Classification
| Field | Value |
|---|
| Incident type | Grounded |
| Severity | High |
| Marine casualty classification | Very Serious Marine Casualty |
| Region | Atlantic Ocean |
| Location | Cape Peninsula, South Africa |
Vessel Details
| Field | Value |
|---|
| Name | CV24 |
| Type | Clipper 70 sloop, commercially operated sailing yacht |
| Flag state | United Kingdom |
| International call sign | 2GVF2 |
| Registered owner and manager | Clipper Ventures plc |
| Construction | Foam-reinforced plastic |
| Year built | 2013 |
| Length overall | 21.15 m |
| Displacement | 34.7 tonnes |
| Persons on board | 18 |
Incident Details
| Field | Value |
|---|
| Date and time | 2017-10-31 21:25 ship time (UTC+2) |
| Position | 34°14.27′S, 18°22.34′E |
| Voyage | Cape Town, South Africa, to Fremantle, Australia |
| Operation | Under sail during a commercial race |
| Coordinates | -34.237833, 18.372333 |
| Fatalities | 0; MAIB records injuries/fatalities as nil |
| Injuries | 0; MAIB records injuries/fatalities as nil |
| Vessel outcome | Abandoned, constructive total loss, later cut up and disposed of locally |
| Environmental impact | None recorded by MAIB |
Key facts
- A gust at 21:21 caused CV24 to broach while the crew prepared to gybe with a spinnaker hoisted.
- CV24 gybed at 21:23 and grounded at 21:25, after the yacht had turned toward the coast.
- The crew made unsuccessful attempts to refloat the yacht before the rescue response was activated.
- All 18 people on board abandoned into two liferafts and were transferred ashore by South African National Sea Rescue Institute lifeboats.
- The MAIB found that the coastal passage plan lacked adequate safety information and that navigation was not continuously supported while the skipper managed the deck evolution.
Narrative
CV24 was one of the Clipper 70 yachts competing in the 2017-2018 round-the-world race. On the Cape Town to Fremantle leg, 18 people were aboard: one professional skipper and 17 paid race crew. The yacht was sailing under full mainsail and a code 2 spinnaker as the true wind backed from the northeast and increased.
The skipper noticed that the yacht was no longer on a course that would clear the Cape safely and told the crew that a gybe was necessary. A crew member later saw on the navigation display that CV24 was very close to land, but the warning reached the skipper too late. At 21:21, a gust caused a broach. The yacht was brought back under control, gybed at 21:23, and grounded at 21:25.
The crew tried to refloat CV24 and contacted the race director at 21:48 after those attempts failed. The South African Maritime Rescue Co-ordination Centre directed the launch of NSRI lifeboats. All crew abandoned into two liferafts and were taken ashore. Widespread hull damage and uncontrolled water ingress made recovery impractical; after being washed ashore, the yacht was defueled, cut up, and disposed of locally.
Sequence of events
| Date/time | Event |
|---|
| 2017-10-31 21:15 ship time (UTC+2) | A crew member returning to the navigation station saw that CV24 was very close to land and went to warn the skipper. |
| 2017-10-31 21:21 ship time (UTC+2) | A gust caused CV24 to broach while the crew prepared to gybe. |
| 2017-10-31 21:23 ship time (UTC+2) | The yacht gybed. |
| 2017-10-31 21:25 ship time (UTC+2) | CV24 grounded on the Cape Peninsula. |
| 2017-10-31 21:48 ship time (UTC+2) | The skipper told the race director that CV24 was aground and refloating attempts had failed. |
| 2017-10-31 22:15 ship time (UTC+2) | The race director contacted the South African Maritime Rescue Co-ordination Centre, which directed the launch of NSRI lifeboats. |
| 2017-10-31 23:09 ship time (UTC+2) | The first NSRI lifeboat reached the area; the crew later abandoned into two liferafts and were transferred ashore. |
| 2017-11-01 to 2017-11-03 | CV24 was washed ashore, defueled, cut up, and disposed of locally. |
Contributing factors
| Factor | Evidence status | Description |
|---|
| Inadequate coastal passage planning | Confirmed finding | The MAIB found that the written and electronic plans did not provide enough detail for the coastal passage. No electronic track, cross-track distances, highlighted dangers, safety depths, or look-ahead parameters had been prepared. |
| No dedicated navigation support | Confirmed finding | No crew member was formally assigned to assist the skipper by preparing and monitoring the passage plan, and the navigation station was not continuously manned before the grounding. |
| Skipper distracted by the gybe evolution | Confirmed finding | The skipper took charge of the deck operation while also being the person responsible for the navigational picture. |
| Delayed and difficult night-time gybe | Confirmed finding | The gybe was a complex evolution in darkness with a spinnaker hoisted and a newly formed watch. A broach further delayed the manoeuvre. |
| Missing depth display at the port helm | Confirmed finding | The echo sounder was working, but depth was not displayed at the port helm and no coastal-navigation procedure required that setting. |
Investigation
The UK Marine Accident Investigation Branch investigated the casualty as a very serious marine casualty and published Investigation Report 12/2018 on 27 June 2018. The report made recommendations to the Maritime and Coastguard Agency and Clipper Ventures plc concerning safety management, manning, coastal navigation, and learning from previous groundings.
References
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