Classification
| Field | Value |
|---|
| Incident Type | Fire |
| Severity | High |
Vessel Details
| Field | Value |
|---|
| Vessel Name | AMBASSADOR |
| Vessel Type | Bulk Carrier |
| Flag State | Vanuatu [VU] |
| IMO Number | 8016653 |
| Official Number | 221 |
| Gross Tonnage | 24094 |
| LOA (m) | 222.5 |
| Breadth (m) | 23.17 |
| Year Built | 1983 |
| Crew Size | 35 crew plus 2 supernumeraries |
| Owner | ULS Marbulk Inc. |
| Manager | Barber Ship Management Ltd. |
Incident Details
| Field | Value |
|---|
| Date | 1994-12-31 |
| Location | Belledune, New Brunswick, Canada |
| Coordinates | |
| Region | Canada |
| Fatalities | |
| Injuries | 3 |
| Missing | |
| Cargo | Rock phosphate (bulk) |
| Cargo Loss | Approximately 200-300 tonnes spilled from the conveyor system |
| Direct Damage | |
| Economic Damage | |
Key facts
- The fire was detected at approximately 02:20 after the empty conveyor system had been stopped during a dust-related interruption to unloading.
- Only one outside deck hydrant was usable because the others were frozen; additional hoses had to be led from engine-room hydrants.
- The fire was fought by the crew and shore personnel from seven local community fire departments and port-area factories, using three pumper trucks and about 115 people.
- The self-unloading system was heavily damaged, approximately 25% of the accommodation was destroyed, and three people sustained non-serious injuries.
Narrative
AMBASSADOR berthed at Belledune on 29 December 1994 to discharge rock phosphate. The cargo was unusually difficult to retain on the conveyor belts, and spilled material created dense dust around the transfer conveyors. At 01:15 on 31 December, the crew suspended unloading because the atmosphere in the tunnel had become too dusty. The empty conveyor system continued running while the crew left the area, but it was stopped at 02:05 when the dust did not settle. About 15 minutes later, a heat sensor indicated a fire in the transfer-belt area and smoke emerged from the loop-belt casing.
The crew activated the sprinkler system, stopped tunnel ventilation, and directed water through the casing. Dense smoke prevented direct access to the fire. All but one of the outside deck hydrants were frozen in the extreme cold, so additional hoses were led from engine-room hydrants through the accommodation. Shore assistance included three pumper trucks and approximately 115 people from seven local community fire departments and port-area factories. The tunnel was intentionally flooded to submerge the conveyor system. After the fire appeared to be under control, the site was opened and ventilated following discussions with shore personnel. The fire then intensified and spread through the accommodation; it was fully extinguished approximately 28 hours after the outbreak.
The TSB recorded three non-serious injuries: smoke inhalation affecting one crew member, frostbite affecting the master, and a foot injury suffered by a Ship Safety Branch surveyor. The transfer belts, controls, fittings, and loop-belt casing were heavily damaged. Approximately 25 to 30 metres of each fore-and-aft belt burned, the structure bordering the tunnel at No. 5 hold was distorted, and about 200 to 300 tonnes of cargo had to be cleared from the conveyor system. Approximately 25% of the accommodation was destroyed, with smoke and water damage elsewhere. The TSB reported no damage to harbour installations and no reported pollution.
Sequence of events
| Date/time | Event |
|---|
| 1994-12-29 12:25 AST | Cargo unloading began at Belledune. |
| 1994-12-31 01:15 AST | Unloading was suspended because dust in the tunnel had become too dense for work to continue. |
| 1994-12-31 02:05 AST | The empty conveyor system was stopped while the crew waited for the dust to settle. |
| 1994-12-31 02:20 AST | A heat sensor indicated a fire in the transfer-belt area and smoke emerged from the loop-belt casing. |
| 1994-12-31 | The crew and shore fire departments fought the fire, flooded the tunnel, and later opened and ventilated the site; the fire spread to the accommodation. |
| 1995-01-01 | The fire was fully extinguished approximately 28 hours after the outbreak. |
Contributing factors
| Factor | Evidence status | Description |
|---|
| Overheated conveyor roller | Suspected | The TSB concluded that the belt probably contacted an overheated roller and that the roller probably overheated because of a bearing failure or refuse jamming the roller. |
| Dust, spillage, and debris in the tunnel | Confirmed finding | The rock phosphate produced dense dust and frequent spillages, while debris in the work area compromised safety. |
| Cold-weather firefighting limitations | Confirmed finding | Extreme cold froze all but one outside deck hydrant and hampered the firefighting response; the vessel's preparations for cold-weather operation proved ineffective. |
| Firefighting equipment and training | Confirmed finding | The TSB found ineffective maintenance and testing, degraded hoses, inadequate crew drills, an ineffective fixed sprinkler system for the major tunnel fire, and no shipboard-fire training among shore firefighters. |
| Opening and ventilating the fire site | Suspected | Shore personnel persuaded the response team to open and ventilate the site after the fire appeared controlled. The fire then intensified and spread to the accommodation, although the TSB said it could not establish that a closed approach would have prevented the conflagration. |
Investigation
The Transportation Safety Board of Canada investigated the occurrence under report M94M0057, released on 9 October 1996. The Board determined that the conveyor belt ignited after the conveyors were stopped, probably through contact with an overheated roller. It identified deficiencies in tunnel fire protection, equipment readiness, cold-weather operations, ship-shore firefighting coordination, emergency-alert procedures, and housekeeping. The investigation led to recommendations concerning Canadian port firefighting capability, shore-brigade training, cold-weather readiness, and fire detection and suppression on self-unloading vessels. TSB Recommendation M96-09 was later assessed Fully Satisfactory and closed.
References
Similar incidents
