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Accidents

Edmund Fitzgerald (1975)

The Great Lakes bulk carrier Edmund Fitzgerald sank in eastern Lake Superior during a severe storm on 10 November 1975, with the loss of all 29 people aboard.

Classification

  • Incident Type: Sinking
  • Severity: High
  • Vessel: Great Lakes bulk carrier

The vessel was a total loss and no survivors were found.

Vessel Details

FieldValue
Vessel NameEdmund Fitzgerald
Vessel TypeBulk Carrier
Flag StateUnited States [US]
IMO Number5097216
Official Number277437
Gross Tonnage13632
LOA (m)222.2
Year Built1958
Crew Size29

Incident Details

FieldValue
Date1975-11-10
LocationEastern Lake Superior, approximately 17 miles from Whitefish Bay, Michigan, in Canadian waters
Coordinates46.998500, -85.110167
RegionCanada
Fatalities29
Injuries0
Missing0
Cargo Loss26,116 long tons of taconite pellets
Investigation BodyNational Transportation Safety Board

Key facts

  • Edmund Fitzgerald was fully loaded with 26,116 long tons of taconite pellets on a voyage from Superior, Wisconsin, to Detroit, Michigan.
  • At about 19:15 EST, the vessel sank in eastern Lake Superior at approximately 46°59.91′N, 85°06.61′W.
  • The master reported a damaged fence rail, lost vents and a list at about 15:30; by 16:10 both radars were inoperative.
  • The NTSB found that progressive flooding reduced freeboard and caused one or more hatch covers to collapse under heavy boarding seas, leading to rapid cargo-hold flooding.
  • No distress call was heard, no survivors were found and no bodies were recovered.

Narrative

Edmund Fitzgerald loaded 26,116 long tons of taconite pellets at Burlington Northern Railroad's dock in Superior, Wisconsin, on 9 November 1975. It departed for Detroit, Michigan, in deteriorating weather. The master chose a route using the lee of the Canadian shore rather than the recommended southern track as the storm moved across Lake Superior. The vessel proceeded at reduced speed in heavy seas while the freighter Arthur M. Anderson followed on a different track.

At about 15:30 on 10 November, Edmund Fitzgerald reported to Arthur M. Anderson that a fence rail was down, two vents had been lost and the vessel had a list. The master said both pumps were operating. At about 16:10, he reported that both radars were inoperative and asked Arthur M. Anderson to keep track of the vessel and provide navigational assistance. Between 17:00 and 17:30, he told the Swedish vessel Avafors that Edmund Fitzgerald had a bad list, had lost both radars and was taking heavy seas over the deck.

At 19:10, Edmund Fitzgerald told Arthur M. Anderson that it was holding its own. This was the last radiotelephone conversation. Radar contact was lost at about 19:20, and repeated calls received no response. The vessel sank at about 19:15 according to the NTSB synopsis, in a position approximately 17 miles from the entrance to Whitefish Bay. The wreck was later located in about 530 feet of water just north of the international boundary in Canadian waters.

The NTSB concluded that flooding had entered ballast tanks and the tunnel through topside damage and had also entered the cargo hold through non-weathertight hatch covers. Water on deck and in the hull reduced freeboard and created or increased a list. The resulting hydrostatic and hydrodynamic loads from heavy boarding seas caused one or more hatch covers to collapse. Without transverse watertight bulkheads in the cargo hold, the flooding spread rapidly and the vessel sank bow first. The report found grounding unlikely after reviewing the reconstructed trackline and underwater wreck evidence.

All 29 officers and crewmembers were lost. No distress call was heard by vessels or shore stations, and no survivors or bodies were recovered. The report contains a dissenting opinion that considered shoaling a more likely initiating event; the NTSB majority rejected grounding as the probable initiating cause and retained hatch-cover collapse after progressive flooding as its probable cause.

Sequence of events

Date/timeEvent
1975-11-09Edmund Fitzgerald loaded taconite pellets at Superior, Wisconsin, and departed for Detroit.
1975-11-10 15:30 ESTThe master reported a damaged fence rail, lost vents, a list and operating pumps.
1975-11-10 16:10 ESTThe master reported that both radars were inoperative and requested navigational assistance from Arthur M. Anderson.
1975-11-10 17:00-17:30 ESTThe master told Avafors that the vessel had a bad list and was taking heavy seas over the deck.
1975-11-10 19:10 ESTEdmund Fitzgerald reported that it was holding its own.
1975-11-10 about 19:15 ESTThe vessel sank in eastern Lake Superior.
1975-11-10 about 19:20 ESTArthur M. Anderson lost radar contact and received no response to repeated calls.

Contributing factors

FactorEvidence statusDescription
Progressive flooding and reduced freeboardConfirmed findingTopside and non-weathertight hatch-cover flooding reduced freeboard and contributed to a list before the final failure.
Hatch-cover collapseConfirmed findingHeavy boarding seas imposed sufficient hydrostatic and hydrodynamic loads to collapse one or more hatch covers.
Cargo-hold subdivisionConfirmed findingThe lack of transverse watertight bulkheads allowed flooding to spread through the cargo hold.
Great Lakes load-line amendmentsConfirmed findingThe NTSB identified reduced freeboard authorized by amendments to the Great Lakes Load Line Regulations as a contributing factor.
Possible shoalingSuspectedA dissenting Board member considered shoaling the likely initiating event, but the NTSB majority found grounding unlikely.

Investigation

The National Transportation Safety Board adopted Marine Accident Report NTSB-MAR-78-3 on 4 May 1978. Its probable cause was sudden massive cargo-hold flooding after one or more hatch covers collapsed. The report identified the lack of transverse watertight bulkheads and reduced regulatory freeboard as contributing factors. It also evaluated and rejected grounding as the majority's probable initiating event, while preserving a dissenting opinion that favored shoaling.

References

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