Atlantic Erie grounding southeast of Port Colborne

Classification

Vessel Details

Incident Details

Key facts

• The self-discharging bulk carrier ran aground at approximately 10:20 EDT after proceeding off its intended course for about 15 minutes.
• A bow-thruster circuit-breaker trip caused a voltage drop and multiple bridge alarms; subsequent use of the blackout procedure caused further bridge power interruptions.
• The interruptions while the vessel was turning caused the gyrocompass to become misaligned. The gyrocompass was not verified before it was used for navigation and steering.
• After part of the petroleum-coke cargo was discharged, Atlantic Erie was refloated with assistance from two tugs.
• A post-occurrence diving inspection found cracks in the shell plating and the forward transverse bulkhead. The TSB reported no injuries or pollution.

Narrative

Atlantic Erie departed Chicago, Illinois, on 9 June 2014 bound for Sydney, Nova Scotia. On the morning of 12 June, the vessel was proceeding eastbound in Lake Erie toward Port Colborne at 11.8 knots. Shortly after 08:00, the officer of the watch gave the engineer of the watch one hour's notice to prepare for manoeuvring at the Welland Canal entrance. Around 09:00, the officer of the watch called the master to the bridge; the master took the con at approximately 09:40 and reported the vessel's position to a Seaway Welland vessel traffic controller at 09:42.

At about 09:44, with the vessel 1.5 nautical miles south of the outer piers and making about 9 knots, the master requested the bow thruster. After running for approximately two minutes, its circuit breaker tripped. When the engineer of the watch reset the breaker and attempted a restart at approximately 09:50, the electrical distribution voltage dropped. The resulting alarms included the radars, echo sounder, fire detection panel, navigation lights, and both gyrocompasses. The master put the engine astern, ordered the helm hard to port, and began turning the vessel to starboard to abort the canal approach.

The chief engineer subsequently applied the vessel's blackout procedure twice, although the main engine, steering gear, generators, and lights remained operational. These actions caused additional brief interruptions to bridge equipment. The vessel continued turning while the gyrocompass was without power, and the gyrocompass and its repeater became misaligned. The bridge team did not verify the gyrocompass against the magnetic compass or other available information. The helmsman therefore steered the ordered southerly course using inaccurate heading data, while the master did not use all available bridge resources to monitor the vessel's progress.

At approximately 10:03, the master ordered the helmsman to steer 180 degrees gyro. At 10:06, the helmsman reported that heading, but the actual course made good was diverging. The master recognized the discrepancy only after looking at the ECPINS display and outside the bridge. Corrective action was too late, and the hull touched bottom at approximately 10:20, 1.5 nautical miles southeast of the Port Colborne outer piers. The cargo was partially discharged and the vessel was later refloated with two tugs. The TSB found cracks in the shell plating and forward transverse bulkhead. Its laboratory considered a short between windings in the bow-thruster motor the most likely source of the electrical problem, but the exact reason for the motor failure could not be conclusively determined.

Sequence of events

Contributing factors

Investigation

The Transportation Safety Board of Canada conducted the final marine investigation M14C0106 and released it on 12 August 2015. The report concluded that the bow-thruster breaker trip, additional bridge power interruptions, gyrocompass misalignment, failure to verify the gyrocompass, and ineffective use of bridge resources combined to produce the grounding. The TSB also identified risks associated with alarms that stop without operator acknowledgement and noted that a gyrocompass-failure checklist had been removed from the safety management system without yet being added to the shipboard contingency plan. TSB laboratory report LP129/2014 considered a short between windings in the bow-thruster motor the most likely source of the electrical problem, but the motor failure itself was not conclusively explained.

References

• TSB Marine Investigation Report M14C0106
• TSB Marine Investigation Report M14C0106 PDF
• TSB release: Power interruptions and ineffective bridge resource management led to grounding
• TSB investigation information for M14C0106
• Government of Canada publication record for M14C0106

Related

• Atlantic Erie
• Watchkeeping and navigation monitoring failure
• TSB
• Grounding
• Great Lakes

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