Classification
- Incident Type: Fire
- Severity: Low
- Primary evidence: Australian Transport Safety Bureau investigation report 337-MO-2017-011
Vessel Details
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Vessel Name | BBC Xingang |
| Vessel Type | General Cargo |
| Flag State | Antigua and Barbuda [AG] |
| IMO Number | 9508483 |
| Gross Tonnage | 8255 |
| LOA (m) | 125.80 |
| Breadth (m) | 22.00 |
| Owner/Operator | BBC Chartering & Logistics / Briese Schiffahrts |
| Power (kW) | 6300 |
Incident Details
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-12-11 |
| Time | 11:01 UTC+11 |
| Location | Mayfield number 4 berth, Newcastle, New South Wales, Australia |
| Coordinates | -32.893333, 151.766667 |
| Region | Australia |
| Fatalities | |
| Injuries | |
| Missing | |
| Direct Damage | Cargo transport cloth was damaged and cargo surfaces had blemishes; no other damage was reported. |
| Economic Damage |
Key facts
- BBC Xingang berthed at Mayfield number four berth with containers and project cargo; hot work began to remove welded sea fastenings.
- Molten metal and hot debris burned through blankets over tween-deck gaps and ignited unprotected polyester cloth on lower-hold cargo.
- The boilermaker discovered the fire at about 11:00; a lower-hold fire watch extinguished it with water.
- The cloth was damaged and some cargo surfaces were blemished; no other damage was reported.
- Work resumed at 13:15 after the cutting method, spark containment, and fire-watch position were changed.
Narrative
BBC Xingang berthed at Mayfield number four berth in Newcastle at midnight on 10 December 2017, carrying containers and project cargo. Removing welded sea-fastening brackets was required before discharge. On the morning of 11 December, a shore contractor’s work team boarded and joined ship’s personnel for a safety meeting. They reviewed the hot-work permits and risk assessments, assigned fire-watch duties, and prepared firefighting equipment. Oxy-acetylene cutting and gouging began at 10:15 on the number two hold’s tween deck. Fire blankets covered gaps between its pontoons, but cargo in the lower hold was covered only by polyester transport cloth (ATSB, pp. 1–2).
At about 11:00, the boilermaker stopped to move to another bracket and saw smoke and small flames through a gap in the tween deck. He raised the alarm. The lower-hold fire watch was not directly beneath the work area; after moving there, he quickly extinguished the fire with a hose and water spray. The subsequent inspection found molten metal and other hot material had burned through the blankets and fallen onto the transport cloth. The cloth was 100 per cent polyester, rated to 200 °C. It was damaged, and some cargo surfaces had blemishes; no other damage was reported (ATSB, pp. 2–3).
The ATSB found that hot-work debris reached flammable cargo covering that had not been adequately identified and protected. The fire watch had not been directed to closely monitor the area immediately below the work site, delaying the initial response. After the fire, work was suspended while the ship’s crew and contractor reassessed the controls. They amended the cutting procedure to direct sparks away from openings, improved containment, filled additional tween-deck openings, and repositioned the lower-hold fire watch. Work resumed at 13:15 and was completed without another incident. The ATSB noted that similar sea-fastening fires had previously occurred on other Briese-managed vessels, despite safety measures introduced after those events (ATSB, pp. 3–5).
Sequence of events
| Date/time | Event |
|---|---|
| 2017-12-10 00:00 local | BBC Xingang berthed at Mayfield number four berth. |
| 2017-12-11 06:00 local | The shore work team boarded the vessel. |
| 2017-12-11 06:30 local | A safety meeting reviewed hot-work procedures and fire-watch duties. |
| 2017-12-11 10:15 local | Oxy-acetylene removal of sea fastenings began. |
| 2017-12-11 11:00 local | The boilermaker discovered smoke and flames; the lower-hold fire watch extinguished the fire. |
| 2017-12-11 13:15 local | Work resumed after safety controls were changed. |
Contributing factors
| Factor | Evidence status | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Flammable cargo covering | Confirmed finding | Polyester transport cloth in the lower hold was not adequately identified and protected before hot work began (ATSB, pp. 3–5). |
| Fire-blanket limitation | Confirmed finding | Molten metal produced by the cutting work burned through the fire blankets and fell through the tween-deck gaps (ATSB, pp. 3–5). |
| Fire-watch positioning | Confirmed finding | The lower-hold fire watch was not directed to monitor immediately below the work site and was not in position to react at once (ATSB, pp. 2, 4–5). |
Investigation
The ATSB’s report 337-MO-2017-011 found that hot-work debris burned through fire blankets and ignited unprotected polyester cargo covering. It identified the covering’s inadequate identification and protection, and the fire watch’s positioning, as safety issues (ATSB, pp. 4–5).