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Accidents

Maersk Kendal (2009)

Maersk Kendal departed Laem Chabang, Thailand, with about 3,100 containers and was bound for Tanjung Pelepas, Malaysia. During the Singapore Strait transit, the master took the con while the chief officer supported him with position monitoring, communications, and collision avoidance. The vessel was still making about 21 knots when the bridge team entered the traffic separation scheme.

Classification

  • Incident Type: Grounded
  • Severity: High

Vessel Details

FieldValue
Vessel NameMaersk Kendal
Vessel TypeContainer
Flag StateUnited Kingdom [GB]
IMO Number9332999
Gross Tonnage74642
LOA (m)299.54
Breadth (m)
TEU6200
Year Built2007
Crew Size25
Owner/ManagerThe Maersk Company Limited / A.P. Møller - Maersk A/S
Engine Power (kW)57200

Incident Details

FieldValue
Date2009-09-16
LocationMonggok Sebarok Reef, Singapore Strait
Coordinates1.1975, 103.80556
RegionOther
Fatalities
Injuries0
Missing
Cargo Loss
Direct Damage
Economic Damage
Insured Loss
Salvage/Cleanup Cost

Key facts

  • The UK-registered container ship was carrying about 3,100 containers from Laem Chabang to Tanjung Pelepas when it grounded.
  • At 07:03 local time, Singapore VTIS instructed Maersk Kendal to slow because three ships were exiting Jong Channel; further warnings followed at 07:08, 07:10, and 07:13.
  • The vessel grounded at about 07:15 on a heading of 246 degrees and a speed of about 14.2 knots.
  • The grounding caused substantial damage to the fore peak, bow-thruster room, No. 1 void, and No. 1 centre ballast tank; about 120 tonnes of steel were later renewed.
  • Salvors discharged 365 containers and about 3,000 tonnes of bunkers before the vessel was refloated on 23 September and returned to service on 12 November 2009.

Narrative

Maersk Kendal departed Laem Chabang, Thailand, with about 3,100 containers and was bound for Tanjung Pelepas, Malaysia. During the Singapore Strait transit, the master took the con while the chief officer supported him with position monitoring, communications, and collision avoidance. The vessel was still making about 21 knots when the bridge team entered the traffic separation scheme.

At 07:03 local time, Singapore Vessel Traffic Information System warned Maersk Kendal to slow for three ships exiting Jong Channel. The master altered course to starboard to pass astern of traffic and intended to return to the planned track. The MAIB found that the change from full-ahead manoeuvring to half-ahead did not reduce engine speed as the bridge team expected. The master and chief officer also misinterpreted which vessels VTIS had identified, did not use the ARPA trial-manoeuvre function, and did not reduce speed or alter course sufficiently after further warnings about shallow water.

After Samho Jewelry crossed the bow, the master ordered successive port helm movements. Maersk Kendal grounded on Monggok Sebarok Reef at about 07:15 at 14.2 knots. No injuries or pollution resulted. Two salvage tugs assisted, and the vessel was refloated after containers and bunkers were discharged. The hull and bow-thruster damage was repaired before the vessel resumed service.

Sequence of events

Date/timeEvent
2009-09-14Maersk Kendal departed Laem Chabang with about 3,100 containers for Tanjung Pelepas.
2009-09-16 05:15 UTC+8The vessel entered the eastern Singapore Strait traffic separation scheme.
2009-09-16 07:03 UTC+8Singapore VTIS instructed the vessel to slow because three ships were exiting Jong Channel.
2009-09-16 07:08 UTC+8VTIS again advised the vessel to reduce speed; the vessel was making about 19.1 knots over the ground.
2009-09-16 07:10 UTC+8VTIS warned that Samho Jewelry was ahead and that Maersk Kendal appeared to be heading toward her.
2009-09-16 07:13 UTC+8VTIS warned of shallow water ahead.
2009-09-16 07:15 UTC+8Maersk Kendal grounded on Monggok Sebarok Reef at about 14.2 knots.
2009-09-19Salvage operations began; 365 containers and about 3,000 tonnes of bunkers were discharged.
2009-09-23 12:43 UTC+8The vessel was refloated.
2009-11-12Maersk Kendal resumed service after repairs.

Contributing factors

FactorEvidence statusDescription
Excessive speed and ineffective speed reductionConfirmed findingThe MAIB found that the bridge team remained confident that the vessel's speed would not affect safe navigation, while telegraph movements did not reduce engine speed as expected.
Misinterpretation of VTIS informationConfirmed findingThe master and chief officer misunderstood which vessels VTIS had referred to and did not clarify the information.
Poor bridge-team management and situational awarenessConfirmed findingThe investigation identified inadequate passage planning, poor position monitoring, ineffective interaction, complacency, and loss of awareness of the reef's proximity.
Inadequate ECDIS and ARPA useConfirmed findingThe bridge team did not use the ARPA trial manoeuvre and monitored the vessel on an inappropriately configured ECDIS display that did not show the reef early enough.

Investigation

The UK Marine Accident Investigation Branch investigated the grounding with the cooperation of Singapore's Maritime and Port Authority and issued report 2/2010 in March 2010. It identified the bridge team's speed management, traffic assessment, position monitoring, VTIS communications, and bridge resource management as contributing safety issues. No safety recommendations were issued because corrective actions had already been taken.

References

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