Pollux / Nord Taurus collision (2018)

Classification

• Incident Type: Collision
• Severity: High

Vessel Details

Nord Taurus was a Panama-flagged bulk carrier, IMO 9782182, of 43,471 GT, 228.94 m length overall and 32.24 m breadth. Built in 2016, it was operated by Fleet Ship Management Ltd and carried 21 crew members. It was sailing in ballast from Ghent to Murmansk.

Incident Details

Key facts

• Nord Taurus adopted a lee course for the pilot's transfer to the SWATH pilot tender Perseus while Pollux crossed ahead on automatic pilot.
• The vessels collided at 04:12 local time, when the starboard bow of Nord Taurus struck the port side of Pollux.
• A number of Pollux crew members suffered minor injuries, but the Dutch Safety Board report did not state the exact number; no one aboard Nord Taurus was injured.
• Pollux remained afloat and sailed to Vlissingen under its own power; Nord Taurus anchored off the Steenbank.
• The Dutch Safety Board found that untested assumptions and the absence of active communication left the collision risk poorly assessed by all three vessels involved.

Narrative

Nord Taurus departed Ghent in ballast for Murmansk on the evening of 20 January 2018. After a pilot change off Vlissingen, the bulk carrier continued through the Westerschelde toward the Steenbank pilot station, where its pilot was to transfer to the SWATH pilot tender Perseus. Pollux, a P-class pilot station vessel, was operating nearby and had just completed pilot and crew transfers with Perseus.

At 03:50 local time, Pollux's captain took over the watch. He then manoeuvred toward his usual starting position, intending to cross ahead of Nord Taurus. At 04:00, Pollux set a course of 300 degrees at 8 knots, and its automatic pilot was engaged two minutes later. Pollux displayed pilot lights, but it was not part of the pilot transfer then being conducted between Nord Taurus and Perseus. The captain turned his attention to administrative work. No second lookout was on the bridge and the closest-point-of-approach alarm was switched off.

Perseus instructed Nord Taurus by VHF to steer a lee course of 030 degrees at 10 knots for the transfer. The alteration, which was audible on Pollux's bridge, placed the vessels on a collision course but went unnoticed aboard Pollux. The Nord Taurus bridge team and the disembarking pilot saw Pollux as part of the pilotage operation and assumed it would monitor and facilitate the transfer. Perseus's crew made the same assumption while concentrating on the low-hanging gangway and pilot ladder. None of the three vessels actively tested those assumptions by contacting Pollux.

The pilot transferred to Perseus at 04:11. One minute later, the starboard bow of Nord Taurus struck Pollux's port side. Pollux's captain had detected the danger only seconds earlier and reversed the engines, but could not prevent impact. Pollux suffered severe damage to its bridge and hull, and a number of crew members sustained minor injuries. After checking for leaks and confirming that propulsion and steering remained operational, Pollux sailed to Vlissingen under its own power. Nord Taurus, whose bow was slightly damaged, anchored off the Steenbank.

The Dutch Safety Board concluded that Pollux should have given way because Nord Taurus was restricted in its ability to manoeuvre during the transfer. It also found that the unusual presence of two recognizable but independently operating pilot vessels created conflicting perceptions. Late detection aboard Pollux, untested assumptions aboard Nord Taurus and Perseus, and the resulting lack of active communication allowed the collision risk to develop without effective intervention.

Sequence of events

Contributing factors

Investigation

The Dutch Safety Board investigated the collision using interviews, documents, photographs and voyage data recorder evidence from both Pollux and Nord Taurus. Its January 2021 report concluded that Pollux detected the collision risk too late to give way and that the different perceptions of the pilotage operation led Nord Taurus and Perseus to rely on assumptions instead of active communication.

The Board recommended that Dutch and Belgian pilotage bodies establish joint instructions for situations in which a pilot cutter and a SWATH operate near the same pilot transfer, including when the cutter is not directly involved. It also recommended that Nederlands Loodswezen identify and correct pilot-vessel watch orders that did not conform to STCW lookout and watchkeeping provisions.

References

• Dutch Safety Board source note
• Dutch Safety Board: Perception of pilotage, collision between pilot vessel and bulk carrier in the Scheldt area

Related

• Nord Taurus
• Pollux
• Netherlands
• DSB
• Pilotage
• Collision
• Bridge Resource Management Failure

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