Classification
- Incident Type: Fire
- Severity: High
- Tug involvement: no
- Tug mechanism: N/A
Fire caused by poor operational decisions following an initial machinery breakdown.
Vessel Details
| Field | Value |
|---|
| Vessel Name | Maersk Doha |
| Vessel Type | Container |
| Flag State | United Kingdom [GB] |
| IMO Number | 9103685 |
| Gross Tonnage | 51931 |
| LOA (m) | 280.52 |
| Breadth (m) | |
| TEU | |
| Year Built | 1996 |
| Crew Size | 23 |
Incident Details
| Field | Value |
|---|
| Date | 2006-10-02 |
| Location | Chesapeake Bay, off Norfolk, Virginia |
| Coordinates | 36.961000, -76.060333 |
| Region | United States |
| Fatalities | |
| Injuries | |
| Missing | |
| Outcome | A soot fire damaged the exhaust gas economiser and auxiliary boiler after a low-water boiler failure; the fire was extinguished, but casualty counts are not confirmed in the reviewed report. |
| Direct Damage | |
| Estimated Economic Damage | |
Key facts
- A low-water condition distorted and cracked the auxiliary-boiler furnace tube, causing loss of steam pressure shortly after Maersk Doha left Norfolk.
- The main engine continued running while the exhaust gas economiser's feed-water circulation was unavailable, and the economiser ran dry.
- A soot fire started in the economiser at about 02:00 on 2 October 2006. The crew evacuated the engine room because of intense radiant heat.
- The fixed CO2 system did not discharge fully because its pilot cylinders were empty, and the report found it unsuitable for the deep-seated high-temperature soot fire.
- The crew eventually cooled the economiser boundaries and sprayed water directly onto the tubes. The economiser and boiler sustained heavy damage.
Narrative
At 0030 on October 2, 2006, shortly after leaving Norfolk, the Maersk Doha's auxiliary boiler suffered a failure when a low water condition caused its furnace tube to distort and crack. Steam pressure was lost. Instead of anchoring, the master and chief engineer agreed to proceed. Because the EGE relied on the auxiliary boiler for feed water circulation, it soon ran dry while the main engine continued pumping hot exhaust gases through it. By 0200, an EGE soot fire started. The crew struggled to fight the fire due to intense radiant heat, evacuating the engine room. They activated the CO2 smothering system, but it failed to discharge fully because the pilot cylinders were empty, and regardless, CO2 would have been ineffective against the deep-seated high-temperature soot (and likely hydrogen/iron) fire. With guidance from shore management, the crew eventually managed to cool the EGE boundaries and directly spray water onto the tubes to extinguish the fire. The EGE and boiler sustained heavy damage.
Sequence of events
| Date/time | Event |
|---|
| 2006-10-02 00:30 | The auxiliary boiler suffered a low-water failure and lost steam pressure. |
| 2006-10-02 | Maersk Doha continued under main-engine power, causing the exhaust gas economiser to run dry. |
| 2006-10-02 about 02:00 | A soot fire started in the exhaust gas economiser. |
| 2006-10-02 | The crew evacuated the engine room, and the fixed CO2 system failed to discharge fully. |
| 2006-10-02 | Boundary cooling and direct water application extinguished the fire; the economiser and boiler were heavily damaged. |
Contributing factors
| Factor | Evidence status | Description |
|---|
| Continued main-engine operation | Confirmed finding | The main engine continued running after the auxiliary-boiler low-water failure while economiser feed-water circulation was unavailable. |
| Exhaust gas economiser overheating | Confirmed finding | The economiser ran dry and developed a deep-seated soot fire. |
| CO2 system failure | Confirmed finding | The fixed CO2 system did not discharge fully because the pilot cylinders were empty. |
| Emergency-response deficiencies | Confirmed finding | MAIB identified weak emergency-procedure compliance, fire-drill effectiveness, crew understanding, and leadership by the master and chief engineer. |
Investigation
The Marine Accident Investigation Branch published report 15/2007 in July 2007. It identified the auxiliary-boiler low-water failure, continued main-engine operation, economiser overheating, incomplete CO2 discharge, and weaknesses in emergency response as central to the casualty sequence. The report records heavy machinery damage but does not provide a normalized monetary loss estimate.
References
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