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Accidents

Norwegian Dream (1999)

Other involved vessel:

Classification

  • Incident Type: Collision
  • Severity: High
  • Tug involvement: no

Vessel Details

FieldValue
Vessel NameNorwegian Dream
Vessel TypeCruise
Flag StateBahamas [BS]
MMSI308272000
Call SignC6LG5
Gross Tonnage50764
LOA (m)229.84
Year Built1992
Crew Size638
Passengers1750

Other involved vessel:

VesselTypeFlagLengthGross tonnageIMO NumberNotes
Ever DecentCellular container shipPanama294.13 m520909134244Suffered port-side damage, a reported below-waterline hole, port list, and container-deck fire.

Incident Details

FieldValue
Date1999-08-24
LocationSouth West lane of the Dover Strait Traffic Separation Scheme, 319 degrees and 3.2 nautical miles from F3 Buoy
Coordinates51.433333, 1.933333
RegionEnglish Channel
Fatalities0
Missing0
Investigation BodyBahamas Maritime Authority
Direct DamageNorwegian Dream: bow, starboard shell/passenger-cabin area, starboard rescue/lifeboat arrangements, and starboard bridge wing. Ever Decent: port-side shell damage including a reported below-waterline hole, port list, and container fire.

Key facts

  • The collision occurred at 0055 British Summer Time on 24 August 1999 in the South West lane of the Dover Strait Traffic Separation Scheme.
  • Norwegian Dream was the give-way vessel and did not take adequate avoiding action; Ever Decent was the stand-on vessel but took only late action.
  • Heavy traffic near the F3 buoy constrained the options of both vessels.
  • The BMA linked Norwegian Dream's ineffective avoiding action to ARPA-vector confusion, bridge information overload, and distractions during the approach.
  • Norwegian Dream mustered and accounted for its passengers and crew and moored at Dover at 0635; Ever Decent's arrival was delayed by a container-deck fire.

Narrative

On 24 August 1999, Norwegian Dream was bound for Dover with 1,750 passengers and 638 crew on board. In the approaches to the Dover Strait, near the F3 buoy, the cruise ship encountered the container ship Ever Decent in an area where several traffic flows converged and traffic was heavy. Norwegian Dream had Ever Decent on her starboard bow and was the give-way vessel under the collision regulations.

The approach was complicated by other ships. Norwegian Dream was overtaking a vessel on her starboard side and was also being approached on her port side by another vessel on a collision course. These ships constrained early alterations of course and speed. The BMA found that the officer of the watch was managing visual information, two radar/ARPA displays, VHF communications, charts, and other bridge inputs. A crew member came to the bridge to have the garbage record book signed, and a VHF call from Ever Decent four to five minutes before the collision further distracted the OOW.

The report concluded that the OOW probably confused the true and relative ARPA vectors of Ever Decent and did not appreciate the developing collision risk early enough. Norwegian Dream made a small alteration to starboard, but it was inadequate. Ever Decent was the stand-on vessel, yet the BMA found that it relied on the late VHF exchange and did not take effective avoiding action when it became apparent that Norwegian Dream's action was insufficient. The arrangement of the traffic separation scheme and the nearby vessels limited the choices available to both ships.

At about 0055 BST, Norwegian Dream struck the port side of Ever Decent at approximately right angles. The impact damaged Norwegian Dream's bow, starboard shell and passenger-cabin area, starboard rescue and lifeboat arrangements, and starboard bridge wing. Ever Decent suffered port-side damage, including a reported below-waterline hole, developed a port list, and had a container-deck fire. Norwegian Dream's crew closed watertight doors, mustered the passengers and crew, and confirmed that they were accounted for. The vessel resumed passage at reduced speed, took a Dover pilot at 0523, and moored at the passenger terminal at 0635. Ever Decent eventually proceeded under her own power, with its arrival delayed by the fire.

The report states that no lives were lost and no serious injuries resulted. It does not provide a complete count of minor injuries in the reviewed extract.

Sequence of events

Date/timeEvent
1999-08-24 00:49-00:50 BSTEver Decent made a VHF call to Norwegian Dream approximately four to five minutes before the collision.
1999-08-24 00:54 BSTAn unidentified VHF call saying “Starboard, starboard, starboard” was recorded shortly before impact.
1999-08-24 00:55 BSTNorwegian Dream struck the port side of Ever Decent near the F3 buoy.
1999-08-24 00:56:40 BSTEver Decent broadcast a Securité message and reported a position of 51 degrees 26 minutes N, 001 degrees 56 minutes E.
1999-08-24 01:57 BSTNorwegian Dream stood down passengers from emergency stations and resumed passage to Dover at reduced speed.
1999-08-24 05:23 BSTThe Dover pilot boarded Norwegian Dream.
1999-08-24 06:35 BSTNorwegian Dream moored at the Dover passenger terminal.

Contributing factors

FactorEvidence statusDescription
Inadequate avoiding action by Norwegian DreamConfirmed findingThe BMA found that Norwegian Dream was the give-way vessel and did not take adequate action to avoid collision.
ARPA-vector confusionConfirmed findingThe OOW probably confused true and relative vectors while assessing the passing situation.
Bridge information overload and distractionConfirmed findingHeavy traffic, two ARPA displays, VHF communications, and an interruption on the bridge overloaded the OOW during the critical approach.
Late action by Ever DecentConfirmed findingThe stand-on vessel made a late VHF call but did not take effective avoiding action when Norwegian Dream's action was inadequate.
Traffic separation scheme constraintsConfirmed findingThe layout near the F3 buoy and other nearby vessels restricted early avoiding options for both ships.

Investigation

The Bahamas Maritime Authority investigated the collision in its report dated 12 April 2000. The report concluded that Norwegian Dream's inadequate avoiding action, Ever Decent's late response, traffic constraints, ARPA-vector confusion, and bridge information overload all contributed to the casualty. It recommended improved ARPA practice, clearer standing orders and watchkeeping arrangements, further radar training, and review of information management on complex ship bridges.

References

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