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Accidents

Attilio Ievoli (2004)

On 3 June 2004, the Italian chemical tanker Attilio Ievoli grounded on Lymington Banks in the west Solent, England. The MAIB found that poor bridge team management, inadequate passage planning, and navigation practices contributed to the grounding. The vessel refloated without assistance, with no injuries, fatalities, or pollution reported.

Classification

  • Incident Type: Grounded
  • Severity: Low
  • Evidence status: Confirmed by the MAIB accident investigation report.

Vessel Details

FieldValue
Vessel NameAttilio Ievoli
Vessel TypeChemical tanker
Flag StateItaly [IT]
IMO Number9104873
Gross Tonnage4450
LOA (m)115.5
Breadth (m)
TEU
Year Built1995
Crew Size16

Incident Details

FieldValue
Date2004-06-03
LocationLymington Banks, west Solent, South Coast of England
Coordinates50.7250, -1.5117
RegionUnited Kingdom
Fatalities0
Injuries0
Missing0
Cargo Loss
Direct DamageApprox. 1 m x 1 m x 30 mm bottom-plate indentation and paint scoring; no hull penetration
Economic Damage
Insured Loss
Salvage/Cleanup Cost

Key facts

  • Attilio Ievoli was carrying toluene and styrene monomer after loading at Fawley and was bound for Barcelona.
  • At about 16:32 UTC+1, the vessel grounded at approximately 11 knots, about half a nautical mile north of the intended track.
  • The MAIB report records 16 people aboard, no injuries or fatalities, and no pollution.
  • The grounding caused an indentation in the bottom plating of approximately 1 m x 1 m x 30 mm, about 4 m inboard from the forward end of the port bilge keel, with scoring of the bottom paint.
  • The vessel refloated under its own power at about 18:05, anchored at about 19:20, and was cleared to sail on 4 June after inspection.

Narrative

Attilio Ievoli left Antwerp on 28 May 2004 and later loaded toluene and styrene monomer at Fawley. After clearing the berth at about 15:15 on 3 June, the vessel proceeded toward the west Solent. The master selected the shorter west Solent route despite company standing orders to use the east Solent. The bridge team comprised the master, pilot, second officer, cadet, and chief engineer, who was monitoring the unmanned machinery-space alarms from the port bridge console.

After the pilotage phase, the master had the conn. The MAIB found that the bridge team had not held a pre-sailing briefing to define roles, that the port radar was unavailable because the chief engineer was using the workstation, and that the echo-sounder alarm was set to zero while its trace was not functioning. The master also used a mobile telephone shortly before the grounding. The report describes poor teamwork, including communication difficulties associated with cultural differences, and an inadequate passage plan that did not follow company and IMO guidance.

At about 16:32, Attilio Ievoli grounded on Lymington Banks at approximately 11 knots. The vessel was about half a nautical mile north of its intended track. There was no water ingress or cargo leakage. It refloated under its own power at about 18:05, anchored at about 19:20, and was inspected by divers. The vessel was cleared on 4 June and sailed for Barcelona early the following morning.

Sequence of events

Date/timeEvent
2004-05-28Attilio Ievoli departed Antwerp.
2004-06-03, about 15:15The vessel cleared its berth at Fawley after loading cargo.
2004-06-03, about 16:32 UTC+1The vessel grounded on Lymington Banks at approximately 11 knots.
2004-06-03, about 18:05The vessel refloated under its own power.
2004-06-03, about 19:20The vessel anchored for inspection.
2004-06-04, 19:36The vessel was cleared to sail after inspection.
2004-06-05, about 05:30The vessel departed for Barcelona.

Contributing factors

FactorEvidence statusDescription
Poor bridge team managementConfirmed findingThe MAIB found that bridge teamwork and the division of responsibilities were inadequate; the report states that cultural differences exacerbated the poor teamwork.
Inadequate passage planning and route selectionConfirmed findingThe master chose the west Solent route despite company standing orders and the passage plan did not follow company and IMO guidance.
Deficient navigation equipment availability and useConfirmed findingThe port radar was unavailable, the echo-sounder alarm was set to zero, and the echo-sounder trace was not functioning.
Mobile telephone distractionConfirmed findingThe MAIB found that mobile telephone use on the bridge could detract from safe navigation in confined waters and was a factor in this accident.
Limited traffic control and buoyageConfirmed findingThe MAIB identified the absence of pilotage and VTS surveillance in the west Solent, together with navigational buoyage issues, as relevant system factors.

Investigation

The UK Marine Accident Investigation Branch published Accident Investigation Report 2/2005 in February 2005. It concluded that the grounding resulted from failures in bridge team management, passage planning, position fixing, and the use or availability of bridge equipment. The report also identified the absence of effective traffic control for commercial vessels in the west Solent and recommended measures to the relevant authorities, Trinity House, the vessel operator, and the International Chamber of Shipping.

References

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