Classification
- Incident Type: Fire
- Severity: High
- Investigation classification: Serious incident
Vessel Details
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Vessel Name | Marigold |
| Vessel Type | Bulk Carrier |
| Flag State | Panama [PA] |
| IMO Number | 8815255 |
| Call Sign | 3FEE7 |
| Gross Tonnage | 110779 |
| LOA (m) | 309 |
| Breadth (m) | 50.00 |
| Year Built | 1990 |
| Crew Size | 23 |
Incident Details
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Date | 2014-07-13 |
| Time | About 14:47 local time (UTC+8) |
| Location | Finucane Island B berth, Port Hedland, Western Australia |
| Coordinates | -20.316667, 118.566667 |
| Region | Australia |
| Fatalities | 0 |
| Injuries | 2 |
| Missing | 0 |
Key facts
- The fire began on the number 1 diesel generator after a mismatched compression fitting on fuel-oil pressure-gauge piping separated.
- Pressurized fuel oil sprayed over the generator and likely ignited on a hot surface near the turbocharger.
- Fire doors were held open, ventilation closures could not be fully shut, and the engine room was not effectively isolated.
- The Halon system discharged only partially because a main distribution valve and several bottle-release valves failed.
- Two crewmembers were evacuated to hospital for smoke inhalation; all 23 crewmembers were accounted for.
- The fire burned out after about 12 hours. The generator flat, electrical systems, wiring, and switchboards sustained significant damage, and the accommodation became uninhabitable.
Narrative
Marigold was loading iron ore at Finucane Island B berth in Port Hedland on 13 July 2014. At about 14:47, the fire-detection system activated and the crew saw smoke and flames on the generator flat. The master sounded the general alarm and stopped cargo operations. The first engineer and three crewmembers evacuated from the lower engine room, and one oiler became disoriented while finding an exit. A head count at about 14:57 confirmed that all 23 crewmembers were accounted for.
The fire began after a compression fitting in the number 1 generator's fuel-oil pressure-gauge piping failed. A replacement gauge had been connected using steel and copper pipe with different outside diameters. The ATSB found that the steel pipe was probably not adequately secured, allowing pressurized fuel oil to spray over the generator and ignite on a hot surface.
The crew stopped the generators, operated fuel quick-closing valves, and tried to close ventilation openings. Several dampers and ventilators could not be fully closed, while fire doors had been tied or wired open. At 15:17, the master ordered release of the fixed Halon system, but the engine room was not sealed. Only one of two main distribution valves opened, and several bottle-release valves also failed. Two smoke-affected crewmembers were evacuated by helicopter to hospital.
Harbour tugs provided boundary cooling, but the emergency generator was later shut down, removing electrical power for the ship's fire pump and other systems. The fire continued into the night and burned out after about 12 hours. The generator flat and engine control room sustained extensive damage, the accommodation was uninhabitable, and Marigold was ultimately towed to Singapore for repairs.
Sequence of events
| Date/time | Event |
|---|---|
| 2014-07-13 14:47 local | Fire detection activated, and smoke and flames were found on the generator flat. |
| 2014-07-13 about 14:57 | A head count confirmed that all 23 crewmembers had evacuated the engine room. |
| 2014-07-13 15:17 | The crew released Halon, but the engine room was not effectively sealed and the system only partly discharged. |
| 2014-07-13 about 15:50 | Two smoke-affected crewmembers were evacuated to hospital. |
| 2014-07-13 about 22:00 | Inspection found that the Halon system had not functioned as intended. |
| 2014-07-14 about 13:30 | Specialist firefighters confirmed that the fire had burned out. |
| 2014-07-23 | Marigold departed Port Hedland under tow for repairs in Singapore. |
Contributing factors
| Factor | Evidence status | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Incompatible fuel-pipe fitting | Confirmed finding | A compression fitting joining pipes of different outside diameters separated and released fuel that ignited on a hot generator surface. |
| Fire doors held open | Confirmed finding | Doors held open by wire or rope allowed smoke to spread through the engine room and into accommodation spaces. |
| Inoperative ventilation closures | Confirmed finding | Poorly maintained dampers, ventilators, and other openings could not fully close, preventing effective isolation. |
| Halon-system failures | Confirmed finding | A main distribution valve and several bottle-release valves failed, preventing a full extinguishing-agent discharge. |
| Inadequate system familiarisation | Confirmed finding | Senior officers did not identify the partial Halon failure or activate the available override function. |
Investigation
The Australian Transport Safety Bureau investigated the occurrence in report MO-2014-008. It found that the failed fuel-oil pressure-gauge fitting initiated the fire and identified safety issues involving open fire doors, poorly maintained ventilation closures, the condition and testing of the Halon system, and crew familiarisation. The ATSB also identified weaknesses in Port Hedland's emergency-response coordination and firefighting resources. The report describes extensive physical damage but does not provide a monetary damage estimate.