Classification
- Incident Type: Grounded
- Severity: Low
- Primary evidence: MAIB Report No. 6/2012
Vessel Details
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Vessel Name | Clonlee |
| Vessel Type | Container |
| Flag State | Isle of Man [IM] |
| IMO Number | 9129471 |
| Gross Tonnage | 3999 |
| LOA (m) | 101.1 |
| Owner/Operator | North Atlantic Shipping Ltd |
| Crew Size | 11 |
Incident Details
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Date | 2011-03-16 |
| Location | Little Haven beach, South Shields, England |
| Region | United Kingdom |
| Fatalities | 0 |
| Injuries | 0 |
| Missing | |
| Direct Damage | Buckling damage to the longitudinal floor and associated floor stiffeners on the port side of number 1 ballast tank |
| Environmental Impact | No environmental impact |
| Economic Damage |
Key facts
- Clonlee suffered a total blackout at 01:10 while entering the confined Port of Tyne harbour entrance, then grounded on Little Haven beach at 01:13.
- The emergency generator restored emergency circuits, but the main engine fell to idle and the master could not adjust the controllable-pitch propeller.
- The starboard anchor was not released before grounding because the deck crew member ordered to prepare it had not reached the forecastle.
- The vessel refloated on the rising tide at 10:00 and berthed upriver at 10:40; no injuries or environmental impact were reported.
- The grounding caused buckling damage to the port side of the number 1 ballast tank; the report gives no economic damage estimate.
Narrative
Clonlee departed Rotterdam for South Shields on 15 March 2011 carrying 1,774 tonnes of containerised cargo. At the time of the accident, 11 crew and the master’s wife were aboard. The ship approached the Port of Tyne without a pilot. The MAIB found that its voyage-specific passage plan had not been prepared and the bridge team was below the required composition, leaving the master to handle several bridge duties as the vessel entered confined waters (MAIB, pp. 1–5, 49–50).
At 01:08 on 16 March, the master called the engine control room and ordered a change from the shaft generator to the diesel generators for manoeuvring. The ship suffered a total blackout at 01:10 while making 12.3 knots over the ground. The emergency generator started automatically 21 seconds later and restored emergency circuits, but the main engine slowed to idle and the master could not adjust the controllable-pitch propeller. Engineers briefly restored main power, but the vessel blacked out again. The bridge and engine-room teams did not communicate directly about the developing situation. At 01:12, the master ordered the starboard anchor prepared and then released, but the able seafarer assigned to the order was still moving forward and had not reached the forecastle. The master turned hard to port to avoid the Herd Groyne rocks; Clonlee grounded on the sand at Little Haven beach at about 01:13, making about 7 knots (MAIB, pp. 5–10, 51).
The master informed Vessel Traffic Services and requested a tug. A tug attempted to pull Clonlee off the beach, but it remained aground. Power restoration attempts were followed by another blackout at about 02:03. Engineers restored the main power at 02:20, more than an hour after the initial failure, but the ship remained firmly aground. After the forward ballast tanks were pumped out, Clonlee refloated on the rising tide at about 10:00 and berthed alongside Riverside Quay at 10:40. The report records 12 people aboard, no injuries or fatalities, and no environmental impact. It documents buckling damage to the longitudinal floor and associated stiffeners on the port side of the number 1 ballast tank (MAIB, pp. 2, 10–13).
Sequence of events
| Date/time | Event |
|---|---|
| 2011-03-15 06:00 local | Clonlee departed Rotterdam for South Shields. |
| 2011-03-16 01:08 local | The master ordered the engine room to change over to the diesel generators for manoeuvring. |
| 2011-03-16 01:10 local | The ship suffered a total blackout while entering the Port of Tyne; the emergency generator restored emergency circuits. |
| 2011-03-16 01:12 local | The master ordered the starboard anchor prepared and then released, but the assigned crew member had not reached the forecastle. |
| 2011-03-16 01:13 local | Clonlee grounded on Little Haven beach while making about 7 knots. |
| 2011-03-16 01:55 local | The master instructed tug Lyndhurst to attach a line and try to pull Clonlee off the beach. |
| 2011-03-16 02:03 local | Clonlee blacked out again after the bow-thruster breaker was closed. |
| 2011-03-16 02:20 local | The engineers restored main power, but Clonlee remained aground. |
| 2011-03-16 10:00 local | Clonlee refloated on the rising tide. |
| 2011-03-16 10:40 local | Clonlee berthed alongside Riverside Quay. |
Contributing factors
| Factor | Evidence status | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Electrical system and recovery | Confirmed finding | The initiating electrical fault could not be determined. The engineers lacked manufacturer manuals and did not restore power in a timely, controlled manner (MAIB, pp. 44–46, 56–57). |
| Navigation and passage planning | Confirmed finding | The voyage-specific plan was not prepared or followed, and Clonlee entered the confined approach at speed without the required end-of-sea-passage preparations (MAIB, pp. 49–50, 56–57). |
| Bridge and deck readiness | Confirmed finding | The bridge team was under-resourced and the deck crew were not at their stations; the assigned able seafarer had not reached the forecastle when the anchor order was cancelled (MAIB, pp. 9–10, 49–50, 56). |
| Emergency communication and response | Confirmed finding | The bridge and engine-room teams did not communicate for over an hour, and shipboard emergency procedures were not followed (MAIB, pp. 51, 57–58). |
Investigation
The MAIB’s Report No. 6/2012 concluded that Clonlee grounded after a total power failure in the confined harbour entrance left the master unable to arrest the vessel’s forward motion. The report considered an intermittent fault in the electrical power supply and distribution systems the probable cause of the blackout, but could not establish the exact initiating failure. It identified unsafe passage planning, an under-resourced bridge team, inadequate emergency preparedness, deficiencies in power-recovery practices, and a breakdown in bridge-to-engine-room communication as safety issues contributing to the grounding (MAIB, pp. 44–46, 49–51, 56–58).