Classification
- Incident Type: Grounded
- Severity: Low
- Marine casualty classification: Serious Marine Casualty
Vessel Details
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Vessel Name | CMA CGM Vasco de Gama |
| Vessel Type | Container |
| Flag State | United Kingdom [GB] |
| IMO Number | 9706889 |
| Gross Tonnage | 178228 |
| LOA (m) | 399.2 |
| Registered Owner | CHC Second Shipping S.A. |
| Manager | CMA Ships |
| Year Built | 2015 |
| Persons on Board | 31, including 28 crew, 2 pilots, and 1 passenger |
Incident Details
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Date and time | 2016-08-22 00:32 |
| Location | Thorn Channel precautionary area, Southampton, England |
| Coordinates | 50° 49.4′N 001° 19.02′W |
| Region | United Kingdom |
| Fatalities | 0 |
| Injuries | 0 |
| Vessel outcome | Refloated on the rising tide and departed Southampton the following day |
| Direct damage | No damage reported |
| Environmental impact | None reported |
Key facts
- The 399.2 m container vessel grounded at 0032 local time while inbound to Southampton under pilotage.
- The vessel was about 0.4 nautical miles north-north-east of the north-east Gurnard buoy when it grounded.
- Tugs and the vessel's engines refloated it soon after grounding; MAIB recorded no injuries, pollution, or damage.
- MAIB found that the turn was started from too far north for the vessel to sustain the rate of turn needed to remain in the dredged channel.
Narrative
On 22 August 2016, the UK-flagged container vessel CMA CGM Vasco de Gama approached Southampton from Algeciras with two Southampton pilots on board. The vessel was navigating in darkness in good visibility, with a west-south-westerly wind of 20 to 22 knots and a rising tide. After passing outbound vessels in the precautionary area, the lead pilot commenced the starboard turn towards Thorn Channel.
At 0026 local time, the turn began on a vessel traffic service distance countdown to the Gurnard buoy. The vessel was north of the intended track. As its bow turned out of the wind and it entered shallower water, its rate of turn reduced. Despite full starboard helm and full-ahead engine, it left the dredged channel and grounded at 0032, about 0.4 nautical miles north-north-east of the north-east Gurnard buoy.
The vessel stopped on a gently shelving sand and gravel seabed. After the grounding was confirmed, its engine and bow thrusters were stopped and tugs were dispatched. CMA CGM Vasco de Gama was refloated soon afterwards using tugs and its own engines. Inspections found no damage; MAIB recorded no injuries or pollution. The vessel departed Southampton the following day after further inspections by UK Flag State surveyors, its classification society, and insurers.
MAIB concluded that the ship's northerly position at the start of the turn did not leave enough sea room for the manoeuvre on a flooding tide. Its investigation identified shortcomings in passage planning, bridge-resource management, and oversight rather than a propulsion or steering defect.
Sequence of events
| Date/time | Event |
|---|---|
| 2016-08-21 22:45 local | Two Southampton pilots boarded CMA CGM Vasco de Gama at the designated pilot boarding point. |
| 2016-08-22 00:26 local | The lead pilot began the starboard turn towards Thorn Channel. |
| 2016-08-22 00:31 local | Vessel traffic services warned that the vessel appeared to be leaving the channel and alerted local tug skippers. |
| 2016-08-22 00:32 local | The vessel grounded west of the dredged channel. |
| 2016-08-22 | Tugs and the vessel's engines refloated the vessel soon after the grounding. |
| 2016-08-23 | Following further inspections, the vessel departed Southampton. |
Contributing factors
| Factor | Evidence status | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Position at start of turn | Confirmed finding | The vessel was too far north when the turn into Thorn Channel began and could not sustain the required rate of turn within the dredged channel. |
| Pilotage planning | Confirmed finding | The pilotage plan did not identify the intended route through the precautionary area, key decision points, wheel-over points, or abort options. |
| Bridge-resource management | Confirmed finding | Weak information exchange meant that the bridge team and lead pilot did not share an understanding of the pilot's intentions, limiting challenge and support. |
| Electronic navigation | Confirmed finding | MAIB found that ECDIS and the pilot portable unit were not used effectively for route monitoring, cross-checking, or alarms. |
Investigation
The Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) investigated the casualty as report 23/2017. It found that the Bramble Bank turn had not been executed with sufficient sea room and identified weaknesses in pilotage planning, bridge-resource management, and the use of electronic navigation aids. MAIB issued recommendations to CMA Ships and Associated British Ports Southampton concerning pilotage planning, bridge-team and pilot integration, ECDIS use, communication, and oversight.
References
- MAIB investigation report 23/2017: CMA CGM Vasco de Gama
- MAIB report page: Grounding of the ultra-large container vessel CMA CGM Vasco de Gama
- Source note: MAIB CMA CGM Vasco de Gama investigation report