Classification
- Incident Type: Fire / Explosion
- Severity: High
- Tug involvement: no
- Tug mechanism: N/A
Vessel Details
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Vessel Name | Yeoman Bontrup |
| Vessel Type | Bulk Carrier |
| Flag State | Bahamas [BS] |
| IMO Number | 8912297 |
| Gross Tonnage | 55695 |
| LOA (m) | 249.9 |
| Breadth (m) | 38.00 |
| TEU | |
| Year Built | 1991 |
| Owner/Operator | Holcim UK Ltd, United Kingdom |
| Crew Size | 31 |
Incident Details
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Date | 2010-07-02 |
| Location | Shiploader jetty, Glensanda Quarry, Loch Linnhe, Western Scotland |
| Coordinates | 56.568333, -5.531667 |
| Region | United Kingdom |
| Fatalities | 0 |
| Injuries | 2 |
| Missing | 0 |
| Direct Damage | Severe fire and structural damage to the self-unloading system, engine room, accommodation and steering-gear compartment; the poop deck was detached |
Key facts
- Fire was discovered at 1519 near the base of the vertical cargo conveyor while the vessel was loading at Glensanda Quarry.
- Hot debris from routine hopper-repair hotwork was the most likely ignition source.
- The fire spread rapidly through the conveyor tower and an open door into the engine-room workshop.
- All 31 crew members, one superintendent and three visitors evacuated; two people suffered minor smoke inhalation.
- Chemicals and oils in the steering-gear compartment fuelled an explosion that tore off the poop deck.
- The vessel sustained severe structural and machinery-space damage.
Narrative
Yeoman Bontrup was alongside the shiploader jetty at Glensanda Quarry on 2 July 2010, loading aggregate after arriving the previous evening. Repairs to worn areas of the self-unloading discharge hopper required frequent hotwork. Work paused at 1400, but the continuous fire watch required by the safety plan was not maintained during the break. Hotwork resumed at about 1420.
At 1518, welders in the hopper noticed smoke. One minute later, an able seaman found flames covering about 1.5 square metres of the rising vertical conveyor belt. The fire alarm sounded at 1521 and the master requested shore assistance. Crew members attacked the fire with hoses, foam and carbon-dioxide extinguishers while the quarry fire team supplied additional boundary cooling.
The conveyor belt carried the fire rapidly upward. A door between the self-unloading hydraulic-pump space and the engine-room workshop had been left open and was difficult to secure, allowing heat and smoke to spread into the machinery space. A breathing-apparatus team became separated in dense smoke, and the engine room was evacuated. Part of the conveyor belt collapsed at about 1550.
With the fire beyond control, the master ordered evacuation at 1605. Hoses were lashed in position for continued cooling, fuel shut-off valves were operated and the final senior officers left at about 1615. All 31 crew members, a superintendent and three visitors were accounted for. The cargo engineer suffered smoke inhalation and bruising, and a quarry employee was affected by smoke.
The ship's generators stopped at 1630, ending the onboard water supply. Shore firefighters continued external cooling. A large fireball erupted from the conveyor tower at about 1715, and by 1800 the fire had reached the boom conveyor. At about 1825, oils and chemicals stored in the steering-gear compartment contributed to a violent explosion that tore the poop deck from the ship.
Responders later reboarded to stop back-flooding through the ballast stripping system. The emergency towing vessel Anglian Sovereign arrived at 0055 on 3 July and applied high-volume boundary cooling. The fire was subsequently allowed to burn out, and salvage control was transferred to a commercial company. Yeoman Bontrup was towed to IJmuiden on 28 July for a detailed damage survey.
MAIB found that hot debris from the hopper repairs most likely ignited the belt. Routine hotwork had led to complacency and violations of company controls. The fire escalated because the conveyor system was highly combustible, detection was late, the cargo-handling space lacked effective subdivision and fixed firefighting, and poor chemical stowage increased the fire and explosion hazards.
Sequence of events
| Date/time | Event |
|---|---|
| 2010-07-02 14:00 local | Hopper hotwork paused without the required continuous fire watch. |
| 2010-07-02 about 14:20 local | Hopper repair work resumed. |
| 2010-07-02 15:19 local | Fire was discovered on the vertical conveyor belt. |
| 2010-07-02 15:21 local | The fire alarm sounded and shore assistance was requested. |
| 2010-07-02 16:05 local | The master ordered the vessel evacuated. |
| 2010-07-02 about 17:15 local | A large fireball erupted from the conveyor tower. |
| 2010-07-02 about 18:25 local | An explosion tore the poop deck from the vessel. |
| 2010-07-03 00:55 local | Anglian Sovereign began high-volume boundary cooling. |
| 2010-07-28 | Yeoman Bontrup was towed to IJmuiden for damage assessment. |
Contributing factors
| Factor | Evidence status | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Hotwork debris | Confirmed finding | Hot debris from hopper repairs was the most likely source of ignition for the vertical conveyor belt. |
| Hotwork complacency | Confirmed finding | Frequent repair work led the crew to violate company controls, including the continuous fire-watch requirement. |
| Conveyor-system fire vulnerability | Confirmed finding | The combustible belt, late detection, lack of subdivision and absence of fixed firefighting allowed rapid fire development. |
| Open machinery-space door | Confirmed finding | The hydraulic-pump-space door was left open and could not be easily secured, permitting fire spread into the engine room. |
| Chemical and oil stowage | Confirmed finding | Poor housekeeping increased fire spread, while chemicals in the steering-gear compartment escalated the fire and contributed to the explosion. |
Investigation
The Marine Accident Investigation Branch investigated the very serious marine casualty in report 5/2011. It identified hotwork control failures and regulatory gaps for self-unloading cargo-handling systems, including fire detection, containment, extinguishing and conveyor-belt material standards. MAIB also found inadequate chemical housekeeping, insufficient cargo-space fire drills and unmanaged radioactive level-measuring sources. The ship manager subsequently revised hotwork, chemical-stowage, risk-assessment and emergency-drill procedures.