Classification
| Field | Value |
|---|
| Incident type | Grounded |
| Severity | Low |
| Region | Australia |
| Occurrence class | Serious incident |
Vessel Details
| Field | Value |
|---|
| Vessel Name | Maersk Garonne |
| Vessel Type | Container |
| Flag State | Denmark [DK] |
| IMO Number | 9235579 |
| Gross Tonnage | 50,757 |
| LOA (m) | 292.13 |
| Capacity | 4,318 TEU |
| Year built | 2003 |
| Manager | Maersk Line Ship Management, Singapore |
Incident Details
| Field | Value |
|---|
| Date | 2015-02-28 |
| Time | 04:48 local (UTC+8; detailed VDR chronology) |
| Location | Entrance channel, Port of Fremantle, Fremantle, Western Australia |
| Coordinates | -32.0578, 115.7202 |
| Injuries | 0 recorded; the ATSB occurrence summary lists the highest injury level as none |
| Damage | Minor marking of hull paintwork; no structural damage |
Key facts
- The 292.13 m, 50,757 GT container ship was under harbour pilotage for entry to Fremantle Inner Harbour after a voyage from Singapore.
- The pilot delayed entering the entrance channel because the two assigned harbour tugs were not yet in position, then manoeuvred the ship south of the channel to lose time.
- Maersk Garonne grounded in charted shallow water at about 04:48 local time on 28 February 2015 and was refloated at 08:24 with four tugs assisting.
- Divers found no hull breach on 1 March; damage was limited to minor paint scraping, and the ship departed Fremantle on 3 March after completing cargo operations.
- The ATSB final report, released on 17 October 2016, identified bridge resource management, passage planning, contingency planning and towage procedures as safety issues.
Narrative
On 28 February 2015, the 50,757 GT fully cellular container ship Maersk Garonne approached Fremantle from Singapore for entry to the Inner Harbour. A harbour pilot boarded at 04:00 local time. The approach initially followed the pilot's intended passage, but the ship's speed had exceeded both the passage plan and port recommendations. At 04:35, vessel traffic service advised that the ship was clear to enter and that the two assigned tugs were getting underway. At 04:41, the pilot began the turn toward the entrance channel. Concerned that the second tug was late, he decided at 04:42¾ to take the ship south of the channel and re-enter between the entrance marks after losing time. The bridge team did not establish a shared understanding of this revised plan. At 04:47¼, the master reported only 1 m under the keel on the echo sounder. The ship came to rest on sand and mud outside the channel at about 04:48.
After unsuccessful initial refloating attempts, ballast was discharged and additional tugs arrived. Maersk Garonne was refloated at 08:24 and anchored in Gage Roads. Divers found no hull breach on 1 March and recorded only minor paint scraping. The vessel was safely berthed after satisfactory engine trials and departed Fremantle at 11:00 on 3 March. The ATSB found that the bridge team had not effectively monitored or challenged the pilotage, while pilotage guidance, contingency planning and tug-coordination procedures were inadequate.
Sequence of events
| Date/time | Event |
|---|
| 2015-02-28 04:00 local | Harbour pilot boarded Maersk Garonne for the passage into Fremantle Inner Harbour. |
| 2015-02-28 04:35 local | Vessel traffic service confirmed the ship was clear to enter; the assigned tugs were getting underway. |
| 2015-02-28 04:41 local | The pilot ordered the turn toward the entrance channel. |
| 2015-02-28 04:42¾ local | The pilot decided to take the ship south of the channel to delay entry for the late second tug. |
| 2015-02-28 04:47¼ local | The master reported an echo-sounder depth of 1 m under the keel. |
| 2015-02-28 04:48 local | The ship grounded in charted shallow water south of the entrance channel. |
| 2015-02-28 08:24 local | Maersk Garonne was refloated with four tugs and moved to anchor in Gage Roads. |
| 2015-03-01 | Divers inspected the underwater hull; no breaches were found and damage was limited to minor paint scraping. |
| 2015-03-03 11:00 local | The vessel departed Fremantle after completing cargo operations. |
Contributing factors
| Factor | Evidence status | Description |
|---|
| Pilotage delay manoeuvre | Confirmed finding | The pilot delayed entry because the ship was arriving before the two assigned harbour tugs and manoeuvred the vessel outside the channel. |
| Transit speed | Confirmed finding | The ship's speed exceeded both the passage-plan speed and the port's recommended speed, bringing it to the intended turn at least three minutes early. |
| Bridge resource management | Confirmed finding | The bridge team was not actively engaged in the pilotage, did not effectively monitor the passage, and did not challenge the deviation from the planned track in time. |
| Passage and contingency planning | Confirmed finding | The ship's passage plan was inadequate, while Fremantle Pilots' guidance and procedures lacked effective contingency planning and abort points. |
| Tug coordination | Confirmed finding | Procedures for tug stationing and coordinated movement were not clearly defined, and communications about the tugs were ineffective. |
| Position-monitoring resources | Confirmed finding | The pilot's portable pilotage unit was not available because it was not charged, and the ship's fitted ECDIS was not operational; the ATSB found that this reduced available position-monitoring resources. |
Investigation
The Australian Transport Safety Bureau released the final MO-2015-002 marine occurrence investigation report on 17 October 2016. It classified the event as a serious incident and found safety issues involving bridge resource management, passage planning, contingency planning and towage procedures. The report also recorded safety actions by Maersk Line Ship Management, Fremantle Pilots, Fremantle Ports and Svitzer Australia, including revised procedures, training, defined tug on-station times and clarification of vessel traffic service responsibilities.
References
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