Classification
- Incident Type: Collision
- Severity: High
Vessel Details
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Vessel Name | Eagle Otome |
| Other Vessels | Gull Arrow; Dixie Vengeance; Kirby 30406; Kirby 28112 |
| Vessel Type | Tanker |
| Flag State | Singapore [SG] |
| IMO Number | 9051351 |
| Gross Tonnage | 53504 |
| LOA (m) | 246.88 |
| Year Built | 1994 |
Incident Details
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Date | 2010-01-23 |
| Time | About 09:35 central standard time |
| Location | Sabine-Neches Canal, Port of Port Arthur, Texas |
| Coordinates | 29°51.6′ N, 93°56.4′ W |
| Region | United States |
| Fatalities | 0 |
| Injuries | 4 |
| Direct Damage | Eagle Otome USD 1.5 million; Gull Arrow USD 381,000; Kirby 30406 USD 35,000; Dixie Vengeance none |
| Economic Damage | USD 1.916 million reported property damage; cleanup and wider economic costs not quantified |
Key facts
- Eagle Otome was inbound with 576,864 barrels of Olmeca crude oil for Beaumont, Texas.
- Two Sabine pilots were aboard under local waterway protocol.
- The first pilot initiated the Missouri Bend turn late while distracted by a radio call that the second pilot should have conducted.
- Eagle Otome sheered across the canal, struck Gull Arrow, and was then struck by Kirby 30406.
- The second collision breached Eagle Otome's starboard ballast tank and No. 1 center cargo tank.
- The NTSB's unified-command estimate was 11,000 barrels, or about 462,000 gallons, of crude oil spilled into the water.
Narrative
Eagle Otome departed Pajaritos, Mexico, carrying 576,864 barrels of Olmeca crude oil and proceeded inbound on the Sabine-Neches Waterway toward an ExxonMobil facility in Beaumont. A first Sabine pilot boarded at about 05:24, and a second pilot boarded near Sabine Pass because local guidelines called for two pilots on vessels wider than 120 feet. The pilots rotated navigational control during the transit.
At about 09:15, the first pilot began a VHF exchange with the master of Dixie Vengeance, an outbound towboat pushing two tank barges. Eagle Otome was approaching Missouri Bend, where inbound traffic needed to turn about 32 degrees to starboard. When the call ended, the tankship was near the bend and the turn had not begun. The first pilot ordered hard starboard at about 09:23:54, but the NTSB found that bank effect had already begun moving the bow.
After passing the bend, Eagle Otome developed repeated sheering motions across the canal. The pilots did not warn Dixie Vengeance in time. The towboat's master put the engines full astern and reduced speed, but could not avoid Eagle Otome. At about 09:35, Eagle Otome's port bow struck Gull Arrow, which was berthed and unloading cargo. Seconds later, Kirby 30406 struck Eagle Otome's starboard side.
The second impact breached Eagle Otome's starboard ballast tank and No. 1 center cargo tank. The report states that 862,344 gallons were released from the cargo tank and estimates that 462,000 gallons reached the water. About 136 Port Arthur residents were temporarily evacuated because of crude-oil vapors, mainly hydrogen sulfide. No crewmember on the three vessels was injured, but four longshoremen later reported minor injuries. The NTSB determined that the probable cause was the first pilot's failure to correct sheering motions after the late turn, with fatigue, distraction, ineffective bridge resource management, and insufficient pilot-commission oversight contributing.
Sequence of events
| Date/time | Event |
|---|---|
| 2010-01-23 05:24 | The first Sabine pilot boarded Eagle Otome. |
| 2010-01-23 about 08:00 | The second pilot boarded near Sabine Pass. |
| 2010-01-23 09:15 | The first pilot began the VHF exchange with Dixie Vengeance. |
| 2010-01-23 09:23:54 | The first pilot ordered hard starboard near Missouri Bend. |
| 2010-01-23 about 09:35 | Eagle Otome struck Gull Arrow; Kirby 30406 then struck Eagle Otome. |
| 2011-09-27 | The NTSB adopted Marine Accident Report NTSB/MAR-11/04. |
Contributing factors
| Factor | Evidence status | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Late turn at Missouri Bend | Confirmed finding | The NTSB found that the first pilot initiated the turn late, after bank effect had begun moving Eagle Otome's bow. |
| Pilot fatigue | Confirmed finding | The first pilot's untreated obstructive sleep apnea and work schedule did not permit adequate sleep. |
| Radio-call distraction | Confirmed finding | The first pilot conducted a call that the second pilot should have handled while the tankship approached the bend. |
| Ineffective bridge resource management | Confirmed finding | The pilots did not effectively coordinate the developing sheers and warnings to the tow. |
| Pilot-commission oversight | Confirmed finding | Lack of oversight by the Jefferson and Orange County Board of Pilot Commissioners contributed. |
Investigation
The National Transportation Safety Board investigated the casualty as NTSB/MAR-11/04. It determined that the probable cause was the first pilot's failure to correct sheering motions that began after a late turn at Missouri Bend. Contributing factors included fatigue from untreated sleep apnea and the work schedule, distraction from a radio call, ineffective bridge resource management, and insufficient pilot-commission oversight. The report records the property-damage amounts above and does not resolve cleanup or wider economic costs.