USS Harry S. Truman / BESIKTAS-M collision (2025)

Classification

Incident Type: Collision
Severity: High

Vessel Details

Field	Value
Vessel Name	USS Harry S. Truman
Vessel Names	USS Harry S. Truman / BESIKTAS-M
Vessel Type	Naval / Military
Flag State	USA [US]
IMO Number
Gross Tonnage
LOA (m)	332.84
Breadth (m)	76.81
MMSI	368800000
Call Sign	NHST

USS Harry S. Truman is a Nimitz-class aircraft carrier. The official investigation gives an extreme beam of 252 ft (76.81 m), a waterline beam of 134 ft (40.84 m), a maximum navigational draft of 41 ft, and full displacement of 101,378 tons. It does not provide gross tonnage. BESIKTAS-M was a Panamanian-flagged general cargo/bulk carrier, IMO 9291365, with a gross tonnage of 29,353 and reported length and beam of approximately 187.76 m and 31.70 m.

Incident Details

Field	Value
Date	2025-02-12
Location	Vicinity of Port Said, Egypt; Suez Canal approach
Coordinates
Region	Mediterranean Sea
Fatalities	0
Injuries	0
Missing	0
Direct Damage	BESIKTAS-M struck HST above the waterline, producing a 20-ft gash in the B&A crane area, a 15-ft gash extending to the fantail, and crushed exhaust ducting.
Economic Damage

Key facts

At 2345 local time on 12 February 2025, BESIKTAS-M collided with USS Harry S. Truman in the vicinity of Port Said.
The U.S. Navy investigation characterized HST as the give-way vessel in a crossing situation and found that it did not take early and substantial action to keep clear.
HST was proceeding at 19 knots despite lower planned speeds on the relevant approach legs, and its AIS was in receive mode rather than transmitting.
BESIKTAS-M struck HST's starboard side above the waterline aft of aircraft elevator 3, damaging spaces and structures extending toward the fantail.
The report states that neither vessel had reported personnel or engineering casualties; HST continued its mission and flight operations.

Narrative

USS Harry S. Truman was approaching a loiter position before a scheduled southbound Suez Canal transit. BESIKTAS-M had just completed a northbound transit. HST entered the Western Approaches to Bur Said Traffic Separation Scheme at 2225, exited the scheme at 2318, checked in with the Suez Canal Authority at 2320 and continued toward the loiter position. The carrier was making 19 knots even though the planned speeds on the relevant track legs were lower. The bridge team also did not station a Shipping Officer, and HST's AIS was set to receive mode rather than active transmission.

At 2323, BESIKTAS-M was in sight on HST's starboard bow. At about 2331, the navigation evaluator recorded the merchant vessel at 6.29 nautical miles with a calculated closest point of approach of 581 yards in 13.7 minutes. A later assessment placed the CPA at 393 yards in 13.1 minutes. HST's bridge team planned a starboard turn after passing an anchored vessel, but the plan was not coordinated adequately with the Tactical Operations Plot and the commanding officer did not receive a contact report on BESIKTAS-M.

The investigation found that the bridge team did not recognize BESIKTAS-M's port turn in time. Attempts to contact the merchant vessel by bridge-to-bridge radio received no response. At 2343, HST sounded five short blasts and began further rudder orders. The commanding officer arrived on the bridge as the vessels closed rapidly. By then, the collision could not be avoided, and the commanding officer ordered hard right rudder to reduce the angle of contact.

At 2345, BESIKTAS-M's bow struck HST's starboard side just aft of aircraft elevator 3. The impact created a 20-ft gash in the boat and anchor crane machinery area. Additional contact produced a 15-ft gash through the Paraloft, tire storeroom, line-handling space, a void and the fantail, and crushed external incinerator exhaust ducting. The report states that there was no fire, flooding or electrical damage. Eight personnel working in the Paraloft evacuated safely.

After the collision, HST navigated to safe water and set Condition II damage control at 2352. BESIKTAS-M anchored and requested no assistance. HST returned to Souda Bay on 16 February for damage assessment and temporary repairs, while remaining capable of conducting flight operations. The Navy investigation identified failures in contact management and bridge resource management, poor use of available sensors and recommendations, the absence of a Shipping Officer, non-transmitting AIS, fatigue and operational stress, and weaknesses in training and recordkeeping as contributing issues. The public report does not provide exact collision coordinates or a confirmed repair-cost amount.

Sequence of events

Date/time	Event
2025-02-12 22:25 local	HST entered the Western Approaches to Bur Said Traffic Separation Scheme.
2025-02-12 23:18 local	HST exited the traffic separation scheme.
2025-02-12 23:20 local	HST checked in with the Suez Canal Authority.
2025-02-12 23:23 local	BESIKTAS-M was in sight on HST's starboard bow.
2025-02-12 about 23:31 local	HST recorded BESIKTAS-M at 6.29 nautical miles with a CPA of 581 yards in 13.7 minutes.
2025-02-12 23:43 local	HST sounded five short blasts after further rudder actions were ordered.
2025-02-12 23:45 local	BESIKTAS-M collided with HST's starboard side.
2025-02-12 23:52 local	HST set Condition II damage control.
2025-02-16	HST returned to Souda Bay for damage assessment and temporary repairs.

Contributing factors

Factor	Evidence status	Description
Give-way action	Confirmed finding	The U.S. Navy investigation characterized HST as the give-way vessel in a crossing situation and found that it did not take early and substantial action to keep clear.
Speed management	Confirmed finding	HST continued at 19 knots despite lower planned speeds on the relevant approach legs.
Bridge resource management	Confirmed finding	The investigation identified poor contact management, inadequate Bridge/Tactical Operations Plot coordination and failure to use available recommendations effectively.
Shipping Officer	Confirmed finding	HST did not station a Shipping Officer during the approach, contrary to the applicable procedure.
AIS status	Confirmed finding	HST was not transmitting AIS in the traffic separation scheme.
Fatigue and operational stress	Confirmed finding	The investigation identified operational stress in the preceding 48 hours and fatigue associated with watch rotations and workload.

Investigation

The U.S. Navy convened a command investigation on 15 February 2025. The investigation ran through 18 March and was submitted on 19 March 2025. Its public text includes a root-cause analysis, damage assessment and recommendations. It assigns responsibility for the collision to failures in HST's navigation and contact-management process and identifies human-factor, training and equipment-management issues. The report does not provide exact collision coordinates, a full BESIKTAS-M bridge narrative, or a confirmed repair-cost amount.

References

U.S. Navy command investigation into the collision
Source note for the command investigation