessel Details
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Vessel Name | Hafnia Nile / Ceres I |
| Primary Vessel Type | Tanker |
| Primary Flag State | Singapore [SG] |
| Primary IMO Number | 9766217 |
| Gross Tonnage | 43072 |
| LOA (m) | 228.00 |
| Breadth (m) | 32.24 |
| Power (kW) | 11230 |
| Year Built | 2015 |
| Crew Size | 22 |
| Owner/Operator | BW Fleet Management Pte. Ltd. |
| Other Vessel | Ceres I, oil tanker, Sao Tome and Principe, IMO 9229439, 160229 GT, 329.95 m LOA, 60.00 m breadth, operated by Ceres Shipping Limited |
Incident Details
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Date | 2024-07-19 |
| Time | 0602H (ship's mean time, UTC+8) |
| Location | South China Sea, east of Malaysia |
| Coordinates | 1.723333, 104.675000 |
| Region | South China Sea |
| Fatalities | 1 |
| Injuries | 1 |
| Missing | 0 |
| Cargo Loss | About 4,065.44 MT of naphtha and about 565 MT of VLSFO |
| Direct Damage | |
| Economic Damage | |
| Outcome | The collision breached tanks and caused fires on both vessels and the sea surface; one shore worker died and another was seriously injured. |
| Weather | Good visibility over 12 nm; winds 15-25 knots; northwest current 2-4 knots |
Key facts
- Hafnia Nile collided with anchored Ceres I at about 0602H on 19 July 2024 east of Malaysia.
- The second mate had less than two hours of uninterrupted rest in the preceding 38.5 hours and left the wheelhouse during the developing traffic situation.
- CPA/TCPA alarms were inactive aboard Hafnia Nile, and Ceres I did not use VHF to alert the approaching vessel.
- The collision breached tanks and caused fire on both ships and the sea surface; about 4,065.44 MT of naphtha and 565 MT of VLSFO were lost.
- Two shore workers aboard Ceres I sustained serious burns; one later died. All 22 Hafnia Nile crew were rescued.
Narrative
Hafnia Nile departed Singapore shortly after 0100 on 19 July 2024. The second mate who took the navigational watch had slept less than two hours in the previous 38.5 hours after travel and heavy port workload. During the outbound passage, he repeatedly left the wheelhouse to handle administrative tasks in the chartroom while collision-avoidance alarms were deactivated. Ceres I was anchored ahead in the South China Sea, and the bridge team allowed the closest point of approach to collapse toward zero while trying to pass between Ceres I and another vessel.
At about 0602H, Hafnia Nile's bow contacted Ceres I's port anchor chain, which entangled with Hafnia Nile and drew the ships together. Ceres I's bow breached Hafnia Nile near heavy-fuel-oil and cargo-oil tanks, triggering a flash fire on both vessels and the surrounding sea surface. Hafnia Nile's port bridge wing was also damaged. All 22 Hafnia Nile crew were rescued.
Other vessel involved was Ceres I, a Sao Tome and Principe-flagged oil tanker operated by Ceres Shipping Limited. Its shore workers were caught by the post-collision flash fire; one later died from burn injuries and another was seriously injured. The investigation linked the casualty to fatigue, distraction, reduced bridge manning, deactivated alarms aboard Hafnia Nile, and Ceres I's failure to use VHF despite escalating collision risk.
Sequence of events
| Date/time | Event |
|---|---|
| 2024-07-19 shortly after 0100 | Hafnia Nile departed Singapore. |
| 2024-07-19 before 0602H | Ceres I was anchored east of Malaysia; Hafnia Nile's second mate left the wheelhouse while CPA/TCPA alarms were inactive. |
| 2024-07-19 0602H | Hafnia Nile's bow contacted Ceres I's port anchor chain and the vessels were drawn together. |
| 2024-07-19 after 0602H | The collision caused tank breaches, cargo and fuel release, and flash fires on both vessels and the sea surface. |
Contributing factors
| Factor | Evidence status | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Fatigue | Confirmed finding | The second mate had less than two hours of uninterrupted rest in the preceding 38.5 hours and was likely fatigued. |
| Administrative distraction | Confirmed finding | The second mate left the wheelhouse during a developing close-quarters situation to handle administrative work. |
| Inactive collision alarms | Confirmed finding | CPA/TCPA alarms on Hafnia Nile's radars were deactivated or silenced. |
| Ceres I communication | Confirmed finding | Ceres I's bridge team did not use VHF to alert Hafnia Nile as the collision risk escalated. |
Investigation
The Transport Safety Investigation Bureau of Singapore published report TIB/MAI/CAS.173. It attributed the collision to degraded bridge watchkeeping aboard Hafnia Nile, likely fatigue, administrative distraction, inactive alarms and missed communication opportunities from Ceres I. The report records the resulting fire, cargo and fuel loss, structural damage and shore-worker casualties.
References
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