El Faro (2015)

Classification

• Incident Type: Sinking
• Severity: High

The NTSB classified the sinking as a major marine casualty.

Vessel Details

Incident Details

Key facts

• El Faro departed Jacksonville for San Juan on 29 September 2015 with 27 crew members, six contract repair workers and cargo aboard.
• The vessel approached the strengthening Hurricane Joaquin using weather information that did not fully reflect the storm's latest position and intensity.
• Water entered cargo hold 3, a sustained port list caused loss of lubricating-oil pressure, and the main engine shut down.
• Progressive downflooding through unsecured cargo-hold ventilation closures led to loss of the vessel.
• The captain ordered abandon ship shortly before the voyage data recorder stopped at 0739; all 33 people aboard died and the loss was estimated at USD 36 million.

Narrative

El Faro left Jacksonville, Florida, at 2007 on 29 September 2015 for its regular voyage to San Juan, Puerto Rico. The 40-year-old steamship carried 27 crew members, six contract repair workers and about 11,046 long tons of cargo. Hurricane Joaquin was developing near the planned route. The captain continued toward the Bahamas using weather products that did not fully represent the storm's current position and strengthening, despite concerns and route suggestions raised by bridge officers.

During the early hours of 1 October, the ship encountered worsening hurricane conditions. By about 0130, it was slowing and listing to starboard. An off-course alarm activated at 0253. At 0543, the bridge learned that water was rising in cargo hold 3 and that a watertight scuttle on the starboard side of the second deck was open. The chief mate reported knee-deep water flowing over the scuttle. The captain altered course and transferred ballast to create a port list so the crew could reach and secure it, which they did at about 0600.

The change to a sustained port list exposed a critical machinery vulnerability. The NTSB found that vessel motion and list most likely allowed air into the main-engine lubricating-oil suction. Oil pressure was lost and the engine shut down at about 0613. The engineers could not restore propulsion. The ship was then unable to manoeuvre against the hurricane.

Flooding continued after the scuttle was secured. The NTSB found that damaged seawater piping also admitted water to hold 3. Vehicles in the hold had not been secured in accordance with the approved cargo-securing manual and were more likely to shift after the deck became wet. Investigators considered it highly probable that moving cargo damaged emergency fire-pump piping, although the precise sequence could not be reconstructed.

At 0706, the captain called the company and reported flooding, a severe list and loss of propulsion. He sent a distress alert at 0713. A general alarm was sounded at 0727, followed by the order to abandon ship at 0729. The voyage data recorder stopped at 0739 as conditions deteriorated. Increasing heel submerged unsecured cargo-hold ventilation openings, allowing progressive downflooding. The NTSB concluded that the vessel ultimately lost stability, capsized and sank, although the exact final sequence could not be determined.

Search and rescue operations found no survivors. The wreck was later located at 23.38125°N, 73.9111°W, about 40 nautical miles northeast of Acklins and Crooked Island. All 33 people aboard died, and the loss of the vessel and cargo was estimated at USD 36 million.

Sequence of events

Contributing factors

Investigation

The National Transportation Safety Board investigated the sinking in marine accident report NTSB/MAR-17/01. It determined that the probable cause was the captain's insufficient action to avoid Hurricane Joaquin, failure to use the most current weather information and late decision to muster the crew. The formal finding also identified ineffective bridge resource management, inadequate company oversight, flooding, loss of propulsion, downflooding, the absence of an approved damage-control plan and unsuitable survival craft as contributing factors. The investigation used the recovered voyage data recorder, wreck surveys, stability analysis, weather reconstruction and evidence from El Faro's sister ship.

References

• NTSB report NTSB/MAR-17/01: Sinking of US Cargo Vessel SS El Faro

Related

• El Faro
• Atlantic Ocean
• NTSB
• Sinking
• Loss of Propulsion and Steering

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