Classification
- Incident Type: Fire / Explosion
- Severity: High
Vessel Details
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Vessel Name | Höegh Xiamen |
| Vessel Type | Ro-Ro / Car Carrier |
| Flag State | Norway [NO] |
| IMO Number | 9431848 |
| MMSI | 259025000 |
| Call Sign | LAJM7 |
| Gross Tonnage | 47232 |
| LOA (m) | 182.8 |
| Year Built | 2010 |
| Crew Size | 21 |
Incident Details
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Date | 2020-06-04 |
| Location | Pier 20, Blount Island, Jacksonville, Florida, United States |
| Region | United States |
| Fatalities | 0 |
| Injuries | 9 |
| Missing | 0 |
| Direct Damage | The vessel and its cargo of 2,420 used vehicles sustained extensive fire damage and were declared a total loss. |
| Economic Damage | USD 40 million |
The nine injured people were shoreside firefighters; the NTSB report states that none of the 21 crewmembers were injured.
Key facts
- The fire was discovered at about 15:30 EDT on 4 June 2020 after used-vehicle loading was completed at Jacksonville.
- The NTSB determined that an improperly disconnected battery in a used vehicle caused an electrical fault on cargo deck 8.
- Nine Jacksonville firefighters were injured in an explosion during firefighting, including five who sustained serious injuries.
- The vessel and its 2,420 used vehicles were declared a total loss valued at USD 40 million.
Narrative
Höegh Xiamen was a Norwegian-flagged roll-on/roll-off vehicle carrier loading used vehicles at Pier 20, Blount Island, Jacksonville, Florida. On 4 June 2020, loading was completed at about 15:00 while the vessel prepared for its scheduled departure to Baltimore. At about 15:30, the chief mate saw smoke coming from the ventilation housing serving cargo decks 7 and 8. The fire detection system had been deactivated during loading and was reactivated at 15:45, when it alarmed.
The crew found a fire in the aft portion of deck 8 and tried to fight it, but heavy smoke forced them back. Jacksonville Fire and Rescue Department crews arrived at about 16:03. The vessel's fixed carbon-dioxide system was released into decks 7 and 8 at about 16:13 after the crew and firefighters were unable to gain safe access. The crew then evacuated to the berth. Firefighters continued the response, but the fire spread to higher cargo decks and the accommodation spaces.
At about 18:46, a ventilation housing on deck 12 exploded while firefighters were opening it. Superheated air rushed through the ship, injuring nine firefighters, five seriously. Responders then adopted a defensive strategy using boundary cooling while salvors and the Coast Guard managed firefighting, stability, and pollution concerns. The fire continued for eight days and was extinguished on 12 June. The vessel and its cargo of 2,420 used vehicles sustained extensive damage, were declared a total loss valued at USD 40 million, and the vessel was later towed to Turkey for recycling.
The NTSB found that the fire began on the aft portion of deck 8 and was probably caused by an electrical arc or component fault from an improperly disconnected battery in a used vehicle. It also found that delayed reactivation of the fire-detection system delayed detection and that delayed carbon-dioxide release contributed to the fire's extent.
Sequence of events
| Date/time | Event |
|---|---|
| 2020-06-04 15:00 EDT | Loading of used vehicles was completed at Pier 20. |
| 2020-06-04 15:30 EDT | The chief mate saw smoke from the ventilation housing serving decks 7 and 8. |
| 2020-06-04 15:45 EDT | The fire-detection system was reactivated and alarmed. |
| 2020-06-04 16:03 EDT | Jacksonville Fire and Rescue Department crews arrived. |
| 2020-06-04 16:13 EDT | Carbon dioxide was released into decks 7 and 8, and the crew evacuated. |
| 2020-06-04 18:46 EDT | A ventilation housing exploded, injuring nine firefighters. |
| 2020-06-05 01:30 EDT | Commercial salvage personnel began arriving to support the response. |
| 2020-06-12 | The fire was extinguished after burning for eight days. |
Contributing factors
| Factor | Evidence status | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Vehicle battery securement | Confirmed finding | The NTSB identified ineffective oversight of vehicle loading and an improperly disconnected battery as the probable cause of the electrical fault that started the fire. |
| Delayed fire detection | Confirmed finding | The fire-detection system remained deactivated after loading and was not reactivated until smoke had already been observed. |
| Delayed carbon-dioxide release | Confirmed finding | The NTSB found that the master's decision to delay release of the fixed carbon-dioxide system contributed to the extent of the fire. |
Investigation
The National Transportation Safety Board investigated the casualty and published Fire aboard Roll-on/Roll-off Vehicle Carrier Höegh Xiamen. The NTSB determined that an improperly disconnected battery in a used vehicle on cargo deck 8 caused an electrical fault that started the fire. It also identified delayed fire detection and delayed carbon-dioxide release as factors that increased the fire's extent. The report made recommendations concerning vehicle battery securement, used-vehicle fire risks, fire-detection procedures, emergency communications, and operator oversight.