LEROS STRENGTH (1997) | Novatug Maritime Wiki

Classification

Incident Type: Sinking
Severity: High

The vessel foundered after progressive water ingress into the fore part of the ship. Investigators could not establish the specific initiating damage.

Vessel Details

Field	Value
Vessel Name	LEROS STRENGTH
Vessel Type	Bulk Carrier
Flag State	Cyprus [CY]
IMO Number	7517612
Gross Tonnage	12998
LOA (m)	155
Breadth (m)
TEU
Year Built	1976
Crew Size	20

Incident Details

Field	Value
Date	1997-02-08
Location	About 30 nautical miles southwest of Stavanger, Norway
Region	North Sea
Fatalities	20
Injuries
Missing
Investigation Body	Norwegian Maritime Directorate / Department of Merchant Shipping (Cyprus)

Key facts

Leros Strength sailed from Murmansk on 2 February 1997 with 18,180 tonnes of apatite for Police, Poland.
At 07:50 local time on 8 February, the master reported that the bow was submerged up to No. 1 hold, steering had been lost and the situation was worsening.
Radio contact ended abruptly after about three minutes; the vessel sank and none of the 20 crew members survived.
The Norwegian Maritime Directorate identified the direct cause in general terms as water ingress into the fore part of the ship, but could not determine the specific initiating damage.
The Directorate concluded that the vessel's structural integrity during the voyage could not have met the required standard.

Narrative

Leros Strength left Murmansk on 2 February 1997 for Police, Poland. The Cyprus-flagged bulk carrier carried 18,180 tonnes of apatite in cargo holds Nos. 1, 3 and 5; holds Nos. 2 and 4 were empty. Her crew comprised 20 Polish seafarers. During the six-day passage the vessel encountered poor weather, and by the morning of 8 February conditions near the casualty position were described as a westerly gale or strong gale with waves up to four metres.

At 07:50 local time, about 30 nautical miles southwest of Stavanger, the master contacted the Rescue Co-ordination Centre at Sola/Stavanger and requested immediate assistance. He reported that the bow was under water up to No. 1 hold, the vessel could not be steered and the situation was becoming progressively worse. Radio contact ended abruptly after approximately three minutes.

The Rescue Co-ordination Centre immediately began an emergency response. A helicopter was dispatched at 08:09 and a coastguard vessel left Karmsundet at 08:15. When the helicopter reached the reported position at 08:47, Leros Strength had sunk. Oil, two life rafts and a lifeboat were visible. By 08:59 responders had established that the survival craft contained no survivors. Seven merchant vessels joined the search by midday. The operation resumed the following morning with a coastguard vessel, a helicopter and three aerial searches, but was discontinued at noon. All 20 crew members were lost.

The Norwegian Maritime Directorate later conducted two underwater inspections and reviewed classification and survey records. The wreck was severely crushed and distorted, most likely because it struck a hard seabed beneath a thin sediment layer. That post-sinking damage prevented investigators from identifying the specific initiating failure. The Directorate identified the direct cause only in general terms as water ingress into the fore part of the ship. A stability and longitudinal-strength study commissioned by the Cyprus investigation found it highly probable that the forepeak and Nos. 1 and 2 holds were flooded when the master called for help.

The Directorate considered several possible leakage paths and subsequent failure sequences, including detached shell plating, hatch covers, ventilators, sounding pipes and transverse-bulkhead collapse, but did not select among them. It concluded that the weather was not extreme and that the extent of progressive flooding showed the vessel's structural integrity could not have met the required standard. Its review also found inadequate survey documentation, unclear evidence of repairs and serious inconsistencies between the special-survey record and defects identified shortly afterwards by port-state control.

Sequence of events

Date/time	Event
1997-02-02	Leros Strength departed Murmansk for Police, Poland.
1997-02-08 07:50 local	The master requested immediate assistance and reported the bow submerged up to No. 1 hold and loss of steering.
1997-02-08 07:53 local	Radio contact ended abruptly after approximately three minutes.
1997-02-08 08:09 local	A rescue helicopter was dispatched.
1997-02-08 08:47 local	The helicopter reached the distress position and reported that the vessel had sunk.
1997-02-08 08:59 local	Responders established that there were no survivors in the observed survival craft.
1997-02-09 12:00 local	The search was discontinued as futile.

Contributing factors

Factor	Evidence status	Description
Forward water ingress	Confirmed finding	The Directorate identified water ingress into the fore part of the ship as the direct cause in general terms, while leaving the initiating damage unresolved.
Progressive compartment flooding	Confirmed finding	The Cyprus stability study found it highly probable that the forepeak and Nos. 1 and 2 holds were flooded during the distress call.
Inadequate structural integrity	Confirmed finding	The Directorate concluded that the vessel's structural integrity during the voyage could not have met the required standard.
Gale conditions	Reported	The casualty occurred in a westerly gale or strong gale with waves up to four metres, although the Directorate said the conditions were not extreme.
Survey and repair records	Confirmed finding	The Directorate found inadequate survey documentation and could not verify whether several earlier structural defects had been repaired or overlooked.

Investigation

The Norwegian Maritime Directorate's report supplemented the Cyprus Department of Merchant Shipping's flag-state investigation. It documented the search, underwater inspections, class-transfer history and structural survey record. The Directorate could not establish the specific initiating damage because the wreck had been extensively damaged when it struck the seabed. It therefore stated the direct cause only in general terms as ingress of water into the fore part of the vessel. The report concluded that structural integrity was below the required standard and recommended stronger survey reporting, control of repair deferrals, oversight of structural repairs and tighter safeguards for transfers between classification societies.

References

Norwegian Maritime Directorate report on Leros Strength