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Accidents

Ovit grounding on Varne Bank

On 18 September 2013, the chemical tanker Ovit grounded on the Varne Bank in the Dover Strait while sailing from Rotterdam to Brindisi, then refloated on the rising tide after just under three hours with superficial hull damage.

Classification

  • Incident Type: Grounded
  • Severity: Low
  • Region: English Channel
  • Investigation body: Marine Accident Investigation Branch

Vessel Details

FieldValue
Vessel NameOvit
Vessel TypeTanker
Flag StateMalta [MT]
IMO Number9466611
Gross Tonnage6444
LOA (m)117
Cargo9,500 tonnes of vegetable oil

Incident Details

FieldValue
Date2013-09-18
LocationVarne Bank, Dover Strait
RegionEnglish Channel
Coordinates51.0643, 1.5298
Fatalities0
Injuries0
Missing
Physical damageHull coating loss
PollutionNone reported

Key facts

  • Ovit grounded at 04:34 UTC while following an ECDIS route that passed directly over the Varne Bank.
  • The vessel remained aground for just under three hours, refloated on the rising tide, and later berthed in Dover.
  • The MAIB report records no injuries or fatalities, superficial hull coating loss, and no pollution.
  • The passage plan was prepared by an inexperienced and unsupervised junior officer and was not checked by the master before departure.
  • The report found unsuitable ECDIS safety settings, an inoperative audible alarm, poor situational awareness on the bridge, and a missed CNIS warning opportunity.

Narrative

Ovit was on passage from Rotterdam, Netherlands, to Brindisi, Italy, carrying 9,500 tonnes of vegetable oil. At about 02:30 UTC on 18 September 2013, the chief officer took over as officer of the watch with a deck cadet as lookout. Ovit was operating on an autopilot-controlled heading at 12 to 13 knots. The intended route had been prepared on ECDIS and passed directly over the Varne Bank.

At 04:11, Ovit entered the Varne Bank alerting zone monitored by Dover Coastguard's Channel Navigation Information Service. The alert was acknowledged on the CNIS system, which silenced the warning. At about 04:17, Ovit passed close to the Varne Light Float. The vessel then slowed and grounded at 04:34. An engineering alarm sounded at 04:37, but the officer of the watch initially treated the loss of movement as an engine problem. He recognised that Ovit was aground at about 04:53 after zooming in on the ECDIS display.

The vessel's tanks were checked for leakage and the crew reported no injuries. Ovit refloated on the rising tide after just under three hours and subsequently berthed in Dover. The MAIB found that the route-planning and bridge-monitoring failures were compounded by poor ECDIS configuration and ineffective alarm functions. It also found that the CNIS alerting procedure had not been formalised and that the operator on duty was unqualified, unsupervised, and distracted.

Sequence of events

Date/timeEvent
2013-09-18 02:30 UTCThe chief officer took over the bridge watch while Ovit continued through the Dover Strait.
2013-09-18 04:11 UTCOvit entered the CNIS Varne Bank alerting zone; the warning was acknowledged on the shore system.
2013-09-18 04:17 UTCOvit passed close to the Varne Light Float.
2013-09-18 04:34 UTCOvit grounded on the Varne Bank.
2013-09-18 04:53 UTCThe officer of the watch recognised that the vessel was aground after checking the ECDIS display.
2013-09-18Ovit refloated on the rising tide and later berthed in Dover.

Contributing factors

FactorEvidence statusDescription
Unsafe passage planConfirmed findingThe route prepared on ECDIS passed directly over the Varne Bank and was not checked by the master before departure or by the officer of the watch at the start of the watch.
ECDIS configuration and alarm failureConfirmed findingThe chart scale and operator-defined safety settings were unsuitable for the local conditions, and the audible alarm did not work.
Bridge watchkeeping and situational awarenessConfirmed findingThe vessel was monitored primarily against the intended ECDIS track, navigational marks were not acted upon, and the grounding was recognised 19 minutes after it occurred.
CNIS warning procedure and supervisionConfirmed findingThe warning procedure had not been formalised, and the CNIS operator who handled the alert was unqualified, unsupervised, and distracted.

Investigation

The Marine Accident Investigation Branch published Accident Report 24/2014 in September 2014. MAIB concluded that the grounding resulted from an unsafe ECDIS passage plan and ineffective bridge monitoring, with additional safety issues involving ECDIS settings, training, alarm functionality, and Dover Coastguard's CNIS operation. The report made recommendations to the Maritime and Coastguard Agency, Transport Malta, industry bodies, Ayder Tankers, and the ECDIS manufacturer.

References

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