Classification
- Incident Type: Capsize girding
- Severity: High
Vessel Details
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Vessel Name | Starkad |
| Vessel Names | Starkad / FFS Atlas |
| Vessel Type | Tug |
| Flag State | Norway [NO] |
| IMO Number | |
| Call Sign | LK7940 |
| Gross Tonnage | |
| LOA (m) | 14.33 |
| Breadth (m) | 4.80 |
| Bollard Pull (t) | 7.5 |
| Power (kW) | 350.48 |
| Year Built | 1991 |
| Crew Size | 2 |
FFS Atlas was the 30.7 m, 259 gross tonnage ASD tug towing an unnamed 67 m newbuilding hull. Starkad was engaged as the assisting tug for the newbuilding's approach to Fitjar Mekaniske Verksted.
Incident Details
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Date | 2014-02-22 |
| Location | Fitjarvika, Stord, Norway |
| Coordinates | 59.9356, 5.3003 |
| Region | Norway |
| Fatalities | 1 |
| Injuries | |
| Missing | 0 |
| Vessels Lost | 0 |
| Investigation Body | Accident Investigation Board Norway (AIBN) |
| Direct Damage | |
| Economic Damage | |
| Outcome | Starkad capsized, was righted and sustained water damage; the skipper died and the deckman survived. |
Key facts
- Starkad connected to the port quarter of an unnamed newbuilding being towed by FFS Atlas and was intended to brake the tow during the approach to the shipyard.
- As Starkad turned to place its stern in the direction of travel, the tow accelerated from 2.3 knots to between 3.7 and 4.7 knots.
- The towing hawser pulled taut across Starkad's starboard side, and the tug capsized between 10:49:33 and 10:49:42 local time.
- The skipper was trapped in the wheelhouse and died; the deckman escaped into the water and was rescued by a recreational fisherman.
- Starkad remained afloat upside down, was towed to the shipyard, righted five days later and found to have sustained water damage.
Narrative
Starkad was a Norwegian conventional-propeller tug engaged by BK Marine AS to assist the arrival of an unnamed 67 m fishing-vessel newbuilding at Fitjar Mekaniske Verksted. FFS Atlas had towed the hull from Szczecin and was the main tug. Starkad's role was to connect at the newbuilding's stern and act as a braking tug during the final approach to the yard.
After placing two mooring personnel aboard the newbuilding, Starkad's crew rigged a 48.5 m hawser between the tug's towing hook and a bollard on the newbuilding's port quarter. Starkad initially followed parallel to the tow and then began turning to port so that its stern would face the direction of travel. The skipper manoeuvred from the open starboard wheelhouse doorway while the deckman handled the slack hawser aft.
The tow was making about 2.3 knots when Starkad began the turn. Its crew were then surprised by a sudden acceleration. The hawser tightened across Starkad's starboard side while the tug lay nearly across the tow's course. The skipper moved toward the emergency-release handle, about three metres from the manoeuvring position, but did not reach it before the load came on. The tug heeled sharply and capsized between 10:49:33 and 10:49:42 as the tow's speed increased through 3.7 knots to as much as 4.7 knots.
The deckman was thrown onto the deck, recovered his footing and jumped into the water as the tug reached about 90 degrees of heel. He climbed onto the overturned bow and was taken aboard a recreational fishing boat at 10:59. The skipper remained trapped in the wheelhouse. Divers recovered him at about 12:00, and he was declared dead at 13:04. Starkad stayed afloat inverted, was towed to the shipyard and was righted on 27 February. The investigation recorded water damage to electrical and machinery systems but did not classify the tug as a total loss; it was subsequently sold and renamed.
The AIBN found that Starkad lacked the stability reserve to withstand the transverse hawser load created by its towing arrangement. The effective attachment point was near the vessel's centre rather than aft. The Board also identified deficient planning, incomplete communication between the tug masters, and the inaccessible emergency release as safety-critical factors.
Sequence of events
| Date/time | Event |
|---|---|
| 2014-02-22 09:30 local | FFS Atlas and the newbuilding tow arrived in Fitjarvika. |
| 2014-02-22 10:38 local | FFS Atlas reduced speed so Starkad could place two mooring personnel aboard the newbuilding. |
| 2014-02-22 10:49:33–10:49:42 local | The hawser tightened across Starkad's starboard side as the tow accelerated, and the tug capsized. |
| 2014-02-22 10:59 local | A recreational fisherman rescued the deckman from the overturned tug. |
| 2014-02-22 11:47 local | Starkad was brought alongside the shipyard quay and secured for a diver search. |
| 2014-02-22 12:00 local | A diver found the skipper in the wheelhouse; he was later declared dead. |
| 2014-02-27 | Starkad was righted and pumped out. |
Contributing factors
| Factor | Evidence status | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Towing arrangement | Confirmed finding | The effective hawser attachment point was near midships and on the centreline, leaving Starkad vulnerable to large heel angles when the towline loaded across the side. |
| Tow acceleration | Confirmed finding | The tow accelerated unexpectedly while Starkad was turning, increasing from 2.3 knots to between 3.7 and 4.7 knots during the capsize interval. |
| Planning and risk assessment | Confirmed finding | Starkad's limitations and connection method were absent from the operation manual, and the tug's master was not familiar with the operation's details. |
| Communication | Confirmed finding | The masters of Starkad and FFS Atlas did not correct the incomplete information exchanged before the manoeuvre. |
| Emergency-release access | Confirmed finding | The release handle was about three metres from the manoeuvring position, and the skipper could not reach it before the hawser loaded. |
Investigation
The Accident Investigation Board Norway published Marine Report 2016/12 in October 2016. It concluded that the capsize resulted from a transverse hawser force that exceeded Starkad's stability reserve. The Board considered that moving the effective towing point aft with a gobline would probably have prevented the capsize. It also found that better planning and risk assessment by Fitjar Mekaniske Verksted and Farsund Fortøyningsselskap, clearer communication between the tug masters, and an emergency release within reach of the manoeuvring position could have prevented the accident.
References
Related
- Norway
- Accident Investigation Board Norway (AIBN)
- Girding
- Capsize Girding
- Tug Incident Classification
- Starkad