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Accidents

USS Frank E. Evans (1969)

USS Frank E. Evans and HMAS Melbourne were operating with the Melbourne task group during SEATO Exercise Sea Spirit in the South China Sea on 3 June 1969. Melbourne was the main body and guide. Evans was assigned to the inner screen and was later ordered to form column astern of Melbourne at standard distance before taking rescue-destroyer station. The order required Evans to establish a position about 1,000 yards behind the carrier.

Classification

  • Incident Type: Collision
  • Severity: High
  • Vessels involved: United States Navy destroyer and Royal Australian Navy aircraft carrier

Vessel Details

VesselTypeSource-grounded details
USS Frank E. EvansNaval / MilitaryAllen M. Sumner-class destroyer; breadth 12.45 m; call sign NTKB. The report does not provide gross tonnage or length overall in the reviewed material.
HMAS MelbourneNaval / MilitaryRoyal Australian Navy aircraft carrier and task-group guide; extensive bow damage was reported after the collision.

Incident Details

FieldValue
Date1969-06-03
LocationSouth China Sea
Coordinates8.986667, 110.795000
RegionSouth China Sea
Fatalities74
Injuries6
Missing0
Investigation BodyCombined USN/RAN Board of Investigation
Direct DamageUSS Frank E. Evans lost its hull forward of frame 92 1/2; HMAS Melbourne suffered extensive bow damage

Key facts

  • Evans was ordered to form column 1,000 yards astern of Melbourne before taking rescue-destroyer station.
  • The task group was operating at about 18 knots with Melbourne on course 260° when the formation maneuver developed.
  • Melbourne warned Evans that the destroyer was on a collision course; Evans later ordered right full rudder while Melbourne turned left.
  • The ships collided at approximately 03:15G on 3 June 1969 at 08°59.2′N, 110°47.7′E.
  • The collision divided Evans near frame 92 1/2. The bow section sank in about 1,100 fathoms, while the stern section was later salvaged and towed to Subic Bay.

Narrative

USS Frank E. Evans and HMAS Melbourne were operating with the Melbourne task group during SEATO Exercise Sea Spirit in the South China Sea on 3 June 1969. Melbourne was the main body and guide. Evans was assigned to the inner screen and was later ordered to form column astern of Melbourne at standard distance before taking rescue-destroyer station. The order required Evans to establish a position about 1,000 yards behind the carrier.

During the maneuver, Evans did not correctly establish Melbourne's course and its own relative position before turning. The Board's findings state that Melbourne was steering about 260° at 18 knots. Evans steadied on a course that placed it on or near a collision course with Melbourne. Melbourne's commanding officer recognized the danger and transmitted a warning that Evans was on a collision course. Evans then ordered right full rudder and reported the order. Melbourne ordered a port turn and signalled that it was going hard left. The ships continued under those orders until impact.

At approximately 03:15G, the ships collided at 08°59.2′N, 110°47.7′E. The impact caused Evans to roll deeply to starboard and divide near frame 92 1/2. The bow section settled, became inverted and sank at about 03:24G in approximately 1,100 fathoms of water. The stern section was secured alongside Melbourne, evacuated, cast off and later reboarded for salvage work. USS Everett F. Larson and Evans personnel assisted with salvage, and USS Tawasa later towed the stern section to Subic Bay. Reconstruction of the missing forward section was considered unwarranted.

Rescue operations began immediately. Melbourne's boats, helicopters and crew recovered survivors from the water and from the stern section. By about 04:40, the survivor total had been established as 199 out of 273 people aboard Evans. The Board recorded 74 deaths or personnel lost at sea and six Evans personnel injured for more than 24 hours. No Melbourne personnel were casualties. Melbourne suffered extensive damage to its bow above and below the waterline; the full repair cost was not available to the Board when it submitted its report.

The Board assigned primary responsibility to Evans because it had the duty to remain clear while taking station astern. It identified failures to establish the formation course and relative positions, to keep track of Melbourne's movement and to make a decisive avoiding turn. It also assigned responsibility to Melbourne's task-unit commander for not positively directing Evans once the collision course was recognized and for not backing engines sooner, although the Board considered that action unlikely to have avoided the collision.

Sequence of events

Date/timeEvent
1969-06-03Evans and Melbourne operated in the Melbourne task group during SEATO Exercise Sea Spirit.
1969-06-03 shortly before 03:15GEvans was ordered to form column about 1,000 yards astern of Melbourne before taking rescue-destroyer station.
1969-06-03 shortly before 03:15GMelbourne warned Evans that the destroyer was on a collision course; both ships ordered avoiding maneuvers.
1969-06-03 03:15GEvans and Melbourne collided at 08°59.2′N, 110°47.7′E.
1969-06-03 about 03:24GThe bow section of Evans sank in approximately 1,100 fathoms.
1969-06-03 04:40GThe survivor total was established as 199.
1969-06-03 laterThe Evans stern section was salvaged and later towed to Subic Bay.

Contributing factors

FactorEvidence statusDescription
Evans position and course errorsConfirmed findingThe Board found that Evans did not correctly establish Melbourne's course or Evans' relative position before turning into the formation.
Inadequate tracking of the carrierConfirmed findingThe Evans bridge team failed to keep track of Melbourne's movement visually, by radar or by both methods during the maneuver.
Insufficiently decisive avoiding actionConfirmed findingThe Board found that Evans' later left turn was not decisive enough to eliminate the collision hazard.
Melbourne task-unit directionConfirmed findingThe Board assigned responsibility to Melbourne's task-unit commander for not positively directing Evans after recognizing the collision course.

Investigation

The Combined USN/RAN Board of Investigation examined the collision and adopted findings on responsibility, casualties, rescue operations and ship damage. It placed primary responsibility on Evans for failing to remain clear while taking station astern of Melbourne, while assigning a share of responsibility to Melbourne's task-unit commander for insufficient positive direction once the danger was apparent. The scanned report's OCR is degraded in portions of the casualty-name lists, so this page retains only the report-level totals and findings.

References

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