MV Stride (2024)

Classification

• Incident Type: Fire
• Severity: High

Vessel Details

Incident Details

Key facts

• The fire began at about 0331 local time, roughly 25 minutes after diesel bunkering started.
• Two engine-room crew members died and one was seriously injured; the casualty summary lists 22 people aboard.
• Diesel overflow from a full tank reached operating machinery after an incorrect replacement valve prevented a tank from filling.
• The vessel was declared a constructive total loss, with estimated property damage of USD 12 million.
• The fire self-extinguished after the crew shut down engine-room ventilation; no environmental damage was reported.

Narrative

On 8 January 2024 at about 0331 Central Standard Time, the cargo vessel Stride was alongside at Barbours Cut Marine Terminal in LaPorte, Texas, receiving fuel from a bunker barge. The fire began about 25 minutes after diesel transfer started. The casualty summary records 22 people aboard, two fatal injuries and one serious injury. The chief engineer, third engineer and a wiper were trapped in the engine control room. The ship’s crew and shore firefighters recovered them; the two engineers died at the scene and the wiper was taken to hospital. No environmental damage was reported (NTSB, pp. 1–2, 8–10).

Investigators found that a replacement valve installed in the port diesel tank fill line was a check valve rather than the bidirectional valve specified in the vessel drawings. Although the crew opened the fill valves for both port and starboard tanks, diesel could not enter the port tank and instead filled the starboard tank. The crew increased the transfer rate without first establishing the filling rate or checking tank levels by local sounding. Once the starboard tank filled, continued pumping forced diesel into the common vent pipe. A section of that pipe had been cut out and patched with flexible sealant and tape. The pressure displaced the patch, allowing fuel to pour down into the engine room and onto operating machinery, where it ignited. The report could not identify the precise ignition source (NTSB, pp. 20–24).

The crew stopped machinery, mustered, closed ventilation dampers, prepared hoses and cooled the engine-room boundaries. They initially could not reach the three people in the control room because of fire and smoke. The fire later self-extinguished after ventilation was shut down. Rescue teams found the three crew members at about 0415 and removed them by about 0450. The report valued property damage at USD 12 million and states that Stride was declared a constructive total loss. The NTSB identified diesel cascading onto operating machinery because of the incorrect valve and altered vent pipe as the probable cause; inadequate monitoring of tank levels during bunkering contributed (NTSB, pp. 9–10, 13, 22–24).

Sequence of events

Contributing factors

Investigation

The National Transportation Safety Board investigated the casualty with U.S. Coast Guard participation and published Marine Investigation Report MIR-25-05 on 20 February 2025. The NTSB determined that diesel overflowed through the common vent after the incorrect fill-line valve blocked the port tank, then ignited after cascading onto operating machinery. The report also identified failure to monitor tank levels as a contributing factor. It could not determine the exact ignition source (NTSB, pp. 23–24).

References

• NTSB MIR-25-05: Engine Room Fire aboard Cargo Vessel Stride

Related

• MV Stride
• United States
• Fire
• U.S. Coast Guard / National Transportation Safety Board

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