Classification
- Incident Type: Capsize girding
- Severity: Low
- Region: Australia
This was a near-capsize girding incident. The reviewed web source reports three crewmen overboard, minor flooding and accommodation damage, and fuel contamination; it does not provide a casualty count.
Vessel Details
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Vessel Name | Stockton II |
| Vessel Type | Tug |
| Flag State | |
| IMO Number | |
| Gross Tonnage | |
| LOA (m) | |
| Breadth (m) | |
| Bollard Pull (t) | |
| Power (kW) | |
| Owner/Operator | |
| Year Built | |
| Crew Size | |
| Other vessel | Warramunga, Anzac-class frigate |
Incident Details
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Date | 2000-10-27 |
| Location | Williamstown dockyard and Williamstown Channel, Melbourne |
| Coordinates | -37.8142, 144.9632 |
| Region | Australia |
| Fatalities | |
| Injuries | |
| Missing | |
| Cargo Loss | |
| Direct Damage | Minor flooding and damage to the galley/accommodation; fuel contamination was reported. |
| Economic Damage | |
| Insured Loss | |
| Salvage/Cleanup Cost |
Key facts
- Stockton II was secured port side aft to tow Warramunga from the Williamstown dockyard into the Williamstown Channel.
- As the frigate swung toward the sea, it gathered headway before the tug had been let go. The article reports that the frigate's propellers remained at 40% ahead for more than a minute and that speed exceeded 10 knots.
- The towline could not be kept over Stockton II's stern, leaving the tug broadside with the tow over the beam. The towline parted before the tug fully capsized.
- Three crewmen jumped overboard when capsize appeared likely; the article reports that none was wearing a personal flotation device or lifejacket.
- Water entered through an open deckhouse door and through a fuel-tank vent, causing minor damage to the galley/accommodation and some fuel contamination.
Narrative
Stockton II was made fast port side aft to tow the new Anzac-class frigate Warramunga from the Williamstown dockyard into the Williamstown Channel for sea trials. As the frigate swung head to sea, it gathered headway before the tug had been released. The reviewed web article, which summarizes the Marine Safety Victoria investigation, reports that the frigate's propellers were set to 40% ahead for more than a minute and that the ship's speed exceeded 10 knots.
Stockton II could not keep the towline over its stern. The tug was pulled broadside with the tow over the beam and heeled toward capsize. Three crewmen jumped overboard when the capsize appeared likely. The towline parted before the tug fully capsized, allowing it to return to an upright position. The article reports that water entered through a deckhouse door that had been clipped open and through a fuel-tank vent. This caused minor damage to the galley and accommodation and some fuel contamination.
The reviewed article reports that there had been no pre-task briefing for the tugmasters, that the towline was made fast to H bitts rather than an emergency-release hook, and that Stockton II lacked an after winch or means to adjust its gob rope. These points are presented below as reported findings from the secondary web account. The public sources reviewed do not establish fatalities, injuries, or economic loss.
Sequence of events
| Date/time | Event |
|---|---|
| 2000-10-27 | Stockton II was made fast port side aft to tow Warramunga from Williamstown dockyard. |
| 2000-10-27 | Warramunga gathered headway before the tug had been let go; Stockton II was pulled broadside with the tow over the beam. |
| 2000-10-27 | Three crewmen went overboard as the tug appeared likely to capsize. |
| 2000-10-27 | The towline parted before a full capsize; the tug returned upright, with reported minor flooding and fuel contamination. |
Contributing factors
The following factors are reported in the reviewed Seaways web article's account of the Marine Safety Victoria investigation. The direct official report link was identified but was not accessible in the web review.
| Evidence label | Factor | Evidence-bounded description |
|---|---|---|
| Reported | Frigate gathered headway before release | The article reports sustained 40% ahead propulsion for more than a minute before the tug was ordered to slip. |
| Reported | Communication and bridge resource management | The article reports deficiencies in communication and bridge-team coordination during the manoeuvre. |
| Reported | No pre-task briefing | The article reports that the tugmasters had no pre-task briefing covering the operation and the tug's limitations. |
| Reported | No emergency towline release | The article reports that the towline was made fast to H bitts rather than a slip hook. |
| Reported | Tug configuration and suitability | The article reports that Stockton II lacked an after winch or means to adjust its gob rope and was not well suited to ship-assist work. |
| Reported | Watertight integrity | The article reports that an open deckhouse door allowed water ingress as the tug heeled. |
Investigation
Marine Safety Victoria's 2000 investigation into the incident between Warramunga and the tugs Stockton and Vital is linked by the reviewed Seaways article. The official historical report link was identified on the web, but the direct report could not be fetched in the web review. The findings and contributing factors on this page are therefore labelled as reported from the secondary web account rather than as independently verified quotations from the official report.
References
- Marine Safety Victoria: Investigation of incident between frigate Warramunga and tugs Stockton and Vital, Melbourne
- International Tugmasters Association / Seaways: The importance of ‘being prepared’ as demonstrated by a Melbourne tugboat almost girted
Video
Related
- Stockton II
- Australia
- Girding
- Capsize Girding
- Gog and Gob Rope / Bridle Wire
- Tug Incident Classification
- Marine Safety Victoria