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Accidents

Yantian Express (2019)

A fire broke out in the forward deck cargo of Yantian Express in the North Atlantic on 3 January 2019. Severe weather and limited firefighting resources forced the crew to abandon ship, but all 22 crew survived; salvage teams eventually controlled the fire and towed the vessel to Freeport.

Classification

  • Incident Type: Fire
  • Severity: High
  • Investigation Body: BSU

Vessel Details

FieldValue
Vessel NameYantian Express
Vessel TypeContainer
Flag StateGermany [DE]
IMO Number9229831
Gross Tonnage88493
LOA (m)320.38
Breadth (m)42.80
TEU7236
Year Built2002
Crew Size22

Incident Details

FieldValue
Date2019-01-03
LocationNorth Atlantic
Coordinates37.616667, -51.233333
RegionAtlantic Ocean
Fatalities0
Missing0
Direct DamageExtensive fire, heat and water damage to forward deck cargo and cargo holds 1 and 2.
OutcomeAll 22 crew survived; the vessel was abandoned during the fire, salvaged and towed to Freeport after extensive fire and water damage.

Key facts

  • The fire was detected at about 00:30 ship time on 3 January 2019 in the forward deck cargo near bay 12 above cargo hold 2.
  • Force 8 to 9 winds, low temperatures and an almost exhausted supply of breathing-air cylinders made direct firefighting increasingly dangerous.
  • Eleven crew transferred to SMIT NICOBAR on 5 January; the remaining crew abandoned Yantian Express on 6 January.
  • Salvage teams extinguished the deck-container fires by 21 January, and the tow to the Bahamas began on 22 January.
  • BSU considered self-heating in a container carrying misdeclared pyrochar more likely than other ignition scenarios, but no actual evidence established the cause.

Narrative

Yantian Express was sailing westbound from Colombo to Halifax when a glow was detected in the forward deck cargo at about 00:30 ship time on 3 January 2019. The general alarm was sounded, the crew mustered and the fire was located at the aft edge of bay 12 above cargo hold 2. Crew members used hoses, water-mist lances and breathing apparatus while the ship altered course to place the wind astern.

Firefighting conditions were severe. Winds reached force 8 to 9, the sea state deteriorated and the supply of compressed-air cylinders for breathing apparatus was nearly exhausted. Active crew firefighting was discontinued as the fire spread, although cooling nozzles and water shields remained in use. SMIT NICOBAR arrived late on 4 January and began fighting the fire with its monitors. An explosion occurred on 5 January in a container carrying nitrocellulose, while firefighting water accumulating in cargo hold 2 raised stability concerns.

Eleven of the 22 crew members transferred safely to SMIT NICOBAR on 5 January. The remaining crew abandoned Yantian Express on the afternoon of 6 January, leaving operating systems running where possible because a return was planned. MAERSK MOBILISER arrived on 7 January and took charge of firefighting. On 9 January, five crew members and the salvage master returned to establish a towing connection. Additional firefighters and equipment arrived with SOVEREIGN on 15 January.

Salvage teams announced the deck-container fires extinguished on 21 January. The tow to the Bahamas began on 22 January, and the last burning containers in cargo hold 1 were extinguished by 26 January. Yantian Express reached Freeport roadstead on 30 January and entered port on 4 February. The fire caused extensive heat, fire and water damage to the forward deck cargo and cargo holds 1 and 2. All 22 crew survived.

The BSU found that a container declared as carrying coconut pellets actually contained pyrochar, or coconut charcoal. Investigators considered it more likely that self-heating in the tightly packed pyrochar ignited an adjacent polypropylene cargo and then spread to cotton garments. No actual evidence established either that cause or the alternative ignition scenarios because the prolonged fire destroyed physical evidence and the cargo’s exact properties and transport history were uncertain. The report also identified inaccuracies in the fire and safety plan and a malfunctioning CO2-system time-delay unit.

Sequence of events

Date/timeEvent
2019-01-03 about 00:30 ship timeThe bridge detected a fire in the forward deck cargo; the crew mustered and began firefighting in bay 12.
2019-01-04 late eveningSMIT NICOBAR arrived and began monitor firefighting.
2019-01-05Eleven crew members transferred to SMIT NICOBAR; an explosion occurred in a nitrocellulose container.
2019-01-06 afternoonThe remaining crew abandoned Yantian Express.
2019-01-09Five crew members and the salvage master returned and established a towing connection.
2019-01-21The deck-container fires were declared extinguished.
2019-01-22The tow to the Bahamas began.
2019-01-30The tow arrived at Freeport roadstead.

Contributing factors

FactorEvidence statusDescription
Self-heating pyrocharSuspectedBSU considered self-heating in misdeclared pyrochar the more likely fire origin, but no actual evidence survived to prove the cause.
Severe weatherReportedForce 8 to 9 winds, high seas and low temperatures made access and sustained firefighting difficult.
Limited breathing airConfirmed findingThe near-exhaustion of compressed-air cylinders contributed to discontinuing active crew firefighting.
Fire and safety plan inaccuraciesConfirmed findingThe investigation identified inaccuracies concerning the transverse-bulkhead drencher system and the specified breathing-air volume.
CO2 time-delay malfunctionConfirmed findingA malfunctioning time-delay unit meant that only part of the intended CO2 supply was discharged into cargo hold 1.

Investigation

Germany’s Federal Bureau of Maritime Casualty Investigation investigated the serious marine casualty and published Report 15/19. It considered self-heating in the pyrochar container more likely than alternative ignition scenarios but stated that no actual evidence established the cause. The report also identified fire and safety plan inaccuracies and the CO2-system time-delay malfunction, and it issued a recommendation concerning the fire plan’s treatment of transverse-bulkhead drencher systems.

References

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