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Accidents

Leda Maersk grounding in Otago Lower Harbour

Leda Maersk grounded on the port-side bank of the Otago Lower Harbour channel while entering Port Otago at night; no one was injured and hull damage was limited to paint scraping.

Classification

  • Incident Type: Grounded
  • Severity: Low

Vessel Details

FieldValue
Vessel NameLeda Maersk
Vessel TypeContainer
Flag StateDenmark [DK]
IMO Number9190755
Gross Tonnage50688
LOA (m)265.84
Breadth (m)37.30
Owner/OperatorMaersk Line A/S
Year Built2001
Crew Size24

Incident Details

FieldValue
Date2018-06-10
TimeApproximately 18:29 local
LocationOtago Lower Harbour, Port Otago, New Zealand
RegionOther
Coordinates-45.8200, 170.6200
Fatalities0
Injuries0
Missing
Direct DamageSuperficial scraping and scratches to hull paint
Vessel OutcomeRefloated by tugs with bow-thruster assistance; secure at berth at 19:30

Key facts

  • Leda Maersk entered Otago Harbour in darkness with a harbour pilot aboard and grounded while rounding the final channel bend.
  • The vessel came to rest on the port side of the channel between beacons 22 and 24 at approximately 18:29 local.
  • Tugs Otago and Taiaroa, assisted by the ship’s bow thruster, pulled the vessel clear. It was secure at its berth at 19:30.
  • No one was injured. The following morning’s underwater inspection found superficial hull-paint scrapes and no damage to the propeller or rudder.
  • TAIC found that the pilot and bridge team did not recognize the deviation because they relied mainly on visual cues and did not fully use the electronic navigation aids.

Narrative

Leda Maersk arrived at the Port Otago pilot station at 17:20 on 10 June 2018. The harbour pilot boarded at 17:35, and the ship entered Otago Harbour at 17:54 in darkness with good visibility. The pilot’s portable pilot unit (PPU) showed an 18 m positional offset. Unable to remove the offset, the pilot stopped using the PPU to monitor the ship’s position and did not tell the bridge team, although the PPU continued to be used intermittently for rate-of-turn information.

After Acheron Point, the channel curved to port. The ship was making about six knots and began moving left of the planned centreline. The pilot ordered successive port helm angles of 20 to 35 degrees. The ECDIS, radar, and PPU showed the deviation, and the ECDIS off-track alert activated when the ship was about 55 m left of the planned track. A bridge-team member acknowledged the alert, but the information was not passed to the master or pilot. At approximately 18:28 the ship slowed to 2.5 knots and heeled to starboard. It came to rest on the port-side bank at about 18:29.

The pilot stopped the engine and directed tugs Otago and Taiaroa to pull the vessel back toward the channel centre. With assistance from the bow thruster, the tugs refloated Leda Maersk, which proceeded to its berth and was secure at 19:30. An underwater inspection the following morning found superficial scraping and scratches to the hull paint, with no damage to the propeller or rudder. The vessel departed later that day.

Sequence of events

Date/timeEvent
2018-06-10 17:20 localLeda Maersk arrived at the Port Otago pilot station.
2018-06-10 17:35 localThe harbour pilot boarded and joined the bridge team.
2018-06-10 17:54 localThe vessel entered Otago Harbour in darkness.
2018-06-10 18:19 localTug Taiaroa secured at the stern.
2018-06-10 18:24 localTug Otago secured at the starboard bow after the vessel passed Acheron Point.
2018-06-10 18:28 localThe vessel slowed to about 2.5 knots and heeled to starboard while deviating left of the planned track.
2018-06-10 18:29 localLeda Maersk grounded on the port-side bank between beacons 22 and 24.
2018-06-10 19:30 localThe vessel was secure at its berth after being refloated by the tugs and bow thruster.
2018-06-11An underwater inspection found superficial hull-paint scrapes; the propeller and rudder were undamaged.

Contributing factors

FactorEvidence statusDescription
Reliance on visual navigationConfirmed findingTAIC found that the pilot and bridge team primarily used visual cues and did not fully use the electronic navigation aids that showed the vessel moving off track.
PPU offset and loss of position monitoringConfirmed findingThe pilot’s PPU displayed an 18 m offset. The pilot stopped using it for position monitoring and did not tell the bridge team.
Bridge resource management and procedure complianceConfirmed findingTAIC found that bridge resource management fell below good industry practice and that the bridge team did not fully follow company procedures for navigating in pilotage waters.
Pilotage oversight and local hydrodynamic factorsConfirmed findingTAIC found that Port Otago’s pilotage policies, procedures, and compliance monitoring fell short of good industry standards. It also identified the port helm, residual ebb tide, and likely interaction between the hull and the left bank as physical influences.

Investigation

The Transport Accident Investigation Commission’s inquiry MO-2018-203 was published on 24 October 2019. TAIC found that the vessel deviated from the planned track during a left-hand turn under pilotage and that the pilot and bridge team did not recognize the deviation. The report also identified shortcomings in bridge resource management, compliance with the operator’s pilotage procedures, and Port Otago’s pilotage oversight. TAIC issued recommendations to Maersk Line A/S and Port Otago concerning navigation and pilotage safety management.

References

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