Carnival Splendor engine failure and fire (2010)

Classification

• Incident Type: Engine Failure / Fire
• Severity: High

Vessel Details

Incident Details

Key facts

• The casualty began with a hydrolock-damaged connecting rod in diesel generator 5 that later failed by fatigue.
• The resulting fuel-and-lubricating-oil fire spread from deck level to overhead cable runs.
• Delayed Hi-Fog activation allowed the initial fire to reach the cables, while both attempts to discharge the fixed CO2 system failed.
• The report recorded no injuries or fatalities among 3,299 passengers and 1,167 crew.
• Extensive electrical damage prevented the unaffected generators from restoring primary power, and the vessel was towed to San Diego.

Narrative

On 8 November 2010, the Panamanian-flagged cruise ship Carnival Splendor was approximately 150 nautical miles south of San Diego and proceeding toward Puerto Vallarta. It carried 3,299 passengers and 1,167 crew. Four of its six diesel generators were supplying propulsion and ship-service power when diesel generator 5 (DG5) registered a torsional-vibration alarm at 05:58 Pacific Standard Time. A minute later, engineers investigating the machinery heard an explosion and encountered rapidly developing black smoke.

The United States Coast Guard investigation traced the initiating failure to an earlier hydrolock event. Liquid had entered DG5's B1 cylinder and bent its connecting rod without the damage being detected. The rod subsequently failed through fatigue on the morning of the casualty, destroying machinery in the shared crankshaft bay and ejecting engine components, fuel, and lubricating oil. These materials produced a short-lived pool fire between DG5 and DG6. Before that fire went out, it ignited overhead cable runs, creating a secondary fire that smouldered, generated heavy smoke, and repeatedly reflashed.

Engineering watchstanders shut down DG5 and DG6, stopped ventilation, and began closing fuel valves, dampers, fire-screen doors, and watertight doors. They did not manually activate the local Hi-Fog water-mist system before leaving the engine control room. At 06:01, a bridge watchstander reset the fire-detection panel after detectors above DG5 and DG6 activated. The reset prevented the automatic sequence from operating as intended, and Hi-Fog did not reach the affected generators until 06:15. The Coast Guard found that this delay was critical: prompt local protection would probably have extinguished or contained the initial pool fire before it reached the cables.

At 06:10, the remaining online generators tripped and the ship lost primary electrical power. The emergency diesel generator and batteries supported emergency services, although the emergency generator itself stopped twice and had to be restored by engineers. Fire teams took about two hours to locate the cable fire. Portable dry-powder and CO2 extinguishers achieved temporary knockdown but did not cool the cable conductors, and ventilation of the space before the fire was fully extinguished contributed to reflashing. Smoke spread beyond the aft engine room because boundaries were not effectively maintained.

The master ordered use of the fixed full-flood CO2 system after renewed fire was reported. A remote release attempt at 11:13 failed. A later local attempt also failed because the aft-engine-room section valve did not open and gas leaked from fittings, hoses, and connections; no CO2 entered the machinery space. Investigators identified installation deficiencies, inconsistent operating instructions, and an activation sequence that created a pressure differential across the valve. By 13:15, no active fire was visible. The Coast Guard considered oxygen depletion after the watertight doors were closed the most likely reason the cable fire extinguished.

Fire damage to cables, wireways, and switchboard components prevented engineers from restarting unaffected generators or reconnecting them to the distribution system. The vessel therefore remained without primary propulsion power and was towed to San Diego, arriving on 11 November. No passengers or crew were injured or killed. The report gave no monetary damage estimate and did not separately state a missing-person count.

The investigation distinguished the initiating machinery failure from the response and resilience deficiencies that worsened its consequences. It linked the hydrolock to a degraded and poorly designed air-cooler system, informal drainage controls, and a slow-turn interval extended from 30 minutes to two hours. It separately found shortcomings in Hi-Fog activation, firefighting tactics and training, smoke control, the CO2 installation and procedures, and electrical-system arrangements that allowed damage in one machinery space to cause a complete loss of primary power.

Sequence of events

Contributing factors

Investigation

The United States Coast Guard led the marine casualty investigation, with Panama participating as a substantially interested state and support from the National Transportation Safety Board. Its report, dated 24 June 2013, made five safety recommendations covering Hi-Fog timing, air-cooler and slow-turn controls, crew firefighting competence, CO2 installation and inspection, electrical resilience, and fire-drill oversight. The Commandant's action was published on 15 July 2013.

References

• USCG report of investigation into the fire onboard Carnival Splendor

Video

• On-board video of the 2010 fire

Related

• Carnival Splendor
• Pacific Ocean
• United States Coast Guard
• Fire

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