Skip to main content

Accidents

Cingluku/Jungjuk grounding at Shakmanof Cove

On 25 May 2023, the articulated tug and barge Cingluku/Jungjuk approached Shakmanof Cove from Marmot Bay near Kodiak, Alaska, to deliver supplies. The two vessels had been built in 2022 and were operated by Brice Marine. Cingluku was the powered tug unit and Jungjuk was the freight barge; six crew members were on board the coupled unit.

Classification

  • Incident Type: Grounded
  • Severity: Low

Vessel Details

FieldValue
Vessel NameCingluku / Jungjuk
Vessel TypeTug
Flag StateUnited States [US]
Gross Tonnage145
LOA (m)24.00
Crew Size6
Owner/OperatorBrice Marine

Incident Details

FieldValue
Date2023-05-25
TimeAbout 10:47 local
LocationShakmanof Cove, near Kodiak, Alaska
Coordinates57.9242, -152.6102
RegionUnited States
Fatalities0
Injuries0
Missing0
Direct Damage
Economic DamageUSD 1,467,649
OutcomeJungjuk grounded on a charted submerged rock and sustained hull and framing damage; Cingluku remained undamaged and no injuries or pollution were reported.
Investigation BodyNational Transportation Safety Board

Key facts

  • The articulated tug and barge approached Shakmanof Cove to deliver supplies.
  • Jungjuk grounded on a submerged rock near the cove entrance while the unit was turning.
  • The tug Cingluku remained undamaged; the barge Jungjuk sustained hull and internal framing damage.
  • The NTSB estimated repair costs at USD 1,467,649. No injuries or pollution were reported.

Narrative

On 25 May 2023, the articulated tug and barge Cingluku/Jungjuk approached Shakmanof Cove from Marmot Bay near Kodiak, Alaska, to deliver supplies. The two vessels had been built in 2022 and were operated by Brice Marine. Cingluku was the powered tug unit and Jungjuk was the freight barge; six crew members were on board the coupled unit.

The captain had planned the route into the cove with the vessel's electronic chart system and an electronic navigational chart. A submerged rock was marked near the entrance, but the route crossed the hazard because the captain did not identify it during planning. The investigation found that the United States Coast Pilot had not been consulted and that several grounding-avoidance functions were not being used effectively. The isolated-danger-symbol feature was disabled, contour-depth tools were not used, and the vessel's draft probably had not been entered into the system. As a result, the electronic chart system did not generate obstacle warnings while the route was being prepared.

At about 10:47 local time, Jungjuk grounded on the submerged rock while the articulated unit was turning near the entrance to Shakmanof Cove. The coupled tug remained undamaged, but the barge absorbed the grounding loads. Subsequent inspection identified indentations in the steel hull and damage to internal framing. Repairs to Jungjuk were estimated at USD 1,467,649. No crew members were injured and no pollution was reported.

The NTSB determined that the probable cause was the captain's failure to identify the charted rock when planning the approach. It identified the failure to use other available navigational information and the disabled or unused grounding-avoidance features as contributing factors. The casualty demonstrated that an electronic chart does not provide effective protection when safety contours, vessel draft, warning sectors, and isolated-hazard symbols are not correctly configured and actively checked during route planning.

Sequence of events

Date/timeEvent
2023-05-25 before 10:47Cingluku/Jungjuk approached Shakmanof Cove from Marmot Bay to deliver supplies.
2023-05-25 about 10:47Jungjuk grounded on a submerged rock near the cove entrance while the unit was turning.
2023-05-25 after the groundingCingluku remained undamaged; inspection found indentations and internal framing damage on Jungjuk.

Contributing factors

FactorEvidence statusDescription
Rock not identified during route planningConfirmed findingThe captain did not identify the charted submerged rock when planning the approach.
Coast Pilot not consultedConfirmed findingThe NTSB found that other available navigation resources were not used.
ECS grounding-avoidance featuresConfirmed findingThe isolated-danger-symbol feature was disabled, contour-depth features were not used, and the draft likely was not entered, preventing obstacle alerts.

Investigation

The National Transportation Safety Board investigated the casualty and issued a report in June 2024, reissued in July 2024 for readability corrections. It determined that the probable cause was the captain's failure to identify the charted rock during route planning and identified inadequate use of navigation resources and ECS grounding-avoidance functions as contributing factors.

References

Similar incidents