Classification
- Incident type: Collision
- Severity: High
- Primary authority: National Transportation Safety Board
- Tug involvement: no
- Tug mechanism: N/A
Vessel Details
| Field | CG 33118 | Sea Ray CF 2607 PZ |
|---|---|---|
| Vessel status | U.S. Coast Guard vessel | Unnamed recreational vessel identified by California registration |
| Vessel type | Naval / Military | Other |
| Length | 33 ft / 10.1 m | 24 ft / 7.3 m |
| Builder/model | SAFE Boats International SPC-LE, Defender Class configuration | Sea Ray Sundeck Sports Boat model 240SD |
| Propulsion | Three 300 hp Mercury Verado gasoline outboards | 300 hp Mercruiser 350 Mag MPI inboard/outboard |
| Persons on board | 5 | 13 |
| Damage | Minor damage; cost undetermined | Destroyed; value estimated at USD 30,000 |
Incident Details
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Date and time | 2009-12-20, about 1744 Pacific standard time |
| Location | San Diego Bay, California, near the west end of Harbor Island |
| Approximate position | 32 deg 43'18.8" N, 117 deg 12'38.2" W |
| Event context | Parade of Lights holiday boat parade |
| Fatalities | 1 |
| Injuries | 10, consisting of four serious and six minor injuries |
| Missing | 0 |
| Outcome | CG 33118 struck and overran the Sea Ray during the San Diego Parade of Lights; one Sea Ray passenger died, ten people were injured, and the Sea Ray was destroyed. |
| Direct Damage | |
| Estimated Economic Damage | USD 30,000 estimated value of destroyed Sea Ray; CG 33118 damage cost undetermined |
| Drug/alcohol testing | Negative for CG 33118 crewmembers and the Sea Ray operator |
Key facts
- CG 33118 departed Station San Diego at 17:23 with five crewmembers and later proceeded west toward a reported grounded Catalina sailboat that was not in distress.
- The Sea Ray had 13 people aboard and was proceeding west at about 2-4 knots near the main shipping channel during the Parade of Lights.
- CG 33118 struck and overran the Sea Ray's stern at about 17:44 near the west end of Harbor Island.
- One 8-year-old Sea Ray passenger died and ten other passengers were injured; no CG 33118 crewmembers were injured.
- The Sea Ray was destroyed and valued at approximately USD 30,000. CG 33118 sustained minor damage, but its repair cost was not determined.
- NTSB found that CG 33118 was traveling at least 19 knots and that speed above about 8 knots was unsafe for the darkness, background lighting, and vessel density.
The Sea Ray had left Harbor West Marina at about 1715 with three families aboard. After watching fireworks, the Sea Ray proceeded west at idle speed, about 2-4 knots, to position near the marina for viewing the boat parade. The Sea Ray operator and a passenger told investigators that its navigation lights were illuminated, and postaccident filament evidence supported that the all-around white light was illuminated at impact.
Narrative
CG 33118 initially searched south of Harbor Island for the grounded sailboat, then turned west toward the correct location at Harbor Island's West Basin. The Sea Ray was also proceeding west near the main shipping channel. The Sea Ray operator heard a high-speed engine behind him, saw the approaching vessel nearly dead astern, advanced the throttle, and began a starboard turn. CG 33118 then struck and overran the Sea Ray's stern at an estimated strike angle of about 11 degrees to starboard.
Witnesses described CG 33118 as traveling at planing speed and faster than other vessels in the area. The NTSB concluded CG 33118 was traveling at least 19 knots at the time of collision and that any speed above about 8 knots was unsafe under the prevailing conditions. The NTSB could not determine the precise collision speed and track because exact operating data were unavailable. Video and audio analysis showed CG 33118 had reached about 42 knots on the previous eastbound leg, and witnesses described the westbound accident-leg speed as similar.
The NTSB found that the Sea Ray operator was operating safely for the conditions and that CG 33118's high speed and astern approach left the Sea Ray operator insufficient time to avoid being struck. The NTSB also identified issues involving Coast Guard oversight of small boat operations, SPC-LE forward visibility, AIS policy enforcement, operational data monitoring, and personal cell phone use by CG 33118 crewmembers while under way.
Sequence of events
| Date/time | Event |
|---|---|
| 2009-12-20 17:15 local | The Sea Ray left Harbor West Marina with 13 people aboard. |
| 2009-12-20 17:23 local | CG 33118 departed Station San Diego with five crewmembers. |
| 2009-12-20 about 17:38 local | The Coast Guard broadcast a marine assistance report about a grounded Catalina sailboat. |
| 2009-12-20 about 17:44 local | CG 33118 struck and overran the Sea Ray's stern near the west end of Harbor Island. |
| 2009-12-20 after the collision | Sea Ray passengers were evacuated; the fatally injured passenger later died in hospital. |
Contributing factors
| Factor | Evidence status | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Excessive speed for conditions | Confirmed finding | NTSB found that CG 33118's speed was unsafe for darkness, background lighting, and heavy vessel traffic. |
| Failure to see and avoid the Sea Ray | Confirmed finding | The CG 33118 crew did not detect the Sea Ray in time to avoid the collision. |
| Limited forward visibility and traffic density | Confirmed finding | The operating environment and vessel design reduced the available time to detect and respond to the Sea Ray. |
| Inadequate Coast Guard oversight | Confirmed finding | NTSB identified ineffective oversight of small-boat operations at the national and station levels. |
Investigation
The National Transportation Safety Board investigated the accident in Report NTSB/MAR-11/03. It determined that the probable cause was the CG 33118 crew's failure to see and avoid the Sea Ray because of excessive speed for the conditions, combined with the Coast Guard's lack of effective oversight of small-boat operations. The report confirms the Sea Ray's estimated value but does not determine CG 33118's damage cost or provide an IMO number or gross tonnage.
References
- NTSB source note
- NTSB Report NTSB/MAR-11/03