Classification
- Incident type: Collision
- Severity: High
- Region: Norway
- Investigation bodies: AIBN, DAIBN, and NSIA
Vessel Details
| Vessel | Type | Flag | LOA (m) | Persons on board |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| HNoMS Helge Ingstad | Naval / Military frigate | Norway [NO] | 133 | 137 |
| Sola TS | Oil tanker | Malta | — | — |
Incident Details
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Date | 2018-11-08 |
| Time | 04:01:15 |
| Location | Hjeltefjord outside the Sture Terminal, Norway |
| Region | Norway |
| Coordinates | 60.5722, 4.9152 |
| Fatalities | 0 |
| Injuries | 7 |
| Missing | 0 |
Key facts
- HNoMS Helge Ingstad was proceeding through the Hjeltefjord while Sola TS was departing the Sture Terminal.
- The frigate's bridge team was conducting training during the transit and the frigate's AIS was in passive mode. Bright deck lighting on Sola TS made the tanker and its navigation lights more difficult to distinguish visually.
- Sola TS struck the frigate's starboard side, causing considerable hull damage and flooding. Sola TS sustained minor bow damage and no injuries were reported aboard the tanker.
- Approximately ten minutes after the collision, HNoMS Helge Ingstad ran aground and later sank. The part-two report found that failure to shut down the frigate and maintain required closures contributed to the loss of buoyancy.
Narrative
In the early hours of 8 November 2018, the Norwegian frigate HNoMS Helge Ingstad was proceeding through the Hjeltefjord while the Malta-flagged oil tanker Sola TS departed the Sture Terminal. The frigate had 137 people on board. Its bridge team was conducting training during the transit, and the ship's automatic identification system was operating in passive mode. Sola TS displayed bright deck lighting that made the tanker and its navigation lights more difficult to interpret against the illuminated terminal.
The frigate's bridge team did not establish an accurate picture of the tanker as a moving vessel. Radar and AIS information were not used effectively to resolve the developing situation, and the training activity reduced the bridge team's attention to the external traffic picture. Fedje vessel traffic service also did not maintain complete plotting and monitoring of the frigate's movement or provide sufficiently timely information to prevent the encounter from becoming critical.
At 04:01:15, HNoMS Helge Ingstad and Sola TS collided outside the terminal. Sola TS struck the frigate's starboard side, causing considerable hull damage and flooding. Seven members of the frigate's crew sustained minor injuries. The tanker suffered minor bow damage and no injuries were reported aboard Sola TS.
The frigate ran aground approximately ten minutes after the collision and subsequently sank. The permitted part-two report extract states that flooding affected several compartments and that additional water entered through the hollow propeller shafts after grounding. It also finds that doors, hatches, and other openings that should have been closed to maintain stability and buoyancy were not closed when the crew was evacuated. The report concludes that the frigate's failure to reach the required shutdown state would have caused it to sink even without the grounding being decisive. The collision investigation therefore describes the event as a chain of navigational, organisational, technical, and damage-control failures rather than a single isolated error.
Sequence of events
| Time or stage | Event |
|---|---|
| Before 04:01 | HNoMS Helge Ingstad transited the Hjeltefjord under training conditions while Sola TS departed the Sture Terminal. |
| 04:01:15 | The frigate and tanker collided outside the terminal. |
| About ten minutes later | HNoMS Helge Ingstad ran aground. |
| After the grounding | Flooding continued and damage-control efforts were undertaken while the crew prepared for evacuation. |
| Subsequently | The frigate sank after the crew was evacuated. |
Contributing factors
| Factor | Evidence status | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Vessel identification and AIS | Confirmed finding | Passive AIS use on HNoMS Helge Ingstad and Sola TS's bright deck lighting contributed to the failure to identify the tanker and its navigation lights accurately. |
| Bridge-team attention and information use | Confirmed finding | Training during the transit and ineffective use of radar and AIS prevented the frigate's bridge team from developing a reliable traffic picture. |
| VTS monitoring | Confirmed finding | Fedje VTS did not maintain complete plotting and monitoring of the frigate's movement or provide sufficiently timely intervention. |
| Damage control and shutdown | Confirmed finding | The part-two investigation found insufficient damage-control competence and that the frigate was not brought to the shutdown state required to preserve survivability after flooding. |
Investigation
The AIBN and DAIBN part-one report investigated the collision and identified the navigational, bridge-team, lighting, AIS, and VTS factors. The NSIA part-two report investigated the sequence after the collision and found that damage-control training, decision support, watertight closures, and the frigate's shutdown state affected the subsequent grounding and sinking. The reports confirm the casualty and injuries but do not provide a normalized economic-damage figure.