Classification
- Incident Type: Collision
- Severity: High
Vessel Details
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Vessel Name | USS John S. McCain |
| Vessel Names | USS John S. McCain / Alnic MC |
| Vessel Type | Naval / Military |
| Flag State | United States [US] |
| Gross Tonnage | 9000 |
| LOA (m) | 153.9 |
Incident Details
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-08-21 |
| Location | Straits of Singapore |
| Coordinates | 1.402633, 104.438767 |
| Region | Other |
| Fatalities | 10 |
| Injuries | 48 |
| Missing | 0 |
| Outcome | Ten sailors died, 48 were injured, and the destroyer sustained severe flooding through a 28-foot-diameter hull breach. |
| Direct Damage | |
| Estimated Economic Damage | |
| Investigation Body | Department of the Navy Office of the Chief of Naval Operations |
Key facts
- The collision occurred at approximately 0524 while USS John S. McCain was approaching Singapore for a scheduled port call.
- Alnic MC's bulbous bow opened a 28-foot-diameter hole through the destroyer's port aft side above and below the waterline.
- Ten sailors in Berthing 5 died, and 48 sailors required medical treatment.
- USS John S. McCain's crew controlled progressive flooding and brought the ship to Changi Naval Base under its own power.
- The U.S. Navy found loss of situational awareness, failure to follow the nautical rules of the road, and inadequate steering-system proficiency.
Narrative
Before dawn on 21 August 2017, USS John S. McCain was approaching the Singapore Strait Traffic Separation Scheme on passage to Changi Naval Base. The destroyer was making 20 knots in dense traffic. Alnic MC was a Liberian-flagged oil and chemical tanker built in 2008, approximately 600 feet long and of approximately 30,000 gross tons. All navigation and propulsion equipment was operating properly, but the Sea and Anchor Detail intended for the confined approach was not due to be stationed until 0600.
At about 0519, the commanding officer saw that the helmsman was having difficulty maintaining course while also adjusting speed. He ordered steering to remain at the helm while throttle control moved to the adjacent lee helm station. The unplanned change was not clearly understood. Steering control transferred to the lee helm without the bridge team's knowledge, causing the rudders to move amidships from the small right-rudder angle that had been holding course. The helmsman interpreted the result as a loss of steering, although steering remained operational.
The response compounded the developing turn. When the commanding officer ordered a reduction in speed, the lee helm initially reduced only the port shaft because the throttles were not coupled. The starboard shaft remained at the higher setting for 68 seconds. The rudder position and unequal thrust drove USS John S. McCain to port across nearby traffic. Multiple transfers of steering control followed, and the bridge team did not regain an accurate understanding of the destroyer's movement or Alnic MC's relative position in time. Neither vessel sounded the five-short-blast danger signal or established bridge-to-bridge radio contact.
At approximately 0524, USS John S. McCain crossed ahead of Alnic MC. The tanker's bulbous bow struck the destroyer's port aft side, opening a 28-foot-diameter hole through spaces above and below the waterline. Berthing 5 was compressed and likely flooded in less than a minute. Ten sailors in that compartment died. Forty-eight sailors required medical treatment, including five who were taken to Singapore General Hospital. Alnic MC sustained a hole in its starboard bow and an indentation on its port side; its crew reported no injuries or pollution.
Damage-control teams contained flooding sufficiently for the destroyer to proceed toward Changi at about 3 knots. A multinational search continued outside the hull for more than 80 hours. Navy divers worked inside the wrecked berthing spaces for seven days and recovered all ten sailors.
Sequence of events
| Date/time | Event |
|---|---|
| 2017-08-21 04:54 local | Radar contact was acquired on Alnic MC within 8 nautical miles, but watchstanders did not discuss maneuvering intentions for the nearby traffic. |
| 2017-08-21 05:19 local | The commanding officer ordered steering and throttle duties divided between the helm and lee helm stations. |
| 2017-08-21 05:20 local | Steering control transferred to the lee helm and the rudders moved amidships. |
| 2017-08-21 05:21 local | The helmsman reported a loss of steering while the destroyer was already turning to port. |
| 2017-08-21 05:23 local | The throttles were matched after unequal shaft commands had contributed to the port turn. |
| 2017-08-21 05:24 local | Alnic MC's bulbous bow struck USS John S. McCain's port aft side. |
| 2017-08-21 06:30 local | USS John S. McCain began proceeding toward Changi Naval Base under its own power. |
| 2017-08-21 14:35 local | The destroyer was moored and divers began assessing access to the flooded compartments. |
| 2017-08-24 | The U.S. Seventh Fleet suspended the external search; recovery work inside the hull continued. |
Contributing factors
| Factor | Evidence status | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Loss of situational awareness | Confirmed finding | The bridge team did not understand the steering configuration, the forces acting on the destroyer, or Alnic MC's relative movement during the emergency response. |
| Steering-system proficiency | Confirmed finding | Watchstanders lacked sufficient knowledge of steering and thrust-control transfers, and several had not received adequate training on the ship's system. |
| Unplanned control transfer | Confirmed finding | The division of helm and lee helm duties was not briefed, was not clearly communicated, and inadvertently transferred steering control. |
| Rules-of-the-road failures | Confirmed finding | Neither vessel sounded the prescribed danger signal or made a bridge-to-bridge VHF call before impact. |
| Alnic MC avoiding action and bridge manning | Confirmed finding | Singapore's TSIB found that Alnic MC took insufficient avoiding action and that its bridge was not manned in accordance with the company's safety management system. |
| Risk management and supervision | Confirmed finding | The Navy found that the higher-readiness Sea and Anchor Detail should have been stationed before the destroyer entered the congested traffic scheme. |
Investigation
The Department of the Navy Office of the Chief of Naval Operations published its report on 23 October 2017. It identified three principal causes: loss of situational awareness following mistakes in operating the steering and propulsion system, failure to follow the International Nautical Rules of the Road, and insufficient proficiency and knowledge among watchstanders operating those systems. The report also found deficiencies in preparation, training, command and control, risk management, and supervisory support. Its assessment focused on Navy performance and did not determine the comparative legal fault of Alnic MC.
Singapore's Transport Safety Investigation Bureau published a separate final report on 8 March 2018. It examined both vessels and found that Alnic MC's avoiding action was insufficient after the destroyer's port turn became apparent. It also found that the tanker's bridge was not manned in accordance with its safety management system, while confirming the steering-control and unequal-thrust sequence aboard USS John S. McCain.
References
- U.S. Navy report on the USS Fitzgerald and USS John S. McCain collisions
- Singapore TSIB final report on the collision between Alnic MC and USS John S. McCain
Related
- Alnic MC
- USS John S. McCain
- U.S. Navy
- Department of the Navy Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
- Collision
- Progressive Flooding
- Bridge Resource Management Failure