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Accidents

Ivory Coast (2011)

The report records no injuries to people aboard or to responding firefighters. It does not provide a separate missing-person count.

Classification

  • Incident Type: Fire
  • Severity: Medium

Vessel Details

FieldValue
Vessel NameIvory Coast
Vessel TypeTug
Flag StateUnited States [US]
IMO Number7042825
Gross Tonnage140
LOA (m)33.74
Year Built1967
Crew Size2

Incident Details

FieldValue
Date2011-10-10
LocationGeneral Ship Repair, near Domino Sugar Pier, Baltimore Northwest Harbor, Maryland, United States
Coordinates39.274333, -76.600333
RegionUnited States
Fatalities0
Injuries0
Missing
Direct DamageExtensive fire damage to the engine room, associated machinery, and main-deck galley.
Economic DamageMore than USD 1 million

The report records no injuries to people aboard or to responding firefighters. It does not provide a separate missing-person count.

Key facts

  • Ivory Coast arrived at General Ship Repair on 6 October 2011 for repairs including replacement of the starboard rub rails.
  • A marine chemist issued a certificate for limited hot work, but the certificate was voided when the vessel was moved within the repair facility without authorization.
  • On 10 October, sparks from cutting work fell below the work area onto a wooden tool box that had become saturated with diesel oil.
  • The fire spread from the engine room to the main-deck galley and was extinguished by the Baltimore City Fire Department early that afternoon.
  • The NTSB estimated repairs at more than USD 1 million. No injuries were sustained by the crew, repair workers, or responding firefighters.

Narrative

Ivory Coast arrived at General Ship Repair in Baltimore's Northwest Harbor on 6 October 2011 for repairs that included replacement of the rub rails. Most of the crew left the vessel, while the engineer and ordinary seaman remained aboard in a caretaker status. A marine chemist issued a certificate for limited hot work near the fuel tanks and engine-room space, subject to a fire watch, ventilation, and daily atmospheric monitoring.

Repair work began on 7 October and continued on 10 October. The planned work included cutting along the starboard hull with an oxygen-acetylene torch to remove the rub rails. The shipfitter began at 07:40 and secured the torches for a break at 11:30. When work resumed, the chief engineer was working on the exhaust manifold of the starboard generator. He had drained and disconnected the diesel-oil manifold to give the shipfitter access. A wooden tool box below the manifold had become saturated with diesel oil and was not protected from sparks.

Less than two hours after hot work resumed, the shipfitter felt intense heat and saw that a fire had broken out. The fire watch initially applied a hose, but the water intensified the flames. A portable CO2 extinguisher had no effect. The shipfitter, fire watch, and chief engineer evacuated the vessel, and the Baltimore City Fire Department extinguished the fire early that afternoon. The NTSB reported extensive damage to the engine room, associated machinery, and main-deck galley, with repairs estimated at more than USD 1 million. No injuries were sustained by anyone aboard or by responding firefighters.

Sequence of events

Date/timeEvent
2011-10-06Ivory Coast arrived at General Ship Repair for repairs.
2011-10-07Repair work began.
2011-10-10 07:40The shipfitter began hot work to remove the starboard rub rails.
2011-10-10 11:30The shipfitter secured the cutting torches for a break.
2011-10-10Hot work resumed; less than two hours later a fire was discovered in the engine room.
2011-10-10 early afternoonBaltimore City Fire Department extinguished the fire.

Contributing factors

FactorEvidence statusDescription
Sparks and combustible materialConfirmed findingThe NTSB determined that sparks from oxygen-acetylene hot work ignited unprotected combustible material in the engine room.
Diesel-soaked wooden tool boxConfirmed findingA wooden tool box below the disconnected diesel manifold had become saturated with diesel oil and was beneath the hot-work area.
Void marine chemist certificateConfirmed findingThe certificate issued at the original repair location did not authorize the vessel's later movement within the facility and was therefore voided, although daily monitoring continued.

Investigation

The National Transportation Safety Board published Marine Accident Brief NTSB/MAB-13/06. It determined that sparks from welding and cutting repair work conducted with an oxygen-acetylene torch ignited unprotected combustible material in the engine room. The brief was based on information from the U.S. Coast Guard's informal investigation; the NTSB did not conduct its own on-scene investigation.

References

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