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Accidents

FLARE (1998)

FLARE broke in two and sank during a severe-weather Atlantic crossing, causing 21 deaths and widespread fuel-oil pollution; four crew members survived.

Classification

  • Incident Type: Structural Failure / Sinking
  • Severity: High

Vessel Details

FieldValue
Vessel NameFLARE
Vessel TypeBulk Carrier
Flag StateCyprus [CY]
IMO Number7220477
Official Number708220
Call SignP3GL2
Gross Tonnage16398
LOA (m)180.8
Breadth (m)23.1
Power (kW)8827
OwnerABTA Shipping Co. Ltd.
OperatorTrade Fortune Inc.
Year Built1972
Crew Size25

Incident Details

FieldValue
Date1998-01-16
LocationCabot Strait, approximately 45 nautical miles southwest of Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon
RegionCanada
Coordinates45.1960, -63.1654
Fatalities21
Injuries
Missing6
Investigation BodyTransportation Safety Board of Canada
Direct DamageVessel broke in two and both sections sank
Economic Damage

The Transportation Safety Board recorded 15 recovered fatalities and 6 missing crew members at the close of the search. Its synopsis reports that 21 crew members perished in total. Four crew members survived; the reviewed source does not support a separate total injury count.

Key facts

  • FLARE departed Rotterdam for Montreal in a light-ballast condition and encountered gale- to storm-force winds and seas reaching 16 m or more during the crossing.
  • At about 04:30 ship's time on 16 January, rapid brittle fractures near midships led to complete hull separation.
  • The stern sank within about 30 minutes; the bow remained afloat for four more days before sinking off Nova Scotia.
  • Of the 25 crew members, 15 bodies were recovered, 6 people remained missing, and 4 survivors were rescued from an overturned lifeboat.
  • Fuel oil from the sunken stern produced a widespread, non-recoverable slick and continued leaking until July 1998.

Narrative

The Cypriot bulk carrier FLARE left Rotterdam on 30 December 1997 for Montreal after discharging cargo. It sailed in a light-ballast condition with a shallow forward draught and marked trim by the stern. Hold No. 4, which could serve as a deep ballast tank, was not filled as specified for the vessel's deep-ballast condition. Structural repairs required under a Condition of Class also remained incomplete when the vessel departed.

For most of the Atlantic crossing, FLARE encountered westerly gale- to storm-force winds and very high seas, at times reaching 16 m or more. The vessel pitched, pounded and slammed heavily. Fractures in upper wing ballast-tank boundaries were found and repaired during the voyage, and ballast was adjusted while the work was carried out. The precise ballast distribution at the time of the casualty was not established.

At about midnight ship's time on 16 January, a particularly severe slam produced a loud bang and strong hull whipping. About four and a half hours later, another loud bang was followed by severe vibration. The crew then found that FLARE had broken in two near midships. The Transportation Safety Board determined that rapid brittle fractures initiated in main-deck plating around grain-loading ports and existing fissure damage. The loss of deck strength transferred compressive loads to the bottom structure, which also failed and completed the separation.

The stern listed 30 to 35 degrees to starboard. The starboard lifeboat could not be launched, while extra heavy-weather lashings, darkness, ice and snow prevented the crew from clearing the port lifeboat. A hurried and incomplete MAYDAY did not identify the ship, and the EPIRB transmitted no signal. The stern sank within about 30 minutes. Six crew members reached an overturned lifeboat; two were swept away before rescuers arrived. A helicopter recovered the remaining four after about six hours in freezing conditions.

The search recovered 15 bodies, while 6 crew members remained missing. The report therefore records 21 people as having perished and four as survivors. The separated bow floated for four more days before sinking. Fuel oil escaping from the stern formed a slick about 10 miles downwind of the sinking position, contaminated rescue operations and continued leaking in diminishing quantities until July 1998.

Sequence of events

Date/timeEvent
1997-12-30FLARE departed Rotterdam in light ballast, bound for Montreal.
1998-01-16 00:00 ship's timeA heavy slam caused a loud bang, severe hull whipping and longitudinal flexing.
1998-01-16 04:30 ship's timeA second severe shock preceded rapid brittle fracture and complete hull separation near midships.
1998-01-16 08:32 UTCCanadian radio services received an indistinct, incomplete MAYDAY from an unidentified vessel.
1998-01-16 14:23 UTCA rescue helicopter sighted four survivors clinging to an overturned lifeboat.
1998-01-16 14:34 UTCAll four survivors were aboard the helicopter.

Contributing factors

FactorEvidence statusDescription
Light-ballast conditionConfirmed findingThe shallow forward draught made FLARE highly vulnerable to repeated pounding and slamming.
Severe weatherConfirmed findingGale- to storm-force winds and very high seas repeatedly imposed dynamic shock loads on the hull.
Incomplete structural repairsConfirmed findingRequired repairs in the upper wing ballast tanks had not been completed before departure.
Existing fissure damageConfirmed findingBrittle fractures propagated through main-deck and bottom plating at locations with existing fissure damage, leading to hull separation.
Abandonment and alerting limitationsConfirmed findingList, extra lifeboat lashings, ice-covered decks, the incomplete MAYDAY and the absence of an EPIRB signal impeded abandonment and the search response.

Investigation

The Transportation Safety Board of Canada investigated the casualty as occurrence M98N0001. It found that FLARE's shallow forward draught exposed the hull to repeated pounding and slamming, creating shock loads that initiated rapid brittle fractures near midships and led to catastrophic separation. The Board also identified risks arising from incomplete structural repairs, uncertain ballast distribution, survival-craft access, the EPIRB's failure to transmit, limited immersion-suit provision and delayed identification of the distress position. The report led to five safety recommendations addressing emergency beacon accessibility, cold-water survival equipment, dynamic hull loads and adherence to approved loading guidance.

References

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